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Abstract  
 
A majority of states have signed treaties promising not to torture; torture, however, 
remains widespread.  Something further is needed to turn de jure commitment to de 
facto compliance by the state.  This research focuses on the contribution of civil 
society to this process, employing a mixed methods approach to examine the 
conditions under which civil society can influence the state, and the mechanisms 
through which civil society activism results in state change.  
 
Quantitative evidence demonstrates that where scope conditions are met, states with 
higher openness to civil society activism perform better in relation to torture than 
states with lower openness to civil society activism.  Using case studies from 
Bulgaria, Albania, Romania and Macedonia, it is argued that while the prospect of EU 
accession provides an opportunity for states to reform their practices on torture, with 
states being particularly vulnerable to influence during this period, such reform will 
only be effective where civil society is in a position to exploit this vulnerability to 
influence.   It is argued that civil society organisations are more likely to be successful 
where they can access decision-makers, state agents on the frontline, and individuals 
deprived of their liberty.  Such access enables civil society actors to carry out “norm 
patrol”, which acts as a pathway by which the state can begin the process of 
internalising the norm, in line with agentic constructivism theory. 
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Introduction 
 
Most states in the world have undertaken not to torture.
1
  Despite this formal 
commitment, there are “persistent gaps between rhetorical success and empirical 
reality.”2  In its 2016 report, Amnesty International estimated that at least 122 states 
continued to torture or otherwise ill-treat people.   The act of making an international 
commitment is not in itself the factor that differentiates states that torture from those 
who do not.
3
  What then turns de jure commitment to de facto compliance by the 
state?  This research focuses on the role played in this process by one set of actors: 
civil society, and in particular, that subset of civil society that takes the form of non-
governmental organisations (NGOs).  The purpose is to explore the ways in which 
civil society activism contributes to improved state performance on torture and ill-
treatment. 
 
1. Ending torture: the international normative framework  
 
The prohibition on torture did not begin with the international human rights 
movement of the mid-twentieth century.  Before it was codified in international 
conventions, it was understood to be jus cogens or a peremptory norm. In England, 
parliament rejected the legal use of torture in 1640, with the abolition of the Court of 
                                                 
1 The prohibition on torture is enshrined in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR), to which 170 states are party as of April 2018, and elaborated in UNCAT, to which 163 
states are party as of the same date.  Lists of states party to UN treaties are available from 
https://treaties.un.org  The prohibition on torture is also replicated in European, Inter-American and 
African regional human rights treaties.  
2
 Emilie M. Hafner-Burton and James Ron, ‘Seeing Double: Human Rights Impact through Qualitative 
and Quantitative Eyes’ (2009) World Politics 61(2) 360-401, 362. 
3
 Oona Hathaway, ‘Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?’ (2002) Yale Law Journal 111, 
1935-2042. 
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Star Chamber, where torture evidence was accepted, and the refusal to issue any 
further torture warrants.
4
   It has been suggested that it was easier for a common law 
system to do so than for the continental civil law systems derived from Roman law, 
which relied more heavily on confession evidence, a risk factor for torture.
5
  Lord 
Bingham identifies the underlying motivation of Parliament as a matter of moral 
conscience, mixed with a pragmatic concern regarding its utility:  
 
the common law was moved by the cruelty of the practice as applied to those not 
convicted of crime, by the inherent unreliability of confessions or evidence so 
procured and by the belief that it degraded all those who lent themselves to the 
practice.6 
 
More widely, the spread of Enlightenment values in the eighteenth century led to a 
decline in the painful judicial punishments applied in previous eras.
7
  By 1911, the 
Encyclopaedia Britannica was confidently asserting that torture was of historical 
relevance only, at least as far as Britain was concerned.  The subsequent course of the 
twentieth century made it clear that torture was very much a contemporary 
phenomenon.  The right not to be tortured featured high on the list of rights set out in 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights 1948.  It appears in the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) Article 7.  The definition and the 
associated state obligations are expanded on in some detail in the UN Convention 
against Torture and other forms of Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading treatment 
(UNCAT).  The Inter-American, European and African regional human rights treaties 
all have an equivalent. The right not to be tortured is absolute and non-derogable.   
                                                 
4 This history is set out by Lord Bingham of Cornhill in A and others v the Secretary of State for the 
Home Department [2005] UKHL 71, para 12. 
5 Ibid, para 11. 
6 Ibid. 
7
 See for example the 1764 publication of “Del delitti e delle pene” by Cesare Beccaria; its influence is 
discussed in JD Bessler, ‘Revisiting Beccaria’s Vision: The Enlightenment, America’s Death Penalty, 
and the Abolition Movement’ (2009) Northwestern Journal of Law and Social Policy 4(2), 195-328. 
 3 
 
These treaties do not simply codify the prohibition on torture; they also introduce 
important provisions related to enforcement, including complaint mechanisms for 
individuals who have had their rights violated: complainants can bring their case to 
the UN Human Rights Committee under the ICCPR
8
 and the UN Committee against 
Torture under UNCAT.
9
  Where the state is party to the European Convention on 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the individual has the potential to bring a 
case to the European Court on Human Rights; there are equivalents in the other 
regional systems.  A further compliance mechanism is the creation of national 
institutions: the Optional Protocol to UNCAT (OPCAT) part IV obliges states to 
“maintain, designate or establish” a National Preventive Mechanism, an independent 
body with the mandate to prevent torture at the domestic level.  The creation of 
national-level bodies acknowledges the importance of local contextual understanding 
in analysing the causes of torture, the ways in which it manifests itself within a given 
state, and the local social and political frameworks within which it must be tackled. 
 
Beyond the Conventions, the human rights systems provide further opportunities to 
examine and comment on states’ performance on torture, including through on-site 
visits by the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, and the Universal Periodic Review 
mechanism of the UN Human Rights Council.  This corpus of law and practice and 
this set of institutions together establish the norms that states must observe and the 
forums in which they can be called to account for failing to do so.   It is further 
supplemented by soft law instruments.
10
 
 
                                                 
8 Provided the state in question has also ratified the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR. 
9 Provided the state in question has made the necessary declaration under Art 22 of UNCAT. 
10 Including Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (1977), updated in 2015 as the 
Mandela Rules; Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials (1979); Body of Principles for the 
Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment (1988). 
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As can be seen from this brief account, the prohibition on torture has deep historical 
roots, predating modern human rights architecture, but now integrated within it.  This 
investigation begins from the standpoint that the norm prohibiting torture is well-
established.  The question examined here is fundamentally empirical rather than 
normative: what turns state commitment into state compliance?   What makes the 
“ought” the “is”? 
 
2. From the normative to the empirical: an enquiry into the role of 
civil society in bringing about state compliance 
 
In international law, the focus traditionally has been on states as the major actors: they 
are the signers of treaties, the locus of the obligation to respect, protect and fulfil 
human rights.  Human rights treaties constrain a state’s freedom: a state must have 
compelling reasons to accept such constraints.  For rationalists, state choices are 
framed in terms of global military-economic power structures: states are pursuing 
economic and reputational advantages by accepting international human rights norms.  
Without discounting the importance of such motivations, this research project is 
sympathetic to the claims of constructivists, with their emphasis on the importance of 
ideation, and the process by which states over time come to internalise norms: where 
things are done because they have become “the done thing”.  In this study, rationalist 
and constructivist theories are viewed as complementary rather than competing: states 
are motivated by a complex mixture of reasons, and both sets of theories contribute to 
disentangling the underlying incentives. This approach is in line with Goodman and 
 5 
 
Jinks’ plea for “theoretical eclecticism” when searching for explanations for changes 
in human rights changes at global level.
11
 
 
This research examines the role of civil society, particularly in the form of non-
government organisations (NGOs), in the process of state reform on torture. NGOs 
here are understood as organised collectives of private individuals, outside state 
governance structures but with an avowed intention of influencing them, through non-
violent means, in pursuit of ideals (in the shape of human rights norms) rather than 
profit.  Both rationalist and constructive approaches can allow for a role for NGOs.  
On the basis of the rationalist understanding that states are motivated by reputational 
advantage, NGOs can exert influence by threatening to expose state abuses and thus 
damaging the state’s reputation.  From the perspective of “agentic constructivism”, as 
espoused by Sikkink, NGOs are seen as agents of socialisation of states, spreading 
“new understandings of the ways in which states ought to behave, and new 
understandings of the national interests of states”.12  This theory forms the bedrock of 
the current research. 
 
Prior to embarking on this research, the author worked in a number of different NGOs 
between 1996 and 2005. These years spanned what was arguably the high-water mark 
of the “romance” between civil society, international organisations such as the UN, 
and sympathetic states, with heady triumphs such as the anti-landmine treaty and the 
                                                 
11
 Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks, ‘Incomplete Internalization and Compliance with Human Rights 
Law: A Rejoinder to Roda Mushkat’ (2009) European Journal of International Law 20(2), 443-446, 
444. 
12
 Kathryn Sikkink, The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions are Changing World 
Politics (WW Norton 2011) 237. 
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creation of the International Criminal Court.
13
  In the immediate aftermath of the 
landmine ban and the ICC’s creation, activist Kenneth Anderson reported that every 
international meeting he attended featured “a sort of adulatorio to NGOs, a hymn of 
thanksgiving for ‘international civil society’”.14   This heady moment did not last 
long: in 2001 came the events of 9/11 and a marked change in the leading global 
narrative, with anxieties over security coming to dominate the agenda.  More recently, 
much of the narrative on civil society focuses on the phenomenon of shrinking civil 
space, a widespread international trend with “many deep-seated structural drivers, in 
part linked to the world’s authoritarian turn, in part the reflection of an emboldened 
anti-liberal social agenda.”15  An EU policy paper from April 2017 noted that “the 
global clampdown on civil society has deepened and accelerated in very recent 
times”.  It observed that this clampdown has “assumed an unprecedented depth and 
seriousness, and…is likely to continue for the foreseeable future”.16  If civil society 
plays a key role in bringing about human rights improvements, the need to understand 
how and when it fulfils this function takes on a new urgency, given its embattled state 
in many countries. This research looks at the conditions under which civil society can 
influence the state, and the mechanisms through which civil society action results in 
state change. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13
 Kenneth Anderson, ‘The Ottawa Convention Banning Landmines, the Role of International Non-
governmental Organizations and the Idea of International Civil Society’ (2000) European Journal of 
International Law 11, 91-120, 92 and 104. 
14 Ibid 112. 
15
 European Parliament Policy Department, Shrinking Space for civil society: the EU response, April 
2017, EP/EXPO/B/COMMITTEE/FWC/2013-08/Lot8/12, at 5. 
16 Ibid at 10. 
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3. Research methods and structure 
 
The research project is driven by an inherently pragmatic worldview: a quest to find 
what works in reducing state abuse.  This philosophy lies behind the choice of a 
mixed methods approach, with both quantitative and qualitative elements.
17
  Hafner-
Burton and Ron have argued that there is a tension between quantitative and 
qualitative methods in this area, with researchers who rely on qualitative methods 
tending to reach more optimistic conclusions than scholars who use quantitative 
methods.
18
  Qualitative researchers may be drawn to case studies where states have 
achieved anomalous success in the reform process over and above states 
demonstrating more indeterminate outcomes, leading to findings of limited 
generalisability.  Quantitative researchers may find that quantifying torture levels is so 
challenging that changes in torture levels are obscured, so that a change in state 
performance on torture is difficult to identify; the search for drivers of such change 
then becomes redundant.  The challenges specific to each method are considered in 
further detail in later chapters: the difficulties inherent in measuring torture and civil 
society activism for the purposes of quantitative research are considered in chapter 
two, while the methodological issues pertaining to qualitative case study research are 
examined in chapter four.  The decision was made to integrate these explorations into 
the body of the research rather than set them out as a discrete methodology chapter, so 
that the rationale for making the relevant research choices is interleaved with an 
account of the research itself.  Both quantitative and qualitative approaches have 
                                                 
17
 The association between pragmatism and a mixed method approach is explored in Abbas Tashakorri 
and Charles Teddlie, Mixed Methodology: Combining Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches (Sage 
Publications 1998). 
18 Emilie M. Hafner-Burton and James Ron, ‘Seeing Double: Human Rights Impact through 
Qualitative and Quantitative Eyes’ (2009) World Politics 61(2), 360-401, 362. 
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distinct strengths and weaknesses; by employing both, it becomes possible to 
triangulate the findings, increasing their robustness. 
 
Similarly, the chapters are ordered in a manner that intertwines theoretical material 
with empirical evidence, so that each can inform the other.  Analysing the available 
data is an inherently iterative process, as the researcher cycles between theory, 
quantitative findings and empirical observations from fieldwork, each part 
challenging and yielding insights for the other parts.  The sequencing of chapters 
reflects this iterative process, with the first chapter taking a theoretical approach, 
chapter two focusing on quantitative investigation, chapters three and four returning 
to theory, before chapters five onwards set out empirical observations from the 
fieldwork.   
 
Chapter one opens by considering the question of why states torture, and why and 
when they reform their practices on torture.  Having posited in this chapter that civil 
society activism would be expected to contribute to a reduction in torture, at least 
when certain scope conditions are met (hypothesis one), chapter two explores the 
empirical evidence for the proposition, examining whether states that experience 
higher levels of civil society advocacy also demonstrate a better performance on 
torture compared to states with lower advocacy.  As data on civil society advocacy 
levels are relatively limited, the chapter also considers whether a state’s openness to 
activism influences its performance on torture.  Statistical tests are applied to examine 
whether there is an association between the dependent variable (state performance on 
torture) and independent variables (levels of advocacy; state openness to activism), 
controlling for factors such as conflict, population size and levels of democracy.  
 9 
 
These tests scrutinise whether it is possible to falsify the hypothesis that a relationship 
exists between the dependent and independent variables.   
 
Chapter two will suggest that there is at least an association between civil society 
activism and state practice on torture. A causal link cannot definitively be established 
based on the quantitative evidence alone, and the case studies in later chapters will 
return to this question of causation.  Before embarking on the detailed qualitative 
analysis, it is useful to consider how civil society activism might be expected to 
influence state practice on torture.  This is the subject of chapter three.  While much 
of the existing literature focuses on a particular subset of activism (naming and 
shaming,
19
 strategic litigation,
20
 torture prevention work
21
) or treats activism as a 
single undifferentiated activity, this research attempts to unpick the distinct 
contribution of the various strands of activism. Chapter three introduces a typology of 
organisations and the activities they undertake.  These theories are then tested against 
four case studies, introduced in chapter four, with chapters five to eight each detailing 
a case study.  All four case studies are set in post-socialist states in south-eastern 
Europe:  Bulgaria, Albania, Romania and Macedonia.
22
  Based on the scope 
conditions for torture reform set out in chapter one, these four states are identified as 
                                                 
19
 See for example Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, ‘Sticks and Stones: Naming and Shaming the Human 
Rights Enforcement Problem’ (2008) International Organization 62(4), 689-716; James Meernik, Rosa 
Aloisi, Marsha Sowell and Angela Nichols, ‘The Impact of Human Rights Organizations on Naming 
and Shaming Campaigns’ (2012)  Journal of Conflict Resolution 56(2), 233-256; Cullen S Hendrix and  
Wendy H Wong, ‘When is the Pen Truly Mighty?  Regime Type and the Efficacy of Naming and 
Shaming in Curbing Human Rights Abuses’ (2013), British Journal of Political Science 43(03), 651-
672. 
20
 Kathryn Sikkink, The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions are Changing World 
Politics (WW Norton 2011); Dia Anagnostou (ed),  Rights and Courts in Pursuit of Social Change: 
Legal Mobilisation in the Multi-level European System (Hart Publishing 2014). 
21
 Richard Carver and Lisa Handley, Does Torture Prevention Work? (Liverpool University Press 
2016). 
22 “Macedonia” here indicates the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, sometimes referred to as 
FYROM.  The name Macedonia is used for convenience and is not intended to signify any position on 
the politically-sensitive issue of the state’s name. 
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experiencing the opportunity to reform their practices on torture.  The findings from 
chapter two inform case selection to ensure comparability.  From 2000 onwards, the 
four states demonstrate contrasting trends in relation to civil society advocacy:  
Bulgaria consistently receives the best score, while Albania improves over the period 
and by 2016 has the second highest score.  Romania and Macedonia do less well over 
the period, and by 2016 have lower scores for civil society advocacy than the first 
two.  The case study chapters examine whether these trends are reflected in the state’s 
performance on torture over the period.  Do the states with highest advocacy scores 
also demonstrate the best performance and/or the greatest degree of relative 
improvement in relation to torture?  The structure of each case study chapter draws on 
the theoretical framework set out in chapter three, so that the influence actually 
brought to bear by civil society in each case is examined against theories of influence.   
Chapter one introduced the concept of scope conditions for successful activism: the 
case studies identify a new scope condition which has not, it is contended, been given 
sufficient attention previously: the importance of access by civil society, not just to 
decision-makers, which has been described elsewhere,
23
 but also to state agents on the 
frontline (those working in places where people are deprived of their liberty) and to 
those individuals who are deprived of their liberty: even more than decision-makers, 
these are the people who know whether fine words in the capital make any difference 
in real life.  It is contended that this access is in itself an important scope condition for 
successful advocacy in the area of torture and ill-treatment (hypothesis two).   
 
 
 
                                                 
23 Jutta Joachim, ‘Framing Issues and Seizing Opportunities: the UN, NGOs, and Women’s Rights’ 
(2003)  International Studies Quarterly 47(2), 247-274; Jutta Joachim, Agenda Setting, the UN, and 
NGOs: Gender Violence and Reproductive Rights (Georgetown University Press 2007). 
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4. Scope of research  
 
While torture is often popularly understood as a crime committed against political 
prisoners, in the tradition of Amnesty International’s original focus on prisoners of 
conscience, there is no such limitation within the relevant Conventions.  All persons 
deprived of their liberty come within the compass of the right, including for example, 
those held in asylum/immigration centres and living in residential institutions for the 
mentally disabled.   Even where there is no deprivation of liberty, the state may have 
responsibilities to intervene in order to protect individuals at risk of abuse.
24
  Given 
resource limitations, however, the case studies focus on abuses in the context of the 
criminal justice system, particularly in relation to those detained in police stations and 
prisons, exclusive of immigration/asylum centres.  The focus is on behavioural 
change by police and prison officers: whether there has been a reduction in the use of 
purposive ill-treatment, for example to extract confessions, and also of casual 
brutality.  Less attention is paid to conditions of detention, in the sense of the physical 
infrastructure, on the assumption that different mechanisms may be expected to bring 
about change.  A change in detention conditions will often require investment in 
infrastructure and may involve increased use of alternatives to detention in order to 
reduce over-crowding, while a change in behaviour of police and prison officers 
would be expected to require different inputs, such as training and the prosecution of 
individuals perpetrating abuse.  While not the focus of this research, it is of course 
acknowledged that conditions of detention may be so poor that they amount to ill-
                                                 
24 See for example cases on domestic violence: Z v UK ECtHR App. No. 29392/95; E v UK ECtHR 
App. No. 33218/96; ES v Slovakia, ECtHR App. No. 8227/04.  Such cases are not confined to the 
European system: see the Inter-American Court case of Maria da Penha v Brazil, Case 12.051, Report 
no. 54/01, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.111 Doc. 20 rev (2000) and the CEDAW case of AT v Hungary, CEDAW 
2/2003. 
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treatment in and of themselves.  Issues related to inter-prisoner abuse are also beyond 
the scope of this research. 
 
Conant notes that “citizens routinely encounter police, and police are the most 
common perpetrators of peacetime rights violations”.25  Policing involves paradox: 
police protect basic human rights and freedoms – for example, safeguarding an 
individual’s physical integrity by deterring potential assailants – but at the same time, 
the role involves an intrusion into the same rights, such as the use of legitimate force 
in effecting an arrest and deprivation of liberty.  Striking a balance is a challenge for 
states, particularly those in political transition, who find themselves grappling with 
new expectations regarding accountability to the public and the requirement to 
comply with human rights norms. 
 
5. Terminology 
 
Throughout this dissertation, “torture” is generally used as short-hand for torture and 
cruel, inhuman, degrading treatment or punishment (CIDT).  The two categories are 
defined separately in UNCAT, and this distinction can be important in some contexts 
(for example, the principle of non-refoulement is framed in terms of torture rather 
than CIDT).  However, the distinction is often difficult to draw in real life – the same 
act of abuse could amount to either torture or CIDT depending on the characteristics 
of the victim – so they are subsumed into the same category of rights violations for 
the purposes of this research.   
 
                                                 
25
 Lisa Conant, ‘Compelling criteria?  Human rights in the European Union’ in R. Daniel Kelemen, 
Anand Menon and Jonathan Slapin (eds), The European Union: Integration and Enlargement 
(Routledge 2015), 75. 
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Civil society has been defined as an “associational realm….populated by 
organizations which are separate from the state, enjoy autonomy in relation to the 
state and are formed voluntarily by members of the society to protect or extend their 
interests or values”.26  Keane describes civil society as: 
 
 a term that both describes and anticipates a complex and dynamic ensemble  
of legally protected non-governmental institutions that tend to be non-violent,  
self-organising, self-reﬂexive, and permanently in tension, both with each  
other and with the governmental institutions that ‘frame’, constrict and enable  
their activities.27 
 
While civil society and NGOs/CSOs are often used synonymously, civil society 
extends beyond NGOs, and can variously encompass religious groups, student 
movements, trade unions, women’s organisations, formal or informal coalitions of  
peasants, the landless and others.  Donor organisations can play an important role 
through their allocation of resources and sometimes through direct advocacy.  NGOs 
are a particular focus for this research, not least because they are the easiest to 
observe: their regular reporting, along with the self-reflexivity noted by Keane, 
generally means that these organisations leave a paper trail of their goals and the 
activities undertaken to achieve those goals.  I have usually preferred the term NGO, 
although the term CSO appears in Chapter two as I draw on the USAID CSO 
Sustainability Index and otherwise retain the term throughout the chapter for the sake 
of consistency.   
 
The term activism is used here to mean the process of engaging in any of a number of 
(non-violent) influencing activities with the aim of bringing about an improvement in 
                                                 
26 Gordon White, ‘Civil Society, Democratization and Development: Clearing the Analytical Ground’ 
(1994) Democratization 1(3), 375-390. 
27 John Keane, ‘Civil Society, Definitions and Approaches’ in Helmut K. Anheier, Stefan Toepler, and 
Regina List, (eds.), International Encyclopedia of Civil Society (Springer 2009). 
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human rights law and practice.   The USAID CSO Sustainability Index provides 
country scores for what it terms “advocacy”.  This score is based on CSOs’ record in 
relation to influencing public policy, taking into account the opportunities for forming 
coalitions and networks, their ability to communicate with the public and to articulate 
their message to government officials, and whether they can monitor state 
performance.
28
  In other words, the score takes into account the context in which 
organisations operate and the impact of their activities.  In the following chapters, I 
have used the term “advocacy” to indicate when I am drawing on the CSO 
Sustainability Index data, but I have used the term “activism” when focusing 
specifically on the activities of the organisations. 
 
6. Contribution of this research 
 
The claim that civil society norm entrepreneurs play an important role in influencing 
state is not a novel one.
29
 Our knowledge is far from complete, however, regarding 
the pathways along which this influence operates, and the conditions under which it is 
successful.  This research examines how civil society organisations negotiate the 
interplay between extrinsic and intrinsic state motivations for reform in the particular 
context of EU enlargement in south-eastern Europe.  The prospect of EU accession is 
attractive to these states, as it brings economic and political advantages, so any human 
rights reform undertaken with this end in mind is a rational choice.  EU accession 
represents an opportunity to reach states when they are socially and materially 
                                                 
28 See USAID, ‘CSO Sustainability Index Methodology’, 19 February 2016, 
https://www.usaid.gov/what-we-do/democracy-human-rights-and-governance/cso-sustainability-index-
methodology (accessed 4 February 2018). 
29 See in particular Thomas Risse, Stephen C Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink (eds), The Power of Human 
Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change (Cambridge University Press 1999); Thomas Risse, 
Stephen C Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink (eds), The Persistent Power of Human Rights: From 
Commitment to Compliance (Cambridge University Press 2013); Beth Simmons  Mobilizing for 
Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics (Cambridge University Press 2009). 
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vulnerable, and when resources are available for capacity-building.
30
  Given the 
strength of this extrinsic motivation, these states offer valuable insights into whether 
such motivation is sufficient in itself to bring about genuine improvement.  The case 
studies provide opportunities to study whether and how this extrinsic motivation can 
evolve over time into intrinsic motivation, whereby the state has become so 
habituated to the norm that it adheres to that norm it is perceived as the right thing to 
do, not because of external pressure.  The latter perspective is in line with 
constructivist understandings of state motivation: states still make rational choices, 
but these choices are conditioned by a new “logic of appropriateness” steering them 
towards norm compliance.
31
  Central and eastern European states have gone through 
major shifts in their self-identity since the fall of communism regimes at the start of 
the 1990s: the prospect of EU membership is powerfully resonant in that it validates 
states’ desired self-perception as modern, European, rule-compliant members (actual 
or potential) of a powerful regional bloc.  Given these extrinsic and intrinsic 
motivations for reform on torture, are states achieving such reform, and if so, what are 
the mechanisms for making it happen?  If EU membership is the real incentive for 
reform, does civil society matter very much at all in this context?   These states offer a 
powerful test case with global implications: if external incentives can effectively 
replace domestic civil society activism, then would-be reformers might well decide to 
prioritise the former.  If domestic civil society still plays a key role in bringing about 
reform, even where powerful external incentives apply, then those wishing to see 
human rights reform in a given country must support civil society within that state and 
enable it to play its part. 
                                                 
30 The relevance of these points is explored in chapter one. 
31
 See discussion in Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics and 
Political Change’ (1998) International Organization 52(4), 887-917. 
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As noted above, this question takes on renewed urgency in the context of the regional, 
and indeed global, phenomenon of shrinking civil space, discussed further in chapters 
one and four.  If civil society plays an essential role in improving state performance 
on torture, then urgent action is needed to counter the restrictions placed by many 
states on civil society.  If the evidence supports a finding that the contribution of 
NGOs to human rights is, as claimed, a profound one, this offers support for NGO 
legitimacy and value, particularly important given that they find themselves 
beleaguered in many countries.   
 
Constructivists have long argued for the importance of state internalisation of norms, 
but the process by which this internalisation occurs is often described at a relatively 
high level of abstraction.  When making theoretical claims about state acculturation to 
human rights norms, Goodman and Jinks note that their theories need to be refined by 
case studies to identify how the mechanisms for state socialisation actually work.
32
  
This piece of research responds to their challenge.  Drawing on the tradition of Risse, 
Ropp and Sikkink
33
 and Simmons,
34
 this investigation builds on existing views of 
civil society actors as agents of norm creation and norm diffusion to insist on their 
importance as agents of what is here called “norm patrol”.   In the context of torture, 
local civil society actors establish expectations of state compliance through the sheer 
force of reiteration:  regular detention monitoring, year on year, acts not just to detect 
abuses, and not just to deter them, but to reinforce expectations of compliance: they 
                                                 
32 Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks, ‘International Law and State Socialization: Empirical, Conceptual 
and Normative Challenges’ (2005) Duke Law Journal 54, 983-998. 
33 Thomas Risse, Stephen C Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink (eds), The Power of Human Rights: 
International Norms and Domestic Change (Cambridge University Press 1999); Thomas Risse, 
Stephen C Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink (eds), The Persistent Power of Human Rights: From 
Commitment to Compliance (Cambridge University Press 2013). 
34 Beth Simmons  Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics (Cambridge 
University Press 2009). 
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offer a tangible reminder of expected conduct, year in and year out.  It is contended 
that this process of reiteration over long periods of time plays an important role in 
creating a new logic of appropriateness within state actors.  Hypothesis three, 
therefore, is that civil society actors with sufficient access carry out the function of 
norm patrol, which is a pathway to eventual internalisation of the norm by the state. 
 
7. Indicators of Internalisation of Norms 
 
To determine whether internalisation has taken place, it is necessary to identify 
indicators of such internalisation.  Internalisation goes well beyond mere legalisation 
of the norm.  The key indicator of full internalisation would be for the state to adhere 
to the norm with only rare exceptions over a long period of time.  As we shall see, 
none of the four case studies has yet achieved this position: none has been awarded 
more than a middling score with regards to its practice on torture.
35
 At best, we can 
look for only partial internalisation.  What then might this look like? 
 
Finnemore and Sikkink set out a three-stage process for norm compliance, involving 
distinct groups of actors at each stage.
36
 The initial stage of norm emergence involves 
norm entrepreneurs (civil society in a broad sense), motivated by altruism and 
idealism, focusing on persuasion.  The second stage, norm cascade, involves states 
and international organisations, motivated by legitimacy, reputation and esteem, 
focusing on socialisation, institutionalisation and demonstration.  The final stage, that 
of internalisation, involves law, professions, bureaucracy, is motivated by conformity, 
and focuses on habit and institutionalisation. 
                                                 
35 The torture scores are discussed at some length in chapter 2. 
36 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’ 
(1998) International Organization 52(4), 887-917, 898. 
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As will be seen, all four states have reached stage one, in that there are civil society 
actors working on the issue of torture.  All can be described as having reached stage 
two: they are parties to the relevant treaties, subject to the jurisdiction of the European 
Court of Human Rights, receive visits from monitoring bodies such as the European 
Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT), and the UN Subcommittee on 
Prevention of Torture (SPT); not least due to the incentive of EU membership, 
“legitimacy, reputation and esteem” represent motivating factors for compliance.  The 
question is how far they are along the path towards stage three.   Finnemore and 
Sikkink’s description can be used to derive a number of indicators:   
 
(1) The breadth of actors who invoke the norm 
NGOs, as norm entrepreneurs, would be expected to refer to the norm (in this 
case, the prohibition on torture), but an indicator of internalisation is where 
there is also engagement more widely within the state by lawyers, professional 
bodies and by bureaucracy. 
 
(2) The existence and effectiveness of domestic accountability mechanisms 
This indicator embodies an important aspect of institutionalisation.  All four 
states are members of the Council of Europe, meaning they are parties to the 
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), 
and subject to the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR).  To this extent, a powerful complaint mechanism is available in all 
four states where domestic accountability fails.  However, it is a long and 
cumbersome route: a high volume of ECtHR cases relating to the state is 
positive in the sense that local lawyers are engaging with the norm, but 
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negative in that it indicates that the state is failing to address complaints at an 
earlier point.  A norm-compliant state should be taking responsibility to 
investigate and penalise abuses, and provide redress to victims.  
 
(3) The role played by the National Preventive Mechanism (NPM).  This is 
another feature of institutionalisation and habit formation.  The Optional 
Protocol to the UN Convention against Torture (OPCAT) requires states to 
designate an NPM to oversee its progress in implementing its obligations 
under the Convention.  In many states, the role of NPM is added to that of the 
national human rights institution/Ombudsman.  These bodies are established 
by the state with a constitutional and/or legislative mandate to protect and 
promote human rights.  While funded by the state, and usually accountable to 
the legislative, the Paris Principles set out the expectation that they be 
empowered to act with independence and autonomy.
37
  These bodies are 
required to cooperate with state and the civil society sector, but to be 
independent of both.
38
  Despite their formal independence, it may be 
challenging for such institutions to curb the excesses of the government that 
put them in place.  There is a risk of institutional capture, meaning that the 
institution may serve as “’window-dressing’ placebos” at best, and at worse 
reinforce restrictions on civil society.
39
  Institutional capture is by no means a 
                                                 
37 OHCHR, National Human Rights Institutions.  History, Principles, Roles and Responsibilities, 
Professional Training Series no. 4, 2010, 13. 
38
 The issue of NPM independence is discussed in Rachel Murray, ‘National Preventive Mechanisms 
under the Optional Protocol to the Torture Convention: One Size Does Not Fit All’ (2008) Netherlands 
Quarterly of Human Rights 26(4), 485-506 at 497 et seq. See also Rachel Murray, Elina Steinerte, 
Malcolm Evans and Antenor Hallo de Wolf, The Optional Protocol to the UN Convention against 
Torture (Oxford University Press 2011) 122. 
39 Tom Pegram ‘State Restrictions on Civil Society and the Free Flow of Information’, 13 May 2017, 
available online at http://tompegram/2017/05/state-restrictions-civil-society-free-flow-information/ 
(consulted 24 Dec 2017).  His points relate to NHRIs in general rather than NPMs specifically, but the 
same concerns apply. 
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given, however.  Formal design features such as a constitutional foundation 
can enhance their independence, and the appointment of competent and 
credible staff members with sufficient willingness to challenge the authorities.  
Statutory authority is key, in particular the powers they have to launch 
investigations of their own motion, to require evidence via subpoena, and to 
publicly disseminate their reports.
40
  A central aspect of the NPM’s mandate 
involves monitoring visits to places of detention, often with NGO partners and 
representatives from professional bodies, with the aim of inculcating and 
reinforcing good habits by state officials working in those places: the 
importance of this role will be explored in each of the country chapters. 
 
Using these indicators, it will be possible to identify how far each of the states has 
progressed in internalising the norm against torture, and the extent to which this is 
linked to changes in their performance on torture. 
 
8. Summary of hypotheses 
 
 
1. Where scope conditions are met, states with higher levels of civil society 
activism perform better on torture than states with lower levels of civil society 
activism. 
2. Access to decision-makers, state agents on the frontline, and individuals 
deprived of their liberty is an important additional scope condition for 
successful civil society activism in the area of torture and ill-treatment. 
3. Access enables civil society actors carry out “norm patrol”, which is a 
pathway to eventual internalisation of the norm by the state.  
                                                 
40 Ibid. 
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Chapter 1   State Motivations 
 
This survey of the literature begins with the question of why and when states torture, 
which in turn provides insights into why a state may be prepared to renounce the 
practice, and what the barriers are to implementing such a commitment.  
Understanding the drivers for torture is a necessary precursor to any evaluation of 
civil society interventions aimed at ending torture for two reasons.  If the intervention 
is unsuccessful, we must consider whether the failure represents a shortcoming in 
relation to the intervention itself, or whether conditions were such that no intervention 
could have been successful (ie. scope conditions were not met).  Alternatively, if the 
intervention is apparently successful, we need to consider possible alternative 
explanations, such as a change in the drivers for torture.   
 
Section 2 of the chapter introduces the theme of state receptiveness to influence by 
considering the association between states’ democracy levels and their use of torture.  
Democracy implies that political leaders are influenced by the wishes of the electorate 
and are held accountable for improper actions by the state.  Section 3 notes that the 
evidence in the previous sections indicates the existence of certain scope conditions 
which must be fulfilled in order for activism to be effective, and makes the case that 
these are necessary but not sufficient for human rights improvements to take place.  
Something more is needed for change to happen: section 4 goes on to consider civil 
society mobilisation as a candidate for that extra ingredient.  Section 5 returns to the 
theme of how states are influenced, but this time focusing on the processes by which 
states are persuaded to adapt and implement norms, contrasting intrinsic and extrinsic 
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motivations. Section 6 switches attention from states as the targets of persuasion back 
to civil society activists as the agents of persuasion, examining the mechanisms 
through which they operate, followed by a short conclusion in section 7. 
 
1.  States’ Use of Torture  
International human rights law makes states the duty-bearers in relation to human 
rights: states sign international treaties committing themselves to ending torture; they 
submit reports on progress to UN and regional bodies; states rather than individuals 
are held to account in human rights courts.
1
  In defiance of these commitments, many 
states nevertheless continue to torture for a variety of purposes.  The purposive aspect 
is emphasised in the definition of torture in UNCAT article 1, where the violation is 
framed as the intentional infliction of severe pain and suffering: 
for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, 
punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having 
committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on 
discrimination of any kind.   
 
The treatment must have been inflicted “by or at the instigation of or with the consent 
or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity”.   
 
Torture has been used instrumentally by states to maintain control over populations 
(or particular sections of the population, notably ethnic minorities, political groups 
perceived as threatening to the regime, the marginalised), as a policing technique, and 
                                                 
1
 International humanitarian law and international criminal law are outside the scope of this study, but 
it is noted in passing that they create avenues for individuals to be held to account as well as states.  
Some jurisdictions also allow individuals to be held responsible for tortures as a criminal act, or as a 
civil tort: one of the best-known instances of the latter is Filártiga v Peňa-Irala, 630 F 2D 876 (CA, 2 
Cir. 1980). 
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to support the state’s efforts to emerge the victor of a conflict.   In the criminal law 
system, torture has often been seen as a quick way of getting information or a 
confession, particularly where expertise and resources for forensic investigation are 
limited, or where the domestic legal system privileges confessions over other forms of 
evidence.  In one well-known nineteenth century description, the explanation for 
torture is that “It is far pleasanter to sit comfortably in the shade rubbing red pepper 
into a poor devil's eyes than to go about in the sun hunting up evidence”.2    
 
States facing internal or external conflicts are particularly likely to resort to torture.
3
  
In this context, a state’s securitisation strategy typically involves framing a conflict as 
an existential threat justifying the invocation of “panic politics”.4 This move attempts 
to legitimise the use of extraordinary measures by the state, beyond what would 
normally be seen as acceptable, including acts of torture.
5
    Even states which do not 
habitually torture, when faced with a threat, may resort to torture where it is portrayed 
                                                 
2
 This remark was reportedly made by a civil officer discussing the use of torture in India in 1872 by 
certain “native police officers”; it is attributed to Sir James Stephen and quoted in A Lawrence Lowell 
‘The Judicial Use of Torture Part I’ (1897) Harvard Law Review 11(4), 220, 224.  Where legal systems 
include expectations of a confession within a criminal investigation, interrogators have an increased 
incentive to pressure suspects to confess, leading to a higher incidence of torture: Darius M Rejali, 
Torture and Democracy (Princeton University Press 2007).  Wu and Vander Beken note that the 
importance of confessions in the Chinese legal system is a significant factor in the high prevalence of 
torture of criminal suspects.  While confessions extracted under torture are officially deemed 
inadmissible in court in China, this rule is inadequately implemented, and furthermore, evidence is 
admissible even if obtained on the basis of confessions secured through torture (“the fruit of the 
poisoned tree”: Wei Wu and Tom Vander Beken, ‘Police Torture in China and its Causes: A Review of 
the Literature’ (2010) Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology 43(3), 557-579. 
3 Christian Davenport and David A Armstrong II, ‘Democracy and the Violation of Human Rights: A 
Statistical Analysis from 1976 to 1996’ (2004) American Journal of Political Science 48(3), 538–554;  
Courtenay Ryals Conrad and Will H Moore, ‘What Stops the Torture’ (2010) American Journal of 
Political Science 54(2), 459-476. 
4 Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Lynne Rienner 
Publishers 1998), 34. 
5 In the case of torture, this attempted legitimisation is primarily political rather than legal, as 
international law does not permit derogation from the prohibition on torture under any circumstances, 
including a threat to the state. By contrast, derogations from the right to life and liberty may be legally 
permissible where a state of emergency has been declared.  See for example section 15 ECHR. 
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as a “lesser evil” when weighed against the greater good of public protection.6  States 
may attempt to legitimise torture by invoking the “ticking-bomb” scenario, according 
to which a terrorist must be quickly forced to reveal the location of a bomb in order to 
save innocent lives.
7
  In fact, research indicates that rapport-based techniques are 
more effective than torture and other coercive methods in eliciting information from 
suspects,
8
 but the perception of torture as a useful interrogation method lingers on in 
many quarters.  The way that states frame torture is important: much of the work of 
those who oppose torture is necessarily based on framing it in a different way, as an 
illegitimate act, and one where the end does not justify the means. 
 
As well as its use in the criminal system and in conflict, torture is also used as a 
means of maintaining political control: for powerful elites, it is a method of repressing 
challenge and maintaining their grasp on power.  The use of torture for the purposes 
of political repression is central to much human rights campaigning, such as Amnesty 
International’s work on “prisoners of conscience”.  Torture victims in this category 
are often easier for campaigners to portray to domestic and international audiences as 
virtuous victims, ill-treated because they stood up to powerful elites rather than 
because they are suspected criminals or terrorists (although the state will often riposte 
by attempting to blur this distinction). 
 
 
                                                 
6 See in particular Michael Ignatieff, M, The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror 
(Princeton University Press 2005).  
7 See for example the notorious 1999 Torture Ruling in Israel, which provided a mechanism for acts of 
torture to be deemed justified: Public Committee against Torture in Israel v Government of Israel, 
High Court of Justice, 5100/94, 1999. 
8 Laurence J Alison, Emily Alison, Geraldine Noone, Stamatis Elntib and Paul Christiansen, ‘Why 
tough tactics fail and rapport gets results: Observing Rapport-based Interpersonal Techniques (ORBIT) 
to generate useful information from terrorists’ (2013) Psychology, Public Policy and Law 19(4), 411. 
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State attitudes to torture occur on a spectrum: 
State use of torture 
Deliberate/strategic use           Indifferent to its use   Opposed to torture 
 
At one extreme, the state may deliberately use torture as a means of repressing dissent 
and remaining in power; midway on the spectrum, the state may not use torture 
deliberately and strategically, but make little effort to prevent its use by the police and 
the military or other state agents; at the other end of the spectrum, the state may wish 
to eliminate torture, and the question then becomes whether it can be effective in its 
attempts to constrain its agents.  Understanding why torture occurs in a particular 
context is a necessary precursor to understanding how the issue needs to be addressed.  
Solutions are not one size fits all: different contexts will require different strategies, 
and will have different prospects of success.  If the state’s cost-benefit analysis 
indicates that the benefits of torture (such as security of tenure for political elites) 
outweigh the costs (such as international censure), the challenge for those wishing to 
bring about change is to find ways to increase the costs so that they come to outweigh 
the perceived benefit to the state.   
 
Attempts by the state to justify the use of torture have already been described above.  
An alternative state strategy to deflect criticism is denial.  This may take the form of 
denying that the alleged acts occurred; if confronted with evidence that the acts did 
occur, it denies that they amount to torture;
9
 if forced to concede that the acts did take 
place, and did amount to torture, states may deny responsibility, portraying the torture 
as the actions of “a few bad apples” in the army or the police, or the actions of an 
                                                 
9
 A notorious example is the US use of “enhanced interrogation techniques” under Bush and the 
official denial that they amounted to torture.  For an extensive discussion of denial strategies, see 
Stanley Cohen, States of Denial: Knowing about Atrocities and Suffering (Polity Press 2001).  
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armed group beyond the state’s control.10  While some of these denials may be simple 
acts of bad faith by the state, mere attempts to avoid responsibility, it should be 
acknowledged that the issue of its capacity to constrain its agents may indeed be a 
genuine challenge to a state wishing to end the use of torture.  
 
States face the principal-agent problem: the state as principal is handicapped by the 
fact that its agents have their own goals and incomplete information, so that agents do 
not always perfectly implement the wishes of the principal.   Official policy may be to 
renounce torture, but state agents (police, army, detention centre staff and others) may 
fail to change their practices.   Of course, even to speak the state as if it represented a 
single-minded “principal” is problematic in itself: states are made up of institutions 
and institutions are made up of people, each with their own preferences, priorities, and 
ability to make things happen; an executive wishing to bring about change may face a 
veto from powerful institutional players.
11
  The principal-agent problem is itself a 
simplification to the extent that it gives the impression of a “principal” expressing a 
clear demand for its agents to do something: the principal may be speaking to its 
agents with many tongues, making unclear and competing demands.  Formal 
messages (“Do not use torture in criminal investigations”) may be undermined by 
informal messages (“But there are no consequences if you do”).  Hawkins has shown 
                                                 
10 For a discussion on the phenomenon of states effectively sub-contracting human rights abuses to pro-
government militias, see Neil J. Mitchell, Sabine C Carey and Christopher K. Butler, ‘The Impact of 
Pro-Government Militias on Human Rights Violations’ (2014) International Interactions 40(5), 812-
836.  The use of contractors to deliver services is another mechanism by which the state distances itself 
from abuses: see the UK’s use of the private company G4S to run immigration removal centres.  Media 
reports from 1 September 2017 noted that nine staff were suspended by G4S after allegations about 
abuse of detainees.  Thangam Debbonaire, chair of the all-party parliamentary group on refugees said: 
“This contract should be, in my view, suspended and removed.  The Home Office needs to take 
responsibility for this…”  Travis, Alan and Weaver, Matthew, “G4S abuse claims prompt call for 
contract suspension”, The Guardian, 1 September 2017, www.theguardian.co.uk (accessed 31 October 
2017). 
11 Courtenay Ryals Conrad and Will H Moore, ‘What Stops the Torture?’ (2010) American Journal of 
Political Science 54(2), 459-476. 
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how within the Chilean authoritarian regime, a split emerged between “softliners”, 
who wished to establish legitimacy in the eyes of external audiences, and 
“hardliners”, who were less open to influence.12  Competing demands complicate the 
issue of reform. 
 
States may use the challenge of controlling their agents to disguise the fact that they 
are choosing not to control their agents in an attempt to evade accountability.
13
   
Human rights law is not helpless in the face of this strategy by the state: a state’s 
obligation not torture carries not only a negative responsibility (“Do not order your 
agents to torture”) but also positive responsibilities (“Take reasonable steps to ensure 
your agents do not torture”).  States can exert a degree of control over their agents 
through recruitment, training, monitoring, supervision, prompt and fair investigation 
of allegations of torture, and the imposition of proportionate sanctions when torture is 
found to have taken place.  When bodies such as the European Court of Human 
Rights find a state in violation of the prohibition on torture, it is less often because the 
state has directly ordered torture (difficult to prove), and more often because it has 
failed in its positive obligations, such as the duty to investigate allegations of torture.   
 
However, it should be acknowledged that a state’s claim that it “can’t control” its 
agents is not always a smokescreen for “won’t control”.14  In the cases of weak and 
failed states, the government may be unable to physically impose its will throughout 
its territory.  Even in less extreme examples, the central executive is likely to find it 
challenging to introduce universal reform where the state has a large population, 
                                                 
12 Darren Hawkins, International Human Rights and Authoritarian Rule in Chile (University of 
Nebraska Press 2002). 
13
 Neil J. Mitchell and Bronia Naomi Flett, ‘Human Rights Research and Theory’, in Anja Mihr and 
Matthew Gibney (eds), The Sage Handbook of Human Rights (Sage 2014)  14-15.   
14 Ibid. 
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covers a lot of territory, and has devolved local governance.  Economic constraints are 
another barrier: a state with low levels of economic development is more likely to 
experience higher levels of violations of physical integrity.
15
     
 
In summary, states may not be willing to end torture due to its perceived benefits; 
even if they are willing (or can be persuaded to become willing), the state’s limited 
capacity to end torture may be an obstacle.  It is unsurprising therefore that torture, 
once entrenched, usually reoccurs from one year to the next.  Conrad and Moore 
calculate that if torture takes place in a particular state in one year, there is a 93% 
likelihood that it will occur in that state in the following year.
16
   
 
This discussion indicates that there are two main areas that a would-be reformer will 
have to tackle.  One aspect involves practical efforts aimed at ensuring that the state 
has the capacity to change, which is likely to entail a degree of technical support (eg. 
the introduction of forensic investigation techniques, so that the police do not rely on 
obtaining confessions through beatings).  More profoundly, the would-be reformer 
must attempt to influence political will, so that there are enough incentives reaching 
enough state actors to attain a critical mass in favour of reform.  When state actors 
                                                 
15 Poe and Tate originally found a “weak” association: Steven C. Poe and C. Neal Tate, ‘Repression of 
Human Rights to Personal Integrity in the 1980s: A Global Analysis’ (1994) The American Political 
Science Review 88(4), 853-872.  Re-testing the data, Poe, Tate, and Keith found that economic 
development had a significant impact: Steven C. Poe, C. Neal Tate and Linda Camp Keith, ‘Repression 
of the Human Right to Personal Integrity Revisited: A Global Crossnational Study Covering the Years 
1976-1993’ (1999) International Studies Quarterly 43(2), 291-315.  See also Todd Landman, 
Protecting Human Rights: A Comparative Study (Georgetown University Press 2005).  On this basis, 
globalization that is successful in terms of improving a state’s economic standing may be expected to 
improve human rights.  Apodaca finds that trade and foreign direct investment are positively associated 
with respect for human rights: Clair Apodaca, ‘Global Economic Patterns and Personal Integrity Rights 
after the Cold War’ (2001) International Studies Quarterly 45(4), 587–602.  Poverty is relevant not just 
for states but also for groups and individuals who may be subjected to torture: torture tends to be 
disproportionately directed at the poorer elements of society: in eastern Europe, for example, those 
most at risk include the socially-disadvantaged Roma (the term “Roma” is used throughout this 
research to cover communities also known as Sinti, Tzigane and Gypsies).   
16 Courtenay Ryals Conrad and Will H Moore, ‘What Stops the Torture’ (2010), American Journal of 
Political Science 54(2), 459 at 459. 
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carry out a cost-benefit analysis to decide whether to allow torture or attempt to 
constrain it, part of this calculation includes the impact on their security of tenure.  
The level of democratic responsibility in the state will affect this assessment, so we 
now turn to this aspect. 
 
2. Torture and Democracy 
According to quantitative research, torture is more likely to occur where the state 
tends towards the authoritarian rather than the democratic.
17
  Democracy is important 
not only in terms of a state’s likelihood of committing torture in a given year, but also 
as a precondition for its capacity to improve its performance on torture over time: 
democratic consolidation is strongly associated with human rights progress.
18
   
Democracy clearly matters: but what exactly do we mean by democracy in this 
context?  Conceptually, democracy exists where the governed have the power to 
exercise genuine, informed choice regarding those who govern them.  Assuming that 
the governed wish human rights to be observed by the state, the implication is that 
they will remove political leaders who fail in this regard.  By the same logic, 
compliance with human rights obligations will confer an electoral advantage, 
rendering it more attractive to political elites. 
 
This understanding of democracy is not easily quantified, so for the purposes of 
measurability, researchers combine a number of factors, typically including 
                                                 
17 Steven C. Poe and C. Neal Tate, ‘Repression of Human Rights to Personal Integrity in the 1980s: A 
Global Analysis’ (1994) The American Political Science Review 88(4), 853-872; Steven C. Poe, C. 
Neal Tate and Linda Camp Keith, ‘Repression of the Human Right to Personal Integrity Revisited: A 
Global Crossnational Study Covering the Years 1976-1993’ (1999) International Studies Quarterly 
43(2), 291-315; Todd Landman, Protecting Human Rights: A Comparative Study (Georgetown 
University Press 2005). 
18 Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink K (eds), The Power of Human Rights: 
International Norms and Domestic Change. (Cambridge University Press 1999), 241. 
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competitive executive recruitment, competitive participation, executive constraints; 
open executive recruitment; and the regulation of participation.
19
 A state may have 
some of these elements in place, while still failing to meet the above definition.  
Elections in and of themselves will not bring about effective change unless and until 
those elections are preceded by institutional changes that embed accountability.
 20
   
Richards observes that elections alone are a “perilous proxy” for real democracy, 
noting the existence of “technical” democracies where regimes are voted into power 
but still fail to respect the rights of their people.
21
   
Where there is genuine accountability, torture poses a risk to political tenure, thereby 
encouraging elites to reduce torture.
22
  Citizens who can remove their rulers via the 
ballot box are more likely to be listened to by their rulers; freedom of expression, 
particularly in the form of a free press, plays an important role in mediating this 
relationship.
23
   Cardenas finds that rights are more likely to be respected where there 
is broad social support for human rights constituencies, outweighing any competing 
domestic pressures in favour of violations, and where domestic elites have something 
to lose if they allow violations, such as damage to their economic interests.
24
  
Cingranelli and Filippov note that physical integrity rights are most likely to be 
respected in contexts where the electoral advantage is the most immediate: where 
                                                 
19 See for example Bueno de Mesquita B, Downs GW, Smith A, ‘Thinking Inside the Box: A Closer 
Look at Democracy and Human Rights’ (2005) International Studies Quarterly 49, 439-457, 444.   
20 Ibid, 457. 
21 David L. Richards, ‘Perilous Proxy: Human Rights and the Presence of National Elections’ (1999) 
Social Science Quarterly 80(4), 648-665. See also James Franklin, ‘IMF Conditionality, Threat 
Perception, and Political Repression: A Cross-National Analysis’ (1997) Comparative Political Studies 
30, 576-606, who argues that the imposition of structural adjustment policies by the International 
Monetary Fund and World Bank have in some instances led to more democratic features (better 
democratic institutions, freer and fairer elections, and more freedom of speech and press) but less 
respect for physical integrity rights, including an increase in torture.  
22 Courtenay Ryals Conrad and Will H Moore, ‘What Stops the Torture’ (2010), American Journal of 
Political Science 54(2), 459. 
23 Courtenay Ryals Conrad and Will H Moore, ‘What Stops the Torture’ (2010) American Journal of 
Political Science 54(2), 459. 
24 Sonia Cardenas, Conflict and Compliance: State Responses to International Human Rights Pressure 
(University of Pennsylvania Press 2007). 
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members of parliament are elected through low magnitude proportional representation 
districts, and where the electorate vote directly for individual candidates.
25
   
 
There are a number of important caveats.   As explored in the previous section, 
political elites may use denial of the abuse to evade accountability: Rejali argues that 
democracies are more likely to be characterised by stealth torture, leading to 
innovation in “clean torture” techniques, which does not leave physical scarring and 
thus allows plausible deniability.
26
  The threatened exposure of torture is less of a 
threat to political tenure if public opinion is not against torture; the previous section 
has shown how democracies may use justification strategies, such the threat of 
conflict, to evade being penalised at the ballot box,
27
   Besides conflict, the electorate 
may accept that torture is justified in pursuit of a law and order strategy.  In India, for 
example, a state which is both the world’s largest democracy and which experiences 
extremely high levels of torture, a 2014 survey by Amnesty International found that 
74% of Indians surveyed agreed that torture could sometimes be justified.
28
  This lack 
of pressure from its domestic constituency reduces the incentive for the state to 
abolish the use of torture by its agents.   
 
Later chapters will consider states in south-eastern Europe where torture is also not 
generally seen as a high-priority public concern, which creates a challenge for 
                                                 
25
 David Cingranelli and Mikhail Filippov, ‘Electoral Rules and Incentives to Protect Human Rights’ 
(2010) The Journal of Politics 72(1), 1-15. 
26 Darius M Rejali, Torture and Democracy (Princeton University Press 2007).  As an example of this, 
Ron found that international scrutiny of practices in Israel led to a shift to psychological abuse, which 
leaves no physical scars: James Ron, ‘Varying Methods of State Violence’ (1997) International 
Organization 51(2), 275-300.  
27
 Christian Davenport, Will H. Moore and David A. Armstrong, ‘Waterboarding and Democracy: Do 
Democratic Institutions Inhibit Torture?’ (2008) Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the 
International Studies Association, 28 February-3 March 2007, Chicago, IL. 
28 Amnesty International, ‘Global Survey on Attitudes to Torture (2014)’,  www.amnesty.org/Act40 
(accessed 30 August 2016). 
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domestic advocacy.  In such cases, the demand to end torture may emanate from a 
small subset of the population made up of local human rights activists, working in 
alliance with transnational partner organisations.  Democracy should not be seen 
simply a matter of majority rules: minority voices have a claim to be heard too, but 
they often have to work harder to claim legitimacy and to establish political reach.  
This is a theme that will re-emerge throughout the following chapters. 
 
The growth of democracy and increasing respect for human rights are complementary 
processes, creating a positive feedback loop: a degree of respect for rights makes 
democracy feasible, and burgeoning democracy in turn makes respect for rights more 
likely.   However, this does not mean that the relationship between democracy and 
respect for physical integrity rights is an entirely linear one.
29
  Bueno de Mesquita et 
al argue that a state must reach a relatively high threshold of democracy in order for 
authorities to perceive an electoral advantage in restraining abuses.
30
  For 
authoritarian states, minor increases in democracy will not necessarily produce 
equivalent increases in human rights improvement unless and until this threshold has 
been reached.
31
  Vreeland notes that torture is more likely to occur in incomplete 
autocracies, where there is a possibility of challenge to the political elite, such as 
where there are multiple political parties.  In complete autocracies, such as one-party 
or no-party dictatorships, fewer individuals challenge the regime, so there may less 
perceived need for less torture, and in complete democracies, there are effective 
                                                 
29 Christian Davenport and David A Armstrong II, ‘Democracy and the Violation of Human Rights: A 
Statistical Analysis from 1976 to 1996 (2004), American Journal of Political Science 48(3), 538–554. 
30 For more on the finding that only states with the highest levels of democracy are correlated with 
better human rights practices, and not all states conventionally categorised as democracies, see Bruce 
Bueno de Mesquita, George W. Downs and Alastair Smith, ‘Thinking Inside the Box: A Closer Look at 
Democracy and Human Rights’ (2005) International Studies Quarterly 49, 439-457. 
31 Ibid. 
 33 
 
constraints against the habitual use of torture.
32
  States in the middle, where 
challenges to the regime exist and constraints against abuse are weak, experience the 
highest risk, a phenomenon dubbed the “More Murder in the Middle” paradox.33   On 
this logic, the initial stages of democratisation, during which the political elite is 
facing new challenges to its tenure, may see higher rates of human rights abuses both 
compared to the state’s own authoritarian past and in comparison to other states  
where democratic institutions and behaviour are long-established.
34
  As a corollary, 
emerging democracies make particularly interesting case studies for researchers 
studying civil society demands for reform, as there is more need for reform than in 
longer-established democracies, and more opportunity to demand reform than in 
authoritarian states.
35
   This consideration has influenced the selection of case studies, 
as explained in chapter four.  
 
When investigating whether activism improves a state’s practice on torture, one 
alternative explanation to consider is whether the improvement on torture is 
attributable instead to an increase in democracy levels.  An increase in activism may 
co-occur with an improvement in torture performance because of this underlying 
increase in democratisation, rather than the increased activism itself leading to the 
better performance on torture.  Alternatively, it may be the case that while the 
increase in democracy opens up opportunities for more activism, the activism itself 
still plays a causal relationship in improving the state performance on torture.  
                                                 
32 James Vreeland, ‘Political Institutions and Human Rights: Why Dictatorships Enter into the United 
Nations Convention against Torture’ (2008) International Organization 62, 65-101. 
33 Helen Fein, ‘More Murder in the Middle: Life Integrity Violations and Democracy in the World’ 
(1995) Human Rights Quarterly 17, 170-191. 
34 Todd Landman, Protecting Human Rights: A Comparative Study (Georgetown University Press 
2005). 
35 This argument is made by Beth Simmons, Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in 
Domestic Politics (Cambridge University Press 2009).  
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According to this model, activism still matters to state performance on torture, but its 
influence only takes effect once a sufficient threshold of democracy has been met.   
 
 
3. Scope conditions for ending torture 
The above account of the context in which torture occurs suggests (a) explanations for 
why a state experiences a particular level of torture at a given time and (b) a number 
of scope conditions under which change is more likely to occur.  If, as hypothesised, 
civil society activism has an impact on torture, it can be predicted that any such 
impact is more likely to be detected in states not experiencing conflict; where there is 
a sufficient level of democracy to create an incentive for political elites to accede to 
demands to restrain abuses; and where there is in fact at least some demand to restrain 
abuses.  Progress must not be prevented by veto players or spoilers.  States must have 
both willingness and capacity to change.  They must be able to exert sufficient control 
over their agents; state institutions must be adequate for the task; there must be 
enough actors with an interest in promoting rights and the ability to work together in 
coalition to exert the necessary political heft.
36
   
 
Assessing NGO influence on states in relation to women’s rights in an international 
context, Joachim finds that they are successful when two interacting conditions are 
met: (1) NGOs are embedded in a political opportunity structure which allows access 
to decision-makers and where they have influential allies and (2) NGOs can mobilise 
organisational entrepreneurs, a heterogeneous international constituency and 
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 Stephen Hopgood, Jack Snyder and Leslie Vinjamuri (eds), Human Rights Futures (Cambridge 
University Press 2017); see the editors’ Introduction. 
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experts.
37
  Translating her findings into the domestic context, the case studies in later 
chapters will expand in particular on the implications of access, not only to decision-
makers, but to state agents on the frontline and to individuals deprived of their liberty 
– through this access, organisations derive expertise in the form of detailed 
operational knowledge and credibility, both domestically and in the eyes of 
international allies, in line with her second condition. 
 
An assessment of the impact of interventions aimed at ending torture must take into 
account these scope conditions.  Their existence implies that the outcome of a given 
intervention is not predicated entirely on the merits of the intervention itself, but also 
on whether the surrounding context is one in which positive change is possible.
 
 
 
If change is unlikely where these scope conditions are not met, the implication is that 
those living in the most rights-violating states have least hope of succour from human 
rights activism.
38
   It creates something of a moral quandary in deciding where 
resources for human rights improvements should be allocated.  Is the implication that 
human rights advocates should focus on the “easy cases” where states are well-
positioned to change, reducing efforts to reach the “hard cases” which are affected by 
structural impediments to progress?  Or do the hard cases require a different approach, 
perhaps more pragmatic than principled?  In such cases, some argue that the emphasis 
should be on putting in place the scope conditions before insisting on the 
implementation of human rights, so that, for example, human rights abusers are 
                                                 
37 Jutta Joachim, ‘Framing Issues and Seizing Opportunities: the UN, NGOs, and Women’s Rights’ 
(2003) International Studies Quarterly 47(2) , 247-274; Jutta Joachim, Agenda Setting, the UN, and 
NGOs: Gender Violence and Reproductive Rights (Georgetown University Press 2007). 
38 Emilie M. Hafner-Burton and Kiyoteru Tsutsui, ‘Justice Lost!  The Failure of Human Rights Law to 
Matter Where Needed Most’ (2007) Journal of Peace Research 407-425 argue that human rights 
efforts to date have failed people in the most rights-abusing states.  
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granted amnesties to avoid them sabotaging peace processes: putting peace before 
justice in the sequencing of desired outcomes.
39
  In her case study of Chile and 
Argentina, for example, Cardenas argues that human rights improvements could only 
take place once the armed threat had ceased.
40
   
 
Should human rights campaigners therefore abandon the attempt to end torture while 
a state is experiencing conflict?  Should they wait until a sufficiently high level of 
democracy has been attained?  Bueno de Mesquita et al suggest that waiting may be 
necessary.
41
  A human rights campaigner with a “high tolerance for delayed 
gratification” can “get in at the ground floor and labor in a newly democratizing state 
– possibly for years – in an effort to create the broad institutional foundation 
necessary for eventual progress in human rights”.  Alternatively, the authors propose, 
the would-be reformer can simply wait till the state is ready for political party 
competition and thus improved rights.  If this putative reformer is unwilling to wait, 
she can support local right activists and attempt to mobilise external pressure to 
convince the state to change, but the authors are sceptical of the chances of success 
before full democracy is attained.  Bueno de Mesquita et al. are writing from an 
international perspective, it should be noted: a locally-based human rights reformer 
does not have the freedom to cherry-pick an easier environment. 
 
                                                 
39 Stephen Hopgood, Jack Snyder and Leslie Vinjamuri (eds), Human Rights Futures (Cambridge 
University Press 2017) make a case for such sequencing in their Introduction chapter.  This claim is 
strongly contested by those who believe in “no peace without justice”; an organisation of that name, 
founded by former MEP Emma Bonino, is on the steering committee of the International Criminal 
Court. 
40 Sonia Cardenas, Conflict and Compliance: State Responses to International Human Rights Pressure 
(University of Pennsylvania Press 2007), 79. 
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 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, George W. Downs, Alastair Smith, ‘Thinking Inside the Box: A Closer 
Look at Democracy and Human Rights’ (2005) International Studies Quarterly 49, 439-457, at 456. 
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The mere presence of scope conditions is not sufficient in itself to end torture.   The 
potential for change is not enough: some intervention is needed in order to turn the 
potential for change into actual change.  For many researchers, the relevant 
intervention is human rights mobilisation: strategic attempts to influence states by 
transnational actors, in particular civil society actors, to which we now turn.  These 
theories lay the foundation for this current research: before scrutinising if and how 
civil society can influence states’ performance on the specific issue of torture, it is 
necessary to consider if and how civil society can influence states more generally. 
 
 
4. Mobilisation as a means to influence political will  
It has often been asserted that high levels of civic associationalism are linked to strong 
democratic performance,
42
 which as we have seen above, is in turn a precursor to 
motivating states to end the use of torture.  According to this account, civil society 
makes governments respond to citizens’ priorities.  Warren describes associations as a 
mechanism for amplifying “autonomous judgements into collective decisions”.43  Gill 
sees civil society as a providing “channels for popular participation and oversight”, 
which makes it less likely that decision-making will be captured by elites, including 
economic elites.
44
  As discussed above, states are more likely to improve their 
performance on torture where there is otherwise a threat to the tenure of political 
elites, so civil society makes an important contribution by helping to articulate and 
crystallise the threat to tenure. 
                                                 
42 An argument made in the nineteenth century by Alexis de Tocqueville with regard to the US; Robert 
Putnam amassed empirical support for the proposition through his survey of civic participation in Italy 
in Robert Putnam, Making Democracy Work (Princeton University Press 1993). 
43 Mark Warren, Democracy and Association (Princeton University Press 2001), 61. 
44 Graeme Gill, The Dynamics of Democratization: Elites, Civil Society and the Transition Process (St 
Martin's Press 2000) 241. 
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In relation to third and fourth wave democracies, such as the states examined in later 
chapters, Tusalem’s research shows that states with stronger civil society prior to and 
after transition experienced strengthened political freedoms and improved institutional 
performance.
45
  This does not necessarily mean that civil society itself causes the 
better democracy: it could be that the stronger democracies allow more opportunities 
for civil society to flourish.
46
 Causation may run in both directions, so there is a 
mutually reinforcing virtuous cycle of civic space leading to stronger civil society 
leading in turn to expanded civic space, with the overall effect being a better 
functioning democracy.  Democratic demands matter in encouraging the state to 
restrain torture, as discussed above, so whether civil society promotes democracy or 
democracy promotes civil society (or whether both explanations apply), the important 
point is that civil society is strengthened, and acts as the locus of demands for the 
state to refrain from torture. 
 
While the role of civil society mobilisation has been widely praised,
47
 there are some 
dissenting voices, arguing that a civil society wielding excessive power can interfere 
improperly with the business of democratic governance and have a destabilising 
effect.
48
  Berman finds an association with undemocratic political development, 
although her findings relate to the Weimar Republic, which Fish argues renders them 
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anachronistic with regard to contemporary politics.
49
  Huntingdon suggests high 
levels of civil society mobilisation can be associated with higher conflict if political 
institutions are not capable of managing the stresses of modernisation (and as we have 
seen, conflict is in turn associated with torture).
50
  This is not inevitable, however: 
Boulding finds that high levels of civic engagement in Bolivia led to political protest, 
but were still associated with support for the political system; protest and the 
articulation of discontent with a political system should not be conflated with the 
undermining of the political system.
51
  The state and civil society can implicitly 
recognise each other as legitimate interlocutors by engaging with each other, even 
where the engagement is critical in tone.   
 
Armony believes that there is a “dark side” to civil society in that it can deepen social 
fragmentation and exclude minorities.
52
 Similiarly, Brysk notes that the democratic 
deficits in civil society itself need to be addressed.
53
  Encarnación does not argue that 
civil society is inherently harmful to democratic growth, but rather than it may be 
irrelevant; in his view, the performance of political institutions matters more than the 
configuration of civil society, and the former is not necessarily contingent on the 
latter.
54
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Going well beyond this strain of academic scepticism is the rhetoric of a number of 
political actors leading the backlash against civil society mobilisation.  Actors 
threatened by human rights have undertaken a counter-mobilisation against rights 
using a competing discourse based around stability and sovereignty;
55
 in some cases, 
they have strategically invoked alternate value systems (including systems based on a 
particular religion or the so-called “Asian values” system).  In a worrying trend, 
political rhetoric to this effect has been supplemented in a number of states with 
practical obstacles to civil society mobilisation – preventing visits from international 
observers, hindering access by local organisations to international funding; hobbling 
their activities by restrictive registration requirements or taxation rules.
56
  Many 
observers have expressed concern in recent years about the shrinking of the political 
space for civil society.  A 2017 EU policy paper notes that the phenomenon of 
shrinking civil space has been gradually intensifying since 2004 or 2005 at least.  
Initially attributed to the re-emergence of authoritarianism in a few states, it is now 
understood as a wider trend:   
the global clampdown on civil society has deepened and accelerated in very recent 
times…..[it has] assumed an unprecedented depth and seriousness, and…is likely to 
continue for the foreseeable future.57   
 
The implications of shrinking space in the European context are discussed further in 
chapter four, in the context of the case studies in south-eastern Europe. 
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57 European Parliament Policy ‘Shrinking Space for civil society: the EU response’, April 2017, 
EP/EXPO/B/COMMITTEE/FWC/2013-08/Lot8/12, 9. 
 41 
 
One form of backlash is to question the legitimacy of activists’ claims to represent 
what the governed want: contrary to Gill’s claim about civil society as an avenue for 
“popular participation and oversight”, civil society may be making demands for 
something that not is particularly popular with domestic audiences.  We have seen 
above that a majority of the Indian public, for example, expresses the view that torture 
may be necessary: on whose behalf is civil society then speaking in advocating for an 
end to torture in India?   
 
There is an argument for the value of localisation (or “vernacularisation”) in cases 
where rights do not necessarily or immediately resonate with local priorities or values, 
so that the rights are translated (figuratively as well as literally) in ways that 
harmonise better with local perspectives.
58
  Incorporating local voices helps validate 
human rights as a participatory project and brings a new dimension, as when activists 
in the global South demanded more attention for economic and social rights in 
addition to civil and political rights.  However, there are tensions too, when local 
values run counter to human rights; expectations regarding gender are often cited in 
this context.  In some cases, the fear is that the translation of rights becomes a 
watering down of content.  With regard to torture, because it is often inflicted on 
unpopular targets, those perceived as terrorists and/or criminals, widespread public 
sympathy tends to be challenging to achieve, leaving it potentially well down the list 
of locally-derived priorities. In such cases, the demand for human rights 
implementation may be largely foreign-led, so that it becomes derided as a 
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“missionary endeavour”,59 “a cultural project for ‘civilizing savage’ cultures”,60 “legal 
imperialism” 61 or “a cargo cult”.62   
 
The answer may lie somewhere in the middle: efforts to end torture can be locally-
owned even where they are not a high priority for the population as a whole.  In a 
particular state, activists may be drawn largely from an urban, educated middle-class 
who are sufficiently liberated from the struggle for basic survival that they have to 
capacity to undertake work in this area (which is not to deny the contribution of 
activists drawn from the poor and marginalised sections of the population).  Such 
people may be well-positioned to act as mediators between international norms and 
local expectations.  Acharya calls them “insider proponents” who act to localise a 
universal agenda.
63
 Mutua is more scathing of non-Westerners in human rights 
organisations who “think white” and uncritically adopt the international rights 
agenda.
64
  While his critique is useful in demanding that international observers 
scrutinise their own assumptions, it is worth underlining that a concept’s legitimacy 
within a given setting is not derived solely from how indigenous it is to that setting. 
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Alongside concerns about the legitimacy of activists, some observers raise questions 
about their capacity.  It is considerably cheaper for international donors to fund a 
local NGO campaigning for judicial reform than it is to fund a comprehensive state-
based judicial reform programme: investing only in the former becomes a problem if 
it is less effective than the latter.
65
  Quigley finds that in Eastern Europe, donors’ 
limited investment in civil society over relatively short periods of time restricted the 
ability of NGOs to achieve their goals.  On the political front, he argues that 
optimistic assessments of the potential of civil society to drive change were at odds 
with local conditions immediately post-transition, when the mass movements which 
had coalesced around the demand for democracy began to splinter into mutually 
hostile factions and interest groups.
66
 This disintegration had a negative impact both 
on the capacity and legitimacy of activists. 
 
Pragmatically, Simmons notes that local activists are more highly motivated to 
improve their home state than international activists as they have a higher personal 
investment, and their attention is less likely to be distracted by exciting new crises in 
other parts of the word.  She finds: 
Human rights treaties matter where local groups have taken up the torch for 
themselves.  Without that, transnational and peer pressure will ultimately flag as 
funders and headline hunters seek new opportunities to make their mark.67 
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An ongoing commitment is important, particularly where problematic practices are 
deeply embedded.  Alston and Gillespie point out that where rights advocates have 
short attention spans, they can misleadingly imply that problems have been solved 
when this is not the case, and furthermore, they can give the impression that measures 
to address a concern are more useful than they are:  they highlight a number of cases 
where Amnesty International (AI), Human Rights Watch (HRW) and the Special 
Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Executions called for Commissions of Inquiry into 
alleged extrajudicial executions, but failed to follow up the call, or to monitor whether 
a Commission was in fact an effective accountability mechanism, or simply a sop “to 
placate those calling for action”, with no real impact.68  Local organisations are by no 
means guaranteed to have a long tenure, particularly given funding challenges and 
consequent difficulties with staff retention, but they are less likely to switch attention 
to a different set of issues in another part of the world, no matter how much global 
media interest the new issues have garnered. 
 
When we explore the case studies in chapter four onwards, we will see these tensions 
in action, and in particular how some states attempt to delegitimize calls for torture 
reform by portraying them as an externally-imposed agenda.  Transnational networks 
are a key support for local organisations, but they can also lead to their local 
legitimacy being called into question. 
5. Extrinsic v Intrinsic Motivation 
The opportunities available to civil society attempting to influence a particular state 
are conditioned by the state’s openness to influence, and the types of incentives, 
positive or negative, that are likely to motivate it.  Risse et al. view openness to 
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influence as itself a scope condition for positive change: whether the state is 
materially vulnerable or not (with China’s relative lack of material vulnerability 
helping to explain its resistance to international human rights pressure, for example) 
and also whether the state is socially vulnerable (how much it cares what others 
think).
69
   
 
Rationalist scholars have traditionally emphasised the importance of coercion in 
influencing states: the sticks and carrots that impel states to journey in a particular 
direction. Earlier in the chapter, individual politicians were described as receptive to 
the demand to restrain torture where this led to an electoral advantage.  The prospect 
of loss of tenure is a form of coercion.  Coercion applies not just to individual 
politicians, but also to the collective interests of the executive, for example, where the 
prospect of joining a powerful trading bloc such as the EU encourages states to 
establish themselves as compliant with norms, including the prohibition on torture.  
This type of motivation is extrinsic; states undertake obligations without necessarily 
being persuaded of the value of the obligation itself, but as a step towards achieving 
another goal. 
 
Constructivist scholars, however, emphasise the importance of ideation and the 
development of intrinsic motivation.  This view focuses on the socialisation process 
by which states learn to internalise norms.  Where this socialisation is successful, 
states do not have to be coerced into meeting their human rights obligations, because 
these obligations have become part of their identity, incorporated into “business as 
usual”.  States develop intrinsic motivation to comply with norms over and above 
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extrinsic pressures. The role of domestic activists in localising rights feeds into this 
internalisation process. Domestic voices, freighted with local understanding, can turn 
“something that donors want” into “something that we want”. The process is one of 
“identity transformation”, so that over time, human rights are increasingly observed 
“for reasons of belief and identity”, part of the logic of appropriateness.70  Beyond 
compliance, states may see themselves as beacons for other states, encouraging the 
adoption of norms in regional and international fora.  Sweden played an important 
role in advocating for the creation of UNCAT,
 71
 for example, while Costa Rica 
advocated for the creation of OPCAT.
72
 
 
There are obvious parallels with individual psychology, and how for example, a 
police officer makes the decision whether or not to ill-treat a suspect under 
interrogation: the police officer may refrain from ill-treatment based on the 
perceptions that sanctions are reasonably likely to follow (extrinsic motivation).
73
  As 
well, or perhaps alternatively, as a result of training and the influence of peers and 
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seniors, ill-treatment may be perceived as near unthinkable: simply not how things are 
done (intrinsic motivation).   
 
Returning to the state, it can be useful to think of these two mechanisms less as 
alternative explanations, and more in terms of sequencing, or perhaps parallel but 
complementary processes.  An element of coercion may be required to bring states to 
undertake human rights obligations.  Having formally validated the norms, the state 
begins a process of internalising them.  The sequencing can also work in the opposite 
direction: human rights norms can begin as statement of principle (the ideation phase) 
with increased supervision (implying potential criticism, and thus coercion) following 
later.
74
   The classic example of this progress can be seen with the creation of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, which stated the norms; supervisory 
mechanisms followed nearly two decades later, in the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights.   
 
Risse et al agree that state motivation is best explained by these mechanisms acting in 
combination: rational decisions are made in the context of a constructed world-view.  
In their articulation: 
the logic of consequences and the cost-benefit calculations of utility-maximizing 
egoistic actors are often embedded in a more encompassing logic of appropriateness 
of norm-guided behaviour as institutionalized in the contemporary international 
human rights regime.75  
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In the case of states wishing to accede to the EU, it may be a rational choice for the 
state to ratify the ECHR and to carry out reforms of the justice and security sector 
(including restraining its agents from torturing) as this is a prerequisite for eventual 
EU membership, ie an extrinsic reason for reform.  Of course, the extent to which 
these issues are prioritised in the context of EU membership reflects a constructed set 
of values promoted by EU institutions and member states, so the extrinsic demand in 
one place is ultimately based on an intrinsic motivation arising elsewhere.    
 
Goodman and Jinks use the term “acculturation” for the mixture of internal and 
external pressures to change behaviour.
76
  Their theory applies in a context where 
there is a reference group of states within which a set of norms is accepted:  states 
outside that group can be influenced to act in the same way through “a number of 
microprocesses, including orthodoxy, mimicry, identification and status 
maximization”.77  This mechanism explains the “contagion” effect: states are more 
likely to institutionalize norms where other states in the region have also recently 
done so.
78
  Contagion, as we shall see, can also work in the opposite direction, so that 
a state pursuing a backlash strategy against civil society may in turn influence its 
neighbours.   
 
Goodman and Jinks do not specify a causal pathway for the acculturation process, 
speculating that it may result from the acculturation of government leaders or high-
level policymakers; alternatively, or as well, it may involve domestic and 
international activists as norms transmitters.  They sound a note of caution in terms of 
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the pressure being brought to bear on states: it is not necessarily the case of the more 
different types of pressure the better.   Introducing a material incentive can degrade its 
value as a social signal which can weaken commitment to the social norms.
79
  The 
state actor might not want to be seen as motivated by the material pay-off (or fear of 
censure); it may not wish to appear weak and easily coerced; this fear in turn can play 
into the hands of those who would promote a counter-narrative centred on state 
sovereignty.  The source of the pressure has political implications – its influence may 
be compromised if it is seen as emanating from a resented foreign authority or a 
hostile country or unrepresentative segment of civil society.  Even if the incentive 
promotes compliance, external incentives can cause actors to overlook why they 
originally wanted to comply (internal motivation), retrospectively attributing their 
compliance to the external incentive.  If the material incentive is then taken away, 
compliance might then fall below where it would have been if the incentive never 
applied as the intrinsic motivation has been weakened.  The effect is to stop the norm 
becoming internalised and part of the state’s new identity.  Of relevance to the case 
studies in later chapters is the suggestion that a state’s compliance with norms on the 
basis of its desire to join the EU could be an instance of external incentives crowding 
out internal motivation.  If a state is restraining its agents from torturing in order to 
position itself for EU membership, what happens when EU membership becomes less 
attainable or less desirable?  Does the impetus for restraining torture also drop away?  
This question will reoccur in the context of the Macedonian case study in particular. 
 
It can be contended that international civil society implicitly (and often explicitly) 
focuses on extrinsic motivation: the desire of the state to avoid international 
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criticism.
80
  Local civil society can and does use the same threat of international 
censure, and transnational activist networks support local civil society in doing so; 
local concerns can be disseminated to a global audience with the help of the 
transnational network.   However, it is also contended here that local civil society is 
much better placed than non-national actors to foster the growth of intrinsic 
motivation on the part of the state to conform to human rights norms.  They can more 
credibly make the case that “As citizens of country x, this is how we want our country 
to be”.  Their legitimacy to represent the will of the people may be challenged, as 
discussed above, but they are nevertheless better-placed than those outside the state.  
From a constructivist perspective, they are in a position to contribute to the dynamic 
process of identity formation.   
 
6. Mechanisms for influencing the state 
To identify if and how civil society activism improves state performance on torture, it 
is necessary to understand the processes by which the input of civil society activism 
can lead to the output of an improved state performance on torture.  Risse et al 
identify a mixture of three sub-processes within the larger process of socialization, to 
which transnational activists are central: bargaining and adaptation; arguing and moral 
consciousness-raising; institutionalization and habitualization.
81
 Domestic and 
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transnational activists work together to put norm-violating states on the international 
agenda, pressurising states both from “below” (domestic protest) and “above” 
(pressure from other states and from intergovernmental institutions).
82
  Here we see 
an element of coercion (extrinsic motivation) to allow political space for dialogue to 
take place; but through this dialogue, states become persuaded of the value of human 
rights, with the desired end-point being a state that has absorbed human rights into its 
identity and complies with norms for intrinsic reasons. 
 
In their 2013 revisiting of their original 1999 theories, Risse et al. scrutinise in more 
detail how states transition from accepting norms in principle to complying with them 
in practice.  As well as coercion, sanctions and rewards, and persuasion, they note the 
importance of capacity-building, acknowledging violations as often arising from lack 
of state capacity rather than the deliberate intention to violate (where the state “can’t” 
rather than “won’t” protect, as discussed earlier in the chapter).  Capacity-building 
includes education, training and development of administrative capacity to implement 
and enforce human rights.
83
  
 
An important step in a state’s progress towards (potential) compliance with the ban on 
torture is its ratification of international treaties forbidding torture.
84
  Hathaway found 
that ratification is not in itself an immediate turning point for state practice: in her 
analysis, ratifying a human rights treaty can be a low-cost substitute for effective 
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action to bring about change.
85
  She does concede that ratification may lead to 
improvements over the longer term, by “creating public commitments to which 
human rights activists can point as they push nations to make gradual, if grudging, 
improvements down the road”.86  Subsequent research has further established that 
ratification is an important step in a longer process.  Treaties have a positive effect if a 
strong civil society exists to make use of them.
87
  Even if the state is making an 
insincere commitment in the first place (in response to extrinsic motivation), the 
benefits include giving domestic protest more breathing space, legitimizing their 
demands and empowering them, allowing them more room to interact with trans-
national actors.  States may under-estimate the power of these tactical concessions 
and can be surprised by what is set in motion both domestically and internationally.   
 
Risse et al describe acceptance of a convention as “not inconsequential”, as it leads 
governments to “entangle” themselves in a legal process which they “find harder and 
harder to escape”. 88  At least sometimes, states “matched words with deeds 
eventually”.89  By engaging with their critics, states legitimize them as “valid 
interlocutors”; once in the “dialogical mode of arguing” they have to justify 
themselves and make concessions.  Over time, it becomes more of a true dialogue, as 
governments begin to internalize a rights-based worldview (leading eventually to 
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intrinsic motivation for rights compliance).
90
  As noted above, this process is by no 
means a guaranteed trajectory, and may be subject to disruption and backlash. 
 
Simmons sees three domestic mechanisms as being set in train by treaty commitment: 
elite-led agendas are affected; opportunities for litigation are increased; and the gap 
between expectation and performance is highlighted, (potentially) sparking popular 
mobilisation behind the issue.  She sees treaties as providing political, legal and social 
resources to activists.  Her view is that the additional leverage is most likely to have 
an impact in political contexts which are neither entrenched democracies nor 
entrenched autocracies, where the scales could come down either way, and even a 
small amount of additional power to human rights advocates can create a tipping 
point.
91
 
 
7. Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined existing research that finds that states are more likely to 
torture when political elites perceive that its utility outweighs its costs.  The challenge 
for reformers is to increase the political costs of torture to the state to the point where 
they outweigh the perceived benefits.   Certain scope conditions need to be met before 
reform will take full effect: as well as propitious conditions for change, there needs to 
be a felt demand for change, and civil society mobilisation is, in the eyes of many if 
not all observers, central to the articulation of this demand.  A sufficient degree of 
democracy is required in order to open up the space necessary for this mobilisation.  
The demand needs to be sufficiently persuasive to political elites: it may appeal to 
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extrinsic or intrinsic motivations or some combination of both.  Local civil society 
organisations can be expected to be particularly important in the development over 
time of intrinsic motivation by the state to comply with human rights norms.   
 
Risse et al are particular cheerleaders for this process, hailing transnational civil 
society as “the single most important group of actors to put a norm-violating 
government on the international agenda”.92  But there is nothing inevitable about the 
process of human rights reform.   The role of activists in influencing states is a 
contested one: their relevance, legitimacy and capacity may be questioned; they may 
face a powerful backlash from the state; they may find that the state pays lip service to 
the objective of ending torture but does little more.   
 
Mobilisation theory offers a plausible explanation for how states progress to accepting 
and implementing human rights norms.  The processes described here underpin the 
examination in later chapters of how civil society organisations attempt to influence 
state practice on torture, and the extent to which they succeed.   
 
The chapter opened with a warning about the potential for spurious causality: it is 
unsafe to assume that a particular intervention (civil society activism) causes a 
particular outcome (improved state performance on torture) without considering other 
factors that may have played a role.  For example, conflict in state A comes to an end, 
and a military dictatorship is replaced with a nascent democracy.  Over the next few 
years, civil society becomes highly active; post-conflict reconstruction activities 
include training for police and army; the prosecution of war crimes, including torture, 
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take place.  The prevalence of torture declines.  In this scenario, it would be unsafe to 
conclude that the decline in torture was caused by civil society activism on the issue, 
alongside the training of state agents, and a reduction in impunity, as all these 
outcomes stem from the same ultimate cause: the end of the conflict and the increase 
in democracy.    The civil society interventions may be a proximate cause, or 
mechanisms through which the change occurred, and so are not negligible in their 
own right, but it would be risky to assume that they would be enough to end torture in 
state B, where the conflict persists and/or the regime remains authoritarian.  The case 
studies in later chapters are designed to deliver a richer description of the political 
context in which activism occurs, with a view to unpicking as far as possible its 
distinct role in the causal process. 
 
Having considered these questions in theoretical terms and on the basis of the existing 
literature in this chapter, the next chapter examines whether there is empirical 
evidence to support the hypothesis that civil society activism is associated with better 
state performance on torture, and under what conditions. 
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Chapter 2   Is More Activism Associated with Less Torture?  
 
Chapter one explored the theoretical underpinnings for the hypothesis that civil 
society activism can be expected, provided scope conditions are met, to influence 
state practice in relation to torture.  This chapter marshals further empirical evidence 
in support of this hypothesis, demonstrating that under certain conditions at least, (a) 
states that experience more civil society advocacy and (b) states that are more open to 
activism also tend to demonstrate a lower prevalence of torture. 
 
Drawing on the discussion in the previous chapter, three factors are controlled for: 
size of population, the presence of conflict, and levels of democracy.  It has been 
argued in the previous chapter that the second two variables affect the prevalence of 
torture in any given year.  It also seems reasonable to assume that they may affect the 
degree of influence that civil society is likely to attain: it is harder for civil society 
activists to engage in dialogue with an authoritarian government than a democratic 
one, and more challenging to advocate against torture where this can be construed as 
undermining a war effort.  The impact of population size has previously been noted 
by quantitative researchers such as Poe, Tate and Keith.
1
  From a theoretical 
perspective, the impact of population size has been explored much less than the 
impact of democracy and conflict levels.  Possible explanations include the fact that 
states with smaller populations are more likely to be socially and materially 
vulnerable than their larger counterparts, and potentially more subject to 
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contagion/spillover effects from neighbouring states.  We cannot rule out the fact the 
apparent lower rate of abuse in small states could potentially be a mere reporting 
function, because the state’s small size may make it harder to maintain a cadre of 
human rights professionals, and may inhibit the reporting of human rights violations 
(as individuals making reports become more identifiable and hence more at risk).  It is 
plausible, however, that it is a genuine phenomenon, as activists in the smaller states 
find it easier to access decision-makers, and decision-makers are more directly 
accountable where abuses do take place.  At a practical level, it seems likely that, all 
things being equal, it is easier for the executive to maintain control over its agents in 
small states.  
 
Having examined whether higher activism levels are associated with better scores on 
torture, at least under specific conditions, we then consider the dynamics of change 
over a set period.  Does an improved torture score precede an increased activism score 
(perhaps indicating that a state is becoming less repressive, less likely to use torture, 
and thus a more hospitable environment for activism) or does increased activism 
influence the state in a way that shows up in an improved torture score soon 
afterwards?  Both scenarios are plausible in different states at different times, and 
given the relatively sparse data, it is not possible to provide a definitive answer. 
However, comparing changes in activism scores with changes in torture scores over 
time is at least suggestive with regard to the sequencing of those changes. 
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Limitations 
This chapter explores the evidence for a correlation between NGO activism and an 
improved performance on torture.  Correlation, of course, is not the same as 
causation: it is important to emphasise that the following analysis does not claim to 
demonstrate a causal relationship between the variables. A state may become (a) more 
open to activism and (b) less likely to use torture, not because (a) causes (b), but 
because (a) and (b) are both caused by (c) where (c) might be, for example, a change 
in political leadership.  Even if there is a degree of causality between (a) and (b), a 
question remains regarding the direction of this causality: section 10 below attempts 
to identify whether (a) or (b) come first in time, but it must be acknowledged that a 
finding that (a) preceded (b) again does not establish that (a) caused (b) – known as 
the post hoc fallacy.  The causality, if it exists, it may flow both ways, so that more 
activism encourages the state to reduce torture, and a reduced threat of torture leads to 
more emboldened and vigorous activism.   
 
In addition to the causality issue, another important limitation relates to the difficulty 
of measuring the variables.  Are the measures both factually correct (for example, are 
there accurate measures for the prevalence of torture in a given state in a given year?) 
and conceptually satisfying (while international law provides a definition for torture, 
what can and should be captured in the score for activism)?  Before turning to the 
analysis, the next sections elaborate on these challenges. 
 
1. The challenge of measuring torture 
There are a number of existing datasets, created using a standards-based measurement 
approach in which narrative human rights reports are used to assign each state a score 
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for its performance in a given year based on a predetermined set of coding standards.  
All the datasets considered here rely primarily on either or both of two sources, the 
annual US State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices and 
Amnesty International (AI) reports.  Other UN and regional human rights bodies as 
well as other civil society organisations also issue reports, but as they do not attempt 
to cover all states on an annual basis, it is more difficult to extract comparable data 
year-on-year for each state.   Generating accurate data on torture prevalence is a major 
challenge for a number of reasons: 
 
(i) Information gaps 
Information about torture is often hard to verify, and there is room for error in 
extrapolating from reported individual incidences to the overall prevalence of torture.   
As noted in the previous chapter, states fall on a spectrum in relation to their 
willingness to admit the existence of torture (use of justification v. use of denial).  The 
state may not only suppress information, but also challenge reports from other 
sources, claiming that such reports are unreliable and subject to political bias.  Where 
there is little hope of justice and a risk of retaliation, victims themselves are also 
likely to under-report incidences of torture, as there is little incentive and a high risk 
attached to reporting, at least while the victim and/or family members remain within 
the country.
2
  Where torture is common, individuals may not necessarily identify as 
victims of human rights abuse, taking it for granted, for example, that an encounter 
with the police will involve a degree of physical violence. 
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where he fears future torture.  This is often why states which themselves commit little or no torture are 
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Resistance to reporting may be less likely to occur in states which do not use torture 
strategically to achieve political control, and where the ill-treatment that occurs is 
more a matter of de facto tolerance of the abuse by authorities (often through a failure 
to hold individual police officers accountable for the use of excessive force).  Where a 
state makes genuine efforts to tackle the issue by monitoring and prosecuting 
incidences of torture, its record can appear worse than a state where torture is frequent 
but there is no monitoring or state response.  A state’s record may therefore appear to 
decline at the point where it begins its attempts to acknowledge and eradicate torture.
3
   
This phenomenon has been dubbed the “human rights information paradox”.4  As 
Anagnostou and Mungiu-Pippidi explain, “higher reporting often stands at the root of 
the puzzling fact that the more open and liberal states tend to show higher levels of 
rights violations.”5  As well as the fact that a more open state allows more opportunity 
for reporting, an incident of ill-treatment in a state where abuse rarely occurs is more 
newsworthy than a similar incident in a state where it is common.  Greater coverage in 
reports can lead to the incident having a proportionately much greater impact on the 
perceived performance on the state in question. 
 
(ii) Potential bias by reporting body 
Both the US State Department and AI reports have their limitations.  The US State 
Department has on occasion been accused of bias: Qian and Yanagizawa detect a 
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to the appointment of a particularly active Ombudswoman in 1995, who increased public trust that 
reported abuses would be investigated and prosecuted. 
4
 See for example Ann Marie Clark and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘Information Effects and Human Rights 
Data: Is the Good News about Increased Human Rights Information Bad News for Human Rights 
Measures?’ (2013) Human Rights Quarterly, 35, 539-568. 
5
Dia Anagnostou and Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, ‘Domestic Implementation of Human Rights Judgments 
in Europe: Legal Infrastructure and Government Effectiveness Matter’ (2014) European Journal of 
International Law 25, 205-227, 213. 
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degree of bias in favour of Cold War allies,
6
 while Alston and Gillespie find the US 
State Department reluctant to criticise “embattled allies” such as Israel, and its 
reporting potentially uneven across states and over time.
7
   They note that on the 
whole, however, the reports are “considered by many to be reasonably balanced and 
accurate”.8  Poe et al noted some bias towards trading partners, but on the whole they 
found a high degree of concurrence between AI and US State Department Human 
Rights reports.
9
   
 
Political bias was arguably more of a concern in the 1990s: for example, in 1994, in 
the context of the US-backed “war on drugs” in Bolivia the US State Department 
raised the possibility that reports of serious abuses by a US funded- and trained-
section of the national police force were potentially politically motivated and 
therefore suspect.
10
   The concern is not the US State Department’s assertion that the 
abuse allegations were politically motivated per se, but that it made this assertion in a 
context where abuse allegations had not been properly investigated.  AI did not flag 
any such doubts about the credibility of the abuse claims.
11
  In later years, the US 
State Department changed the wording of its reports to acknowledge that torture 
allegations existed and not been properly investigated (failure to investigate 
                                                 
6Nancy Qian and David Yanagizawa, ‘The Strategic Determinants of U.S. Human Rights Reporting: 
Evidence from The Cold War’ (2009) Journal of the European Economic Association 7(2-3), 446-457. 
7 In the CIRI dataset provided in appendix one, which draws on both the US State Department reports 
and Amnesty International reports, Israel receives the worst possible score on torture during the years 
2006-2010, suggesting that under-reporting of abuse in that state is not impacting on the country score. 
8
 Philip Alston and Colin Gillespie, ‘Global Human Rights Monitoring, New Technologies, and the 
Politics of Information’ (2012) European Journal of International Law 23(4), 1089-1123, 1098. 
9 Steven C. Poe, Sabine C. Carey and Tanya C. Vasquez, ‘How are these pictures different? 
A quantitative comparison of the U.S. State Department and Amnesty International Human Rights 
Reports, 1976-95’ (2001) Human Rights Quarterly 23, 650-77. 
10
 US State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994: Bolivia (1995).  
Available at http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ (accessed 5 May 2013):  “Some rural leaders exaggerated reports 
of UMOPAR abuses, making it harder to distinguish between legitimate complaints and political 
agitation”.  
11 AI, A Summary of Amnesty International’s concerns related to the Bolivian Governments 
implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (March 1997), AMR 
18/0597.   
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allegations of torture is of course a state violation in its own right), suggesting that it 
is to some degree self-correcting over time in respect of political bias.
12
    
 
(iii) Lack of sustained focus on issue by reporting body 
Unlike the fixed format of the US State Department reports, which cover the same 
categories in the same order every year, and where certain sections of text may be 
repeated from year to year, the sub-headings within each state entry in an AI report 
vary from one year to the next, so that different issues are given prominence.   AI 
reports reflect AI’s activities and priorities, and should not be read as a 
comprehensive account of all aspects of human rights in that state.  Hopgood 
describes how the concept of minimum adequate coverage (the capacity to speak with 
authority on any country and a commitment to include every state in the Annual 
Report) was modified in the mid-1990s to become strategic coverage (prioritising 
coverage based on the perceived seriousness of human rights violations, the likelihood 
of having an impact, or the usefulness of a test cases).
13
  In 2005, AI expanded its 
remit beyond its relatively narrow traditional focus on civil and political rights such as 
arbitrary detention and torture, embracing the “full spectrum” of rights, including 
economic, social and cultural rights.
14
  This development limited the space available 
for discussion of torture.  To choose one example, the country report on Nicaragua in 
2006 reported on violence against women, the right to health, indigenous peoples, 
                                                 
12 By the time of its 1997 report, the US State Department was conceding although “many such 
allegations clearly were politically motivated exaggerations, the similarity and volume of such claims 
suggest that they had some basis in truth”: US State Department Country Reports on Human Rights 
Practices for 1997: Bolivia (1998).  Available at http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ (accessed 5 May 2013). 
13
 This turbulent period of organisational repositioning is explored in detail in Stephen Hopgood, 
Keepers of the Flame: Understanding Amnesty International (Cornell University Press 2006). 
14 Stephen Bowen, ‘Full-spectrum' human rights: Amnesty International rethinks’, 2 June 2005, 
openDemocracy, available at http://www.opendemocracy.net/democracy-think_tank/amnesty_2569.jsp 
(accessed 14 January 2012).  Stephen Hopgood, ‘Amnesty International: The politics of morality’, 22 
March 2010, openDemocracy, available at http://www.opendemocracy.net/democracy-
think_tank/amnesty_morality_3625.jsp (accessed 14 January 2012). 
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labour right and LGBT rights, whereas the discussion of torture or excessive use of 
force by police in Nicagarua, previously covered in AI reports, correspondingly 
disappeared.  The US State Department report for the same year demonstrates that 
torture had not stopped being an issue in 2006. A similar trend is clear in AI reports 
on other states: Cameroon was reported by AI as having serious problems with torture 
until 2007, and then for the next few years any mention of torture disappeared from its 
country reports, with no suggestion that its lack of discussion implied that violations 
had ended.  The “disappearance” of torture from AI reports does not necessarily 
indicate an improvement, but contrariwise, it is also not safe to infer that no mention 
of torture indicates a continuation of the status quo:  in its reports on South Korea, AI 
stopped mentioning torture from 2003, whereas the US State Department reports 
describe significant improvements over the following years.    
 
This point is made not to criticise AI, or other organisations such as Human Rights 
Watch, which similarly displays changes of focus, year on year: both of these 
organisations readily acknowledge that their reporting is not exhaustive.  Their reports 
include a disclaimer to this effect, stating that silence on a given issue is not to be 
interpreted as meaning that no violation has taken place.
15
  Their reports are 
ultimately designed to support their advocacy work rather than to form the basis for 
the creation of a dataset.  It does mean, however, that caution needs to be exercised in 
relation to any coding system based solely on AI reports. If reports stop mentioning 
torture because the reporting organisation has changed its focus, and this in turn 
affects the score, there is a risk of making spurious associations.   
                                                 
15
 See discussion in Philip Alston and Colin Gillespie, ‘Global Human Rights Monitoring, New 
Technologies, and the Politics of Information’ (2012) European Journal of International Law 23(4), 
1089, 1096.  They quote the disclaimers found in the AI and HRW annual reports for 2009. 
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(iv) The translation of narratives into scores 
Neither the US State Department nor AI design their narrative reports for the purpose 
of conversion into scores.  Where a dataset attributes scores based on an (inevitably) 
arbitrary number of reported incidents, a state may appear to change its performance 
significantly where it has tortured (say) 50 people one year and 49 the next, because 
the threshold have been crossed, even though the actual change is minor, and may be 
a function of uneven reporting.  Wood and Gibney note that failure to factor in the 
size of state populations may create a misleading impression: fifty incidents in a 
country such as China, with its billion plus inhabitants, may have different 
implications compared to fifty incidents in a tiny state.
16
  With one aggregate score for 
each state, the scores conceal differences within the state based on geography 
(treatment of detainees in the capital may be very different to those in a contested 
border zone) and the individual characteristic of the detainee (ethnicity, real or 
perceived political affiliation, social class, gender, age).  Carver and Handley note that 
human rights observers have historically been more interested in the fate of political 
detainees over criminal suspects, even though the latter account for the majority of 
victims, which may skew accounts.
17
 
 
As well as absolute (reported) numbers, coders rely on the language used in reports, 
so for example the adjectives “gross”, “widespread”, “systematic”, “epidemic”, 
“extensive”, “wholesale”, “routine” or “regularly” lead to a worse score than the 
adjectives “numerous”, “many”, “various”, “dozens” or “multiple”.   Carver and 
Handley point out that this is a form of content analysis, but whereas content analysis 
                                                 
16 Reed M. Wood and Matthew Gibney, ‘The Political Terror Scale (PTS): A Re-introduction and a 
Comparison to CIRI’ (2010) Human Rights Quarterly 32(2), 367-400, 378. 
17
 Richard Carver and Lisa Handley, Does Torture Prevention Work? (Liverpool University Press 
2016), 36. 
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is normally used to study the medium (methods of communication), here it is used as 
a proxy for the underlying reality.
18
  They note the risks of assuming that word-choice 
is driven entirely by the situation on the ground and “not influenced by such factors as 
personal taste or a wish to avoid repetition”.19 
 
While noting these limitations, it is not contended that they render all efforts at 
measurement invalid.  For the reasons set out above, political bias is not currently a 
major concern with regard to the reliability of the scoring, and AI’s changes of focus 
in reporting from year to year can be compensated for by the US State Department’s 
consistency of coverage.  While imperfect, the available information is sufficiently 
robust to allow us to assign states to one of three categories (best, medium and worst 
performance on torture) and to set up useful comparisons across those categories.   
 
 
2. The available datasets on torture and ill -treatment 
Given resource limitations, it was impractical to carry out a coding exercise 
specifically for the purpose of this current research, necessitating instead the use of an 
existing dataset. Scholars have created a number of datasets scoring political 
repression levels per country-year.  The widely-used Political Terror Scale measures 
physical integrity violations, but does not disaggregate scores according to violation, 
so data relating to torture as a distinct violation compared to, say, extrajudicial killing, 
is not available.
20
  This renders it unsuitable for the current study. 
 
                                                 
18 Ibid 27. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Mark Gibney, Linda Cornett, Reed Wood, Peter Haschke, Daniel Amon and Attilio Pisano, ‘The Political Terror 
Scale’, http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/(accessed 14 January 2012).   
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Of the available torture-specific datasets, Oona Hathaway’s dataset was one of the 
earliest, with her codification exercise covering the years 1985 to 1999.
21
  She created 
this dataset in the context of an important study demonstrating that ratification of an 
international treaty on torture did not, in and of itself, necessarily lead to improved 
performance by the state in relation to this right.  While her insights remain valuable, 
her dataset is not sufficiently recent to be used in this research.  
 
Conrad and Moore created their own dataset through their Ill-Treatment and Torture 
Data Collection Project.  At the time when this analysis was undertaken, it covered 
years up until 2005, which also ends too early for this study.
22
   Aside from its end 
date, a further concern is that the choice has been made not to use data from the US 
Department of State, relying entirely on information from AI (its annual reports and 
its supplementary reports on specific countries/issues).  It has already been contended 
above that reliance on AI reporting alone creates susceptibility to information gaps 
arising from AI’s inconsistent reporting focus from year to year.   
 
In their 2016 book, Handley and Carver make use of their own dataset, the Carver-
Handley Torture Score.
23
  It takes contemporaneous human rights reports as a starting 
point, attempting to verify them through other sources, including “official and 
unofficial statistics, and extensive interviews with primary sources”.24  Their dataset 
relies on the contribution of a large number of in-country researchers and extends to 
                                                 
21
 Oona Hathaway, ‘Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?’ (2002) Yale Law Journal 111, 
1935-2042. 
22 Courtney R Conrad and Will H Moore, ‘The Ill-Treatment & Torture (ITT) Data Collection Project’, 
‘http://www.politicalscience.uncc.edu/cconra16/UNCC/ITT_Data_Collection.html  (accessed 14 
January 2012). 
23 Richard Carver and Lisa Handley, Does Torture Prevention Work? (Liverpool University Press 
2016), 39 et seq. 
24 Ibid.  
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16 countries only.  As the authors observe, this represents a relatively small dataset 
for the purposes of quantitative analysis, although the authors compensate by 
considering the states over a relatively long thirty-year period, 1985-2014.  The 16 
countries do not include those countries discussed in the case studies in later chapters, 
and this dataset is not relied on here, where a wider number of states are examined 
over a shorter period in time. 
 
The dataset used for the purposes of this chapter is the Cingranelli and Richards’ 
Human Rights Data Project (hereafter CIRI).
25
  Unlike the Political Terror Scale, this 
dataset has the advantage of being disaggregated by violation, so a specific score for 
torture can be identified; unlike Conrad and Moore, it uses both Amnesty 
International and US State Department reports.   It provides global coverage, unlike 
the Carver-Handley Torture Score.  At the time when the analysis was undertaken, it 
covered the years 1981-2011, making it more up-to-date than Hathaway and Conrad 
and Moore. 
 
The CIRI dataset has been criticised in some quarters for variance truncation: unlike 
the five- and six-point scales used by both Hathaway and Conrad and Moore, the 
CIRI scores range from 0 (worst record on torture) to 2 (best record on torture).    The 
consequence of this truncation of categories is that, as Hafner-Burton and Ron point 
out, even quite significant changes in state practice will not necessarily show up in the 
score.
26
   It is likely, furthermore, that changes will show up unevenly across the three 
                                                 
25 Full details on the Cingranelli and Richards’ Human Rights Data Project are available at 
http://www.humanrightsdata.org/index.asp 
26
 Emilie M. Hafner-Burton and James Ron, “Seeing Double Human Rights Impact through 
Qualitative and Quantitative Eyes” (2009), World Politics 61(2), 360–401.  The authors make this point 
in relation to the use of quantitative scoring methods in general rather than to the CIRI dataset in 
particular. 
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categories: one or two anomalous incidents of ill-treatment that receive considerable 
attention by virtue of being unusual could cause the state in question to be reclassified 
from 2 to 1, whereas a state already scored at 0 could experience a marked surge in 
torture with no opportunity for a change in score.  While these designations lack 
nuance, however, their parsimony does ensure that they are robust.  The use of such 
broad categories compensates to a degree for the differential availability of 
information about state performance: broad but robust categories are to be preferred 
over a more finely-graduated but potentially less reliable categorisation.  It can be said 
with a reasonable degree of reliability that a detainee is at most risk of ill-treatment in 
a state scoring 0, at medium risk in a state scoring 1, and at least risk in a state scoring 
2, even though there is a spectrum of risk within each category, particularly the 
categories reflecting a score of 1 and 0.   
 
Fariss argues that all the standard datasets underestimate human rights improvements, 
because they fail to take into account the fact that “[t]he standard of accountability 
used to assess state behaviors becomes more stringent as monitors look harder for 
abuse, look in more places for abuse, and classify more acts as abuse”.27  He proposes 
that scores be adjusted over time to account for the fact that the same score several 
decades apart may represent different levels of achievement.  As this chapter concerns 
itself with state performance over a relatively short period, no such adjustment has 
been deemed necessary here: the assumption is made that neither the understanding of 
what constitutes ill-treatment nor how is it identified has changed significantly within 
the period under examination. 
 
                                                 
27 Christopher Fariss, ‘Respect for Human Rights has Improved Over Time: Modeling the Changing 
Standard of Accountability’ (2014) American Political Science Review 108(2), 297–318. 
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Having ascertained the most appropriate dataset for the purposes of measuring torture, 
the next step is to identify a method for measuring civil society activism. 
 
3. The challenge of measuring civil society activism  
 
Assessing levels of civil society activism in a state is not straightforward, even 
without the difficulty of disaggregating activism specifically on torture.  In a weak 
state, civil society may be highly engaged in carrying out what are more usually seen 
as state functions (education, health, development), while the state’s weakness also 
means it lacks effective control over its agents and/or its territory, so that high levels 
of torture co-exist with high levels of civil society.  It is therefore not enough to 
measure rates of civil society presence alone, as this measure does not distinguish a 
state’s willingness to engage with civil society from a state’s derogation of certain 
areas of responsibility to civil society.  The sectors in which torture typically occurs, 
justice and security, are not sectors that states will readily cede to civil society, so a 
high civil society score due to many CSO-run schools and health clinics, for example, 
does not necessarily indicate that the state is amenable to civil society intervention in 
its handling of political or criminal detainees.    
 
Assessing activism is of course a complex task in itself, involving more than simply 
counting the number of CSOs at work:  multiple CSOs may reinforce each other, or 
may duplicate work and compete with each other.
28
  The mere fact that an CSO exists 
does not mean it is active: some may be “briefcase NGOs”, set up in a cynical bid to 
                                                 
28
 See for example the OSCE’s report on its torture prevention work in Bosnia-Herzogovina:  “[T]he 
multiplicity of local actors had brought negative consequence, as rivalries between NGOs in the 
context of discussions on the creation of a network to establish a public monitoring mechanism [on 
torture] led to the process being stalled”: OSCE/ODIHR, The Fight against Torture: The OSCE 
Experience (ODIHR 2009), 20. 
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attract funding; some may be well-intentioned but are not very active in a given year, 
for reasons such as turnover of key personnel, not unusual given the funding 
constraints common to the sector.  Nor does counting the number of CSOs which 
include torture in their mandate indicate how much pressure is brought to bear on the 
state to amend its current practices in this area: a torture rehabilitation organisation 
may focus entirely on supporting victims of political torture from a past regime, 
having little to no involvement with present-day issues of ill-treatment within the 
criminal justice system.  Conversely, an organisation working on gender equality 
could be carrying out advocacy relevant to torture, although framing it in terms of 
women’s physical integrity rights rather than specifically as torture.  Also, not all 
activism is necessarily undertaken by NGOs – it may be undertaken by individuals or 
groups working in journalism, the law, trade unions, religious groups or social 
movements.  Some manifestations may be fleeting and hard to capture: a religious 
leader praying publicly for compassion in the justice system; a lobbyist’s private 
conversation with a politician.  Activism is not always undertaken steadily over the 
course of years – campaigns may be short-lived.  Particularly in large states, activism 
may focus on one area, such as the capital city, and engage to a lesser extent with 
other parts of the country.  The variety of ways in which activism may be manifested 
is explored in the next chapter, but the relevant point here is that quantification is 
difficult.  
 
Despite these challenges, there are some existing attempts at measuring civil society 
strength.  CIVICUS produces reports which assess the environment in which civil 
society operates and the impact it has on the state; at the time of writing, the existing 
dataset is too limited for the analysis undertaken here.  USAID publishes a Civil 
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Society Organization (CSO) Sustainability Index, which measures civil society 
strength, including a specific score on advocacy.  The country advocacy score is 
based on CSOs’ record in relation to influencing public policy in that state, taking into 
account the opportunities for forming coalitions and networks, their ability to 
communicate with the public and to articulate their message to government officials, 
and whether they can monitor state performance.
29
  This dataset is a good fit for the 
current research, although it is not possible to distinguish torture-specific advocacy 
levels.
30
  Unfortunately it only covers a limited number of states for the years during 
which CIRI scores are also available, yielding a relatively low number of observations 
for the purposes of statistical analysis.  Advocacy scores are available for 25 states for 
the years 2000-2010: these scores are used below in an initial test of the hypothesis 
that higher levels of civil society advocacy are associated with a better state 
performance on torture.  However, the number of observations is too low to 
disaggregate the data in order to test the strength of the association under different 
conditions. 
 
                                                 
29 Definition available at USAID, ‘CSO Sustainability Index Methodology’, 
https://www.usaid.gov/what-we-do/democracy-human-rights-and-governance/cso-sustainability-index-
methodology (accessed 4 February 2018). 
30
 Hafner-Burton has measured the naming and shaming by NGOs of state performance on a range of 
rights by counting the number of Amnesty International press releases or background reports 
publishing per year per state:  Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, ‘Sticks and Stones: Naming and Shaming the 
Human Rights Enforcement Problem’, (2008) International Organization 62(4), 689-716 at 697.  
However, as will be described in detail in the next chapter, naming and shaming does not exhaust the 
category of activism under examination here.  Likewise, the work of one prominent international 
organisation is not sufficiently illustrative of local civil society activism, which is important here 
alongside international activism.  DeMeritt and Conrad have created a dataset on the shaming of states 
by the UN Commission on Human Rights and the UN Human Rights Council specifically in relation to 
torture: see Courtenay R. Conrad and Jaqueline DeMerrit, ‘Unintended Consequences: The Effect of 
Advocacy to End Torture on Empowerment Rights Violations’, 159-183 in Examining Torture: 
Empirical Studies of State Repression, eds. Tracy Lightcap and James Pfiffner (Palgrave MacMillan, 
2014).  Again, data on naming and shaming provides only a partial picture of activism, and shaming 
undertaken by these two UN bodies, which has a very particular political context, is not necessarily 
illustrative of activism by civil society.   
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Because it is important to have a larger dataset to ensure that the association is valid 
and to control for variables that may influence the relationship between civil society 
activism and performance on torture, it has been found necessary to use another 
dataset, the Freedom House annual scores on associational and organisational rights 
which measure the state’s openness to civil society activism, ie. its respect for the 
rights that effectively create the political space in which civil society can operate.  It is 
not necessarily the case that the political space available for activism will be perfectly 
exploited by activists, but at least in principle, a facilitative environment should be 
relevant to the contribution that it is possible for civil society activism to make within 
a given social and political context.
31
  The Freedom House only began to publish 
scores on associational and organisational rights from 2006 onwards.  The analysis 
therefore focuses on the years 2006-2010, a five-year period for which both CIRI 
scores on torture and Freedom House scores on openness to activism are available. 
 
Use of a rights-based score has a limitation that must be acknowledged.  States that 
respect one right (the right of individuals not to be tortured) may also be more likely 
to respect another set of rights (associational and organisational rights).  There is a 
risk of circularity in finding that a rights-respecting state in one respect is a rights-
respecting state in another respect.  At the same time, an advantage of using openness 
to activism as an indicator rather than levels of activism per se is that it protects 
against endogeneity, as the dependent variable is less likely to drive the independent 
variable.  One reason a state with high openness to activism may have little torture-
                                                 
31 In the Freedom House dataset, scores are based on a scale of 0 to 4 for each of three questions where 
a score of 0 represents the smallest degree and 4 the greatest degree of rights or liberties present.  States 
score highly where there is freedom of assembly, demonstration, and open public discussion (so, 
for example, peaceful protests are permitted); where there is freedom for nongovernmental 
organizations (members can go about their work without undue interference); and where there 
are free trade unions or an equivalent. See 
 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-
2011/  (accessed 19 May 2013). 
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specific activism is because there is no felt need, as little or no torture occurs in that 
state.  More torture may thus mean more torture-related activism (albeit perhaps not a 
linear increase, as the risks to activists become higher with increased torture, leading 
to a potential tapering off of activism where torture is highest).  By contrast, more 
torture would not be expected to drive more state openness to activism. 
 
4. Control variables 
As discussed in the previous chapter, a number of variables have been identified as 
influencing the prevalence of torture; to isolate the impact of openness to activism, it 
is necessary to control for these intervening factors.  
(i) Conflict 
Data on conflict is taken from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program.
32
  The threshold 
for conflict is deemed to be at least 25 battle-related deaths per calendar year, across 
the categories of intrastate, interstate, one-sided and non-state conflict.  Some scholars 
prefer to use a lower threshold for conflict; for example, Conrad and Moore deem 
violent dissent to be present if a state experiences at least one act of guerrilla war or is 
coded by the Correlates of War project as experiencing a civil war in a given year.  
The authors apply this threshold to test whether even relatively low levels of conflict 
change the probability of whether a state uses torture.  The higher threshold applied in 
this research here poses a slightly different question: whether civil society activism 
can still have an observable effect even in states with some low-level dissent.  The 
scores have been used to create a dichotomous classification of states as experiencing 
conflict versus not experiencing conflict. 
                                                 
32 Uppsala Conflict Data Program, available at http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/search.php (accessed 
18 February 2015) 
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(ii) Democracy 
To determine level of democracy, the Freedom House score for political rights is 
used.  States are assessed on the electoral process, political pluralism and 
participation, and functioning of government. The score is independent of the score 
for associational and organisational rights.  It is a 7-point scale, with the lowest scores 
representing the strongest democracies.  States have been divided into three 
categories: high democracy states (based on a Freedom House Political Rights score 
of 1); medium democracy states (score of 2-5) and low democracy states (score of 6-
7).
33
  Data tables are provided for reference in Appendix 1. 
(iii) Population size 
Using data from 2010, states are categorised as having a small population size as 
(under 2 million), a medium population (between 2 and 22 million) and large 
(over 22 million).
34
   
 
 
5. Presentation of findings 
As a visual aid, heat maps are used here to depict the distribution of performance on 
torture within each category, alongside statistical analyses to identify the degree of 
statistical significance of the associations identified.  In each heat map, states in the 
relevant category are listed in descending order of advocacy score (first set of 
findings) and then openness to activism (second set of findings).  Full country-year 
scores are provided in the appendix, but omitted in the chapter.  In the following 
                                                 
33
 Freedom House, ‘Freedom in the World: Aggregate and Subcategory Scores’, 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-aggregate-and-subcategory-scores (accessed 30 
November 2016). 
34
 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Annual statistics.  Montenegro is omitted 
as scores are not available for 2006. 
 75 
 
graphs, the state’s performance on torture over the period is colour-coded to show the 
best, medium and worst performance on torture.  The heat map should be read from 
top to bottom.  If performance on torture improves in association with openness to 
activism, we would therefore expect to see a heat map that appears as follows, with 
the best country-year performances (represented by dark green) on torture clustered at 
the top of the table, in the area showing most openness to activism, and the worst 
country-year performances on torture (represented by orange) at the bottom of the 
table, where there is least openness to activism.  States with middling levels of civil 
society advocacy/openness to activism are located in the middle of the table, and 
show a middling performance on torture (light green). 
States in descending 
order of advocacy or 
openness to activism 
 
 
Best performance on torture  
   
   
Medium performance on torture   
   
   
Worst performance on torture   
   
Figure1   Sample heat map where advocacy/openness to activism is associated  
  with state performance on torture 
 
The closer a heat map is to this ideal pattern, the stronger the association between 
openness to activism and performance on torture.   
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6. Association between advocacy and performance on torture  
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CSO 
advocacy 
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advocacy 
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Figure 2 States in descending order of CSO advocacy scores, colour-coded according  
to state performance on torture (for 25 states where scores are available) 
 
Full country scores are provided in the appendix on p.295.  Using the USAID CSO 
Sustainability Index advocacy scores and the CIRI torture scores, this heat map shows 
that the best and medium performance on torture (dark green and light green colour-
coding respectively) occurs most often in states with high and medium advocacy 
scores.   The category of states with low CSO advocacy scores contains the worst 
performances on torture.  This table indicates that there is a linear relationship 
between CSO advocacy and state performance on torture, ie. as CSO advocacy 
increases, state performance on torture also improves. 
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Represented as a cross-tabulation, the figures are as follows:
35
 
 
Advocacy * Torture Crosstabulation 
 
Torture 
Total Worst Medium Best 
Advocacy Low Count 85 10 0 95 
% within Advocacy 89.5% 10.5% 0.0% 100.0% 
Medium Count 65 60 9 134 
% within Advocacy 48.5% 44.8% 6.7% 100.0% 
High Count 5 37 3 45 
% within Advocacy 11.1% 82.2% 6.7% 100.0% 
Total Count 155 107 12 274 
% within Advocacy 56.6% 39.1% 4.4% 100.0% 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymptotic 
Significance (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 84.924
a
 4 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 97.190 4 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 73.128 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 274   
a. 2 cells (22.2%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.97. 
 
As two cells have an expected count of under 5, results are rechecked combining best 
and medium categories on torture, yielding the following (almost identical) result. 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymptotic 
Significance (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 83.259
a
 2 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 94.128 2 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 82.873 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 274   
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 19.54. 
 
                                                 
35 High advocacy indicates a score of 2.9 or below; medium advocacy is 3.0 to 3.9; low advocacy is over 4.0.  Full 
data provided in appendix. 
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This test indicates that there is a statistically significant association between CSO 
advocacy and state performance on torture at p=0.01.  A further test, equivalent to a 
correlation between these ordinal variables, confirms the strong association. 
 
Correlations 
 Advocacy Torture 
Spearman's rho Advocacy Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .550
**
 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 
N 274 274 
Torture Correlation Coefficient .550
**
 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . 
N 274 274 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
This finding strongly supports the hypothesis that a higher score for CSO advocacy is 
correlated with better state performance on torture. 
 
As noted earlier in the chapter, the USAID dataset on CSO advocacy covers only a 
limited number of states for this time period. Numbers are too low to allow 
examination of whether this association persists when we control for factors such as 
conflict and democracy levels. To fill the gap, we turn to the dataset produced by 
Freedom House, which allows us to rank states by their openness to civil society 
activism.  We now examine whether openness to activism is correlated with better 
performance on torture independently of conflict, democracy levels, and population 
size.  
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7. Association between state openness to activism and performance 
on torture, controlling for conflict  
For states not experiencing conflict, the relationship between levels of openness to 
activism and state performance on torture can be represented as follows. 
States without conflict 
High state 
openness to 
civil society 
activism 
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Figure 3 States in descending order of openness to activism,  
 (based on 141states not experiencing conflict) 
 
Full country scores are provided in the appendix on p.296-299.  The graph suggests 
that although the association is not perfect, better performance on torture is 
concentrated in the states most open to civil society activism.  Dark green (best 
performance on torture) predominates at the top of the table, amongst states most 
open to activism, while the worst performances on torture are clustered at the bottom 
of the table (states least open to activism).  On the whole, states which are more open 
to activism perform better on torture than states which are less open.  Using statistical 
tests leads to the following results. 
Openness * Torture Crosstab (states without conflict) 
 
Torture 
Total Worst Best/med 3 
Openness Low Count 87 18 20 125 
% within Openness 69.6% 14.4% 16.0% 100.0% 
Medium Count 101 121 23 245 
% within Openness 41.2% 49.4% 9.4% 100.0% 
High Count 48 181 106 335 
% within Openness 14.3% 54.0% 31.6% 100.0% 
Total Count 236 320 149 705 
% within Openness 33.5% 45.4% 21.1% 100.0% 
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Chi-Square Tests (states without conflict) 
 Value df Asymptotic Significance (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 157.687
a
 4 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 167.226 4 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 107.790 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 705   
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 26.42. 
 
 
There is a significant association between openness to activism and performance on 
torture in states without conflict at p=0.01.  Its strength is confirmed by Spearman’s 
rank-order correlation. 
 
Correlations (states without conflict) 
 Openness Torture 
Spearman's rho Openness Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .408
**
 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 
N 705 705 
Torture Correlation Coefficient .408
**
 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . 
N 705 705 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
States with conflict 
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Figure 4  States in descending order of openness to  
CSO activism (based on 48 states experiencing  
conflict in one or more years 2006-2010) 
 
Full country scores are provided in the appendix on p.299-300.  The most obvious 
point is that states experiencing conflict rarely score highly on openness to activism 
(Israel being the only exception), and there are no cases in which a state experiencing 
conflict demonstrates the best score on torture.  Comparing this graph with the 
previous one confirms that states experiencing conflict generally perform poorly on 
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torture, although medium-open states perform slightly better than low-open states.   
This can be demonstrated statistically as follows:  
 
Openness * Torture Crosstab (states with conflict) 
 
Torture 
Total Worst Best/med 
Openness Low Count 79 21 100 
% within Openness 79.0% 21.0% 100.0% 
High/med Count 99 41 140 
% within Openness 70.7% 29.3% 100.0% 
Total Count 178 62 240 
% within Openness 74.2% 25.8% 100.0% 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests (states with conflict) 
 Value df 
Asymptotic 
Significance (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact 
Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 2.090
a
 1 .148   
Continuity Correction
b
 1.680 1 .195   
Likelihood Ratio 2.123 1 .145   
Fisher's Exact Test    .179 .097 
Linear-by-Linear Association 2.081 1 .149   
N of Valid Cases 240     
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 25.83. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
Correlations (states with conflict) 
 Openness Torture 
Spearman's rho Openness Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .093 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .149 
N 240 240 
Torture Correlation Coefficient .093 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .149 . 
N 240 240 
 
Spearman’s rho remains positive, although the association is weaker than in states 
without conflict. 
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8. Association between state openness to activism and performance 
on torture, controlling for democracy
High democracy 
High  
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with a FH score on 
political rights of 1 
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Figure 6  Based on 63 states 
with a FH score on 
political rights of 2-4 
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Figure 7  Based on 67 states 
with a FH score on 
political rights of 5-7 
 
Full country scores are provided in the appendix on p.301-305.  High democracy 
states are nearly all highly open to activism; a few states (USA, Japan, Grenada) have 
only medium levels of openness, but no highly-democratic state showed low openness 
to activism.  Given the skewed distribution in this category, comparing torture 
performance in high versus medium open states does not lead to a statistically reliable 
result, and so a statistical analysis is not undertaken here.   Conversely, none of the 
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low democracy states can be categorised as highly open to activism.  Even comparing 
medium openness to low openness to activism, it does not seem to be the case that the 
former category performs better on torture than the latter. The category of low 
democracies with low openness to activism contains a number of states with an 
anomalously good performance, such Brunei, Bhutan and Qatar.  There are a number 
of possible explanations for this puzzle.  As shown below, states with small 
populations tend to perform better on torture than would be expected based on their 
openness to activism.  Chapter one also referred to the contention that in states where 
power is not shared, either through a multi-party system or otherwise, individuals are 
less likely to defect against the regime, which so the state perceives less need to use 
torture. By this logic, the most complete autocracies would be expected to experience 
less torture than less complete autocracies.
168
  The mixed picture above does not 
entirely support this view: it seems to be true of some states but not others, perhaps on 
the basis of a state’s capacity to control its agents, as discussed in chapter one.  It may 
be the case that conditions in the low democracy states are so unfavourable to 
activism that there is very little scope for civil society to monitor and report on 
torture, so that the absence of reported torture appears as an absence of actual torture, 
a corollary to the information paradox discussed earlier in the chapter.   
 
Only medium democracies exhibit high, medium and low openness to activism.  In 
this category, the states with high openness to activism perform better overall on 
torture than the states with low openness (which uniformly perform badly on torture), 
but there is a great degree of variation, particularly in the states with medium 
openness.   
                                                 
168 James Vreeland, ‘Political Institutions and Human Rights: Why Dictatorships Enter into the United 
Nations Convention against Torture’ (2008) International Organization 62, 65-101. 
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Openness * Torture Crosstab (medium democracy) 
 
Torture 
Total Worst Medium Best 
Openness Medium/Low Count 111 113 21 245 
% within Openness 45.3% 46.1% 8.6% 100.0% 
High Count 22 38 10 70 
% within Openness 31.4% 54.3% 14.3% 100.0% 
Total Count 133 151 31 315 
% within Openness 42.2% 47.9% 9.8% 100.0% 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests (medium democracy)  
 Value df Asymptotic Significance (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 5.047
a
 2 .080 
Likelihood Ratio 5.046 2 .080 
Linear-by-Linear Association 5.010 1 .025 
N of Valid Cases 315   
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 6.89. 
 
As the category for low openness to activism is so small, it is combined here with 
medium openness.  The association is below the threshold for significance where p = 
0.01 although it is significant at a lower threshold of p = 0.1; significance is affected 
by the lower number of observations.  Again, Spearman’s rho is positive. 
 
Correlations (medium democracy) 
 Openness Torture 
Spearman's rho Openness Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .126
*
 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .025 
N 315 315 
Torture Correlation Coefficient .126
*
 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .025 . 
N 315 315 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Moving to low democracy states, there are no low democracy states that are also 
highly open to activism, so we can only compare states with medium openness to 
activism and states with low openness to activism. 
 
Openness * Torture Crosstab (low democracy) 
 
Torture 
Total Worst Medium Best 
Openness Low Count 155 50 0 205 
% within Openness 75.6% 24.4% 0.0% 100.0% 
Medium Count 85 0 45 130 
% within Openness 65.4% 0.0% 34.6% 100.0% 
Total Count 240 50 45 335 
% within Openness 71.6% 14.9% 13.4% 100.0% 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests (low democracy) 
 Value df Asymptotic Significance (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 103.830
a
 2 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 135.480 2 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 31.153 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 335   
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 17.46. 
 
Using this measure, there is a significant association between openness to activism 
and performance on torture at p=0.01.  
 
Correlations (low democracy) 
 Openness Torture 
Spearman's rho Openness Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .199
**
 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 
N 335 335 
Torture Correlation Coefficient .199
**
 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . 
N 335 335 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
Rho remains positive for both medium and low democracy countries.    
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9. Association between state openness to activism and performance 
on torture, controlling for population size  
Small populations 
High 
openness  
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Figure 10  Based on 50 states 
with populations over 
22 million in 2010 
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Full country scores are provided in the appendix on p.306-310.  It is immediately 
obvious that size matters: the states with the smallest populations generally perform 
much better on torture than the states with the largest populations (ie. of the three 
graphs, the one for small populations has the most green overall, and the most dark 
green).  States with small populations tend to be more open to activism than states 
with medium or large populations, and even where not open, at least some small 
states apparently still perform well on torture (Brunei, Bhutan, Qatar). As noted at 
the start of the chapter, this may be because smaller states have a lesser principal-
agent problem, because they have higher levels of social or material vulnerability 
to international influence, because state authorities are more accessible to activists, 
or it may be due to some other factor, such as a greater sense of national identity 
and solidarity within the population, and/or fewer social cleavages. Alternatively, 
and more negatively, it may be because this category includes a number of 
complete autocracies: Vreeland noted, as pointed out above, that in these complete 
autocracies, torture is less likely to be used as the political leader is not fending off 
challenge.  Again, as noted previously, it could also be a reporting issue, with the 
smallest states lacking human rights professionals who can gather and publish 
information on torture violations.   
 
For states with medium and large populations, the better performances on torture 
are clustered in the most open states; this is particularly marked in the states with 
the largest populations.  We can see a linear association between openness to civil 
society activism and performance on torture, particularly in the largest states, where 
good performance on torture is concentrated in the highly-open states, and bad 
performance on torture is concentrated in states with low openness.  Subjecting the 
same data to standard statistical tests yields the following results.  
 
 
 
Openness * Torture Crosstab (small population) 
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Torture 
Total Worst Medium Best 
Openness Low Count 11 19 10 40 
% within Openness 27.5% 47.5% 25.0% 100.0% 
Medium Count 1 48 16 65 
% within Openness 1.5% 73.8% 24.6% 100.0% 
High Count 11 59 60 130 
% within Openness 8.5% 45.4% 46.2% 100.0% 
Total Count 23 126 86 235 
% within Openness 9.8% 53.6% 36.6% 100.0% 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests (small population) 
 Value df Asymptotic Significance (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 31.722
a
 4 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 29.819 4 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 12.547 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 235   
a. 1 cells (11.1%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.91. 
 
This test shows that there is a significant association, where p is 0.01.  However, its 
validity is affected by the fact that there is an expected count of less than 5 in the 
category of states with low openness and the worst performance on torture.  We can 
repeat the exercise by combining the categories of medium and low openness to 
activism, so the question is now whether states with high openness to activism 
perform better on torture than states with medium and low openness to activism. 
 
Chi-Square Tests (small population) 
 Value df Asymptotic Significance (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 11.463
a
 2 .003 
Likelihood Ratio 11.703 2 .003 
Linear-by-Linear Association 8.756 1 .003 
N of Valid Cases 235   
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 10.28. 
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Again, with p = 0.01, the association is significant. Spearman’s rho is positive. 
 
Correlations (small population) 
 Openness Torture 
Spearman's rho Openness Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .204
**
 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .002 
N 235 235 
Torture Correlation Coefficient .204
**
 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .002 . 
N 235 235 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
Turning to medium populations, we find, once more, that the relationship is 
significant. 
Openness * Torture Crosstab (medium population) 
 
Torture 
Total Worst Medium Best 
Openness Low Count 75 15 10 100 
% within Openness 75.0% 15.0% 10.0% 100.0% 
Medium Count 116 83 1 200 
% within Openness 58.0% 41.5% 0.5% 100.0% 
High Count 25 85 35 145 
% within Openness 17.2% 58.6% 24.1% 100.0% 
Total Count 216 183 46 445 
% within Openness 48.5% 41.1% 10.3% 100.0% 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests (medium population) 
 Value df Asymptotic Significance (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 120.221
a
 4 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 138.991 4 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 79.643 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 445   
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 10.34. 
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Correlations (medium population) 
 Openness Torture 
Spearman's rho Openness Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .447
**
 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 
N 445 445 
Torture Correlation Coefficient .447
**
 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . 
N 445 445 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
The association between the variables is stronger in states with medium populations 
than in those with small populations, and as we shall see below, it is strongest of all in 
states with the largest populations. 
 
 
Openness * Torture Crosstab (large population) 
 
Torture 
Total Worst Medium Best 
Openness Low Count 67 3 0 70 
% within Openness 95.7% 4.3% 0.0% 100.0% 
Medium Count 82 32 6 120 
% within Openness 68.3% 26.7% 5.0% 100.0% 
High Count 17 35 8 60 
% within Openness 28.3% 58.3% 13.3% 100.0% 
Total Count 166 70 14 250 
% within Openness 66.4% 28.0% 5.6% 100.0% 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests (large population) 
 Value df Asymptotic Significance (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 66.478
a
 4 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 74.264 4 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 59.134 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 250   
a. 2 cells (22.2%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.36. 
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Once more there is a significant association between openness to activism and 
performance on torture, with p =0.01.  Given the presence of two cells with an 
expected count under 5, we redo the test combining the categories of best and 
medium performance on torture. 
 
Chi-Square Tests (large population) 
 Value df Asymptotic Significance (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 66.133
a
 2 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 73.036 2 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 64.763 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 250   
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 20.16. 
 
 
The significance of the association persists. 
 
Correlations (large population) 
 Openness Torture 
Spearman's rho Openness Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .509
**
 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 
N 250 250 
Torture Correlation Coefficient .509
**
 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . 
N 250 250 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
The evidence demonstrates that there is a significant relationship between a state’s 
openness to activism and its performance on torture, and this relationship persists 
when controlling for conflict, democracy levels, and population size. 
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10. Changes over time 
 
Having considered a static measure (what factors affect levels of torture), it is also 
useful to consider a dynamic comparison: what factors contribute to changing levels 
of torture?  How do the trends compare over the years from 2006-2010?  If openness 
to civil society activism has a causal relationship with an improvement in torture, the 
expectation would be that an improvement in openness would predate an 
improvement in torture.  We should not necessarily expect this change to occur within 
a set time-frame: some reform may show up in the scores fairly quickly (eg. the 
introduction and crucially, the enforcement, of stronger sanctions for police officers 
using torture to elicit confessions) while others may be much longer-term (eg. 
changes to the curriculum in police training may have little impact until serving 
officers begin to retire or be replaced over time so that a critical mass is achieved of 
serving officers with human rights training).  We are concerned here only with the 
overall trends rather than attempting to identify cases of an increase in advocacy in 
one year showing up as an improvement on torture in the subsequent year(s).   
 
It should be emphasised that the following tables are offered primarily as descriptive 
data rather than an attempt to test the hypotheses very directly.  Torture levels are 
subject to a number of influences, and the complexities will be explored in detail in 
later chapters.  The following observations on trends can only be suggestive.  
 
A table of the average scores is provided in the appendix.  The relevant information 
here is the trend data, so for ease of comparison, the average CIRI score (between 0 
and 2) has been multiplied by 10 so it can be viewed alongside the average FH score 
(between 0 and 12).  Because the activism score covers a wider range of scores, it 
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registers smaller changes than the score on torture, which can only show bigger jumps 
across the categories of best, medium and worst. 
 
States with and without conflict  
 
Figure 11   Changes in CIRI torture scores compared to changes in FH openness scores 
 
Full country scores are provided in the appendix on p.310.  Trends in torture 
performance appear to demonstrate a relationship with trends in openness to activism.  
In states without conflict, the highest score for openness to activism occurs in 2008, 
preceding the best performance on torture (2009).  In states affected by conflict, both 
openness to civil society and performance follow a similar trend, a decline in 2007, a 
temporary improvement in 2008, and a further decline over the following years.  
These matching trends are not in themselves proof of causation – one must beware 
the post hoc fallacy – but they are consistent with the hypothesis that activism leads 
to improved performance on torture 
 
Repeating the exercise while controlling for democracy rather than conflict produces 
the following results. 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Torture in states
without conflict
Torture in states
with conflict
Openess in
states without
conflict
Openess in
states with
conflict
 96 
 
States with High, Medium and Low Levels of Democracy  
 
Figure 12  Changes in CIRI torture scores compared to changes in FH openness scores 
Full country scores are provided in the appendix on p.311.  As demonstrated above, 
states with high levels of democracy demonstrate a better performance on torture than 
states with medium and low levels of democracy.  There is very little change in either 
performance on torture or openness to activism in the most democratic states, 
consistent with the argument that the overall performance on torture is satisfactory 
enough to reduce the need for civil society pressure for improvement.
169
  In the 
medium democracies, states’ performance on torture varies more over the five-year 
period.  The best score in relation to openness to activism is in 2007, while the best 
performance on torture is seen in the two subsequent years, 2008 and 2009, again 
consistent with a hypothesis that increased openness to activism drives improved 
performance on torture.  The most obvious trend in the low-democracy states is a 
decline in both performance on torture and openness to activism.  Performance on 
                                                 
169 Beth Simmons’ reasoning in this area is explored in more detail in the previous chapter. 
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torture rallies temporarily in 2009, although there is not an obvious link to a change 
in openness to activism. 
 
States with small, medium and large populations  
 
Figure 13  Changes in CIRI torture scores compared to changes in FH openness scores 
 
Full country scores are provided in the appendix on p.311-2.  By and large, we see 
that performance on torture tracks openness to activism.  For small populations, the 
best year for both openness and performance on torture was 2006.  For medium 
populations, openness peaks in 2007, while torture performance improves in 2008 
and peaks in 2009, which accords with the hypothesis that increased openness to 
activism leads to better state performance on torture.  In states with large populations, 
openness and activism both peak in 2006; the lowest level of openness comes in 
2008, while the worst performance on torture is a year later, in 2009.   
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11. Conclusion 
The above analyses indicate a positive association between political space for 
activism and an improved state performance on torture, particularly in states not 
experiencing conflict, and in states with medium to large populations.  Examining 
trends over a five-year period demonstrates that the data is consistent with the 
contention that there is a causal relationship (although it not contended that causation 
has been established), with an improvement in openness to activism in one year being 
associated, in many but not all cases, with an improvement in torture practices in 
subsequent years.   The period examined is perhaps too short to allow for a very 
robust examination of this point, and it should be borne in mind that causality is not 
necessarily uni-directional: freedom for activism may mean that civil society is 
effective in combating on torture, and a lower threat of torture may encourage civil 
society to be more active.  States may enter “virtuous circles” where higher activism 
contributes to less torture which in turn contributes to higher activism, as well as 
“vicious circles” where the opposite happens.   
 
Chapter four will set out the logic underlying the choice of case studies: in line with 
the findings above, case selection focuses on states of medium size, without ongoing 
conflict, and falling within the category of medium democracies.  In describing the 
difficulty of measuring activism, this chapter has alluded to the fact that activism 
manifests itself in a variety of ways.  As preparation for the case studies, therefore, 
the next chapter attempts to capture some of the rich diversity of activism in action, in 
order to be clearer about what we are looking for when attempting to identify the 
presence of activism on torture in a given state. 
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Chapter 3   Civil Society Mechanisms for Influencing the State 
 
Chapter one explored the theory of how states can be influenced to improve their 
record on torture, examining the scope conditions under which attempts to influence 
the state are likely to be successful and the theories underlying how influence works.  
Chapter two assessed the empirical evidence to support the hypothesis that (a) higher 
levels of civil society advocacy are associated with better state performance on torture 
and (b) higher levels of state openness to civil society activism are associated with 
better state performance on torture.  This chapter moves from theories of influence to 
a practical consideration of what would-be influencers actually do.   
 
The first section sets out a basic typology of human rights organisations and the next 
section is a typology of their campaigning strategies.  The remaining part of the 
chapter covers the major categories of activity undertaken by the organisations: 
information-based strategies; dialogue; strategic litigation; and the implementation of 
practical safeguards to protect persons deprived of their liberty, including detention 
monitoring.  By identifying the range of options open to NGOs, the ground is 
prepared for an examination in the case study chapters of what strategic choices 
organisations have made (to the extent that they are choices, rather than decisions 
dictated by the socio-political environment) as well as how impactful their activities 
have been. 
 
The following description of civil society activism should be understood in the 
context of a wider regional and international framework.  The framing of civil society 
 100 
 
demands and the channels through which these demands are articulated are heavily 
shaped by the regional and international frameworks: the treaties, soft law, 
institutions and mechanisms put in place by the UN, the Council of Europe, the Inter-
American and the African systems.  Civil society activism predates these human 
rights frameworks (see for example eighteenth and nineteenth century campaigning 
against the slave trade), and civil society activism helped to create these frameworks 
and the treaties within them.
1
  Of particular relevance to the fight against torture is the 
history of how UNCAT received its initial impetus from a 1973 report by Amnesty 
International on torture worldwide.
2
   Having predated these supranational 
frameworks and helped to create them, civil society also makes much strategic use of 
them: for example, by bringing legal cases to regional human rights courts, flagging 
concerns with treaty bodies and special rapporteurs, and issuing shadow reports 
alongside the state’s own reports on its progress.  As noted in the introduction, 
international law also mandates the existence of a potentially important ally for NGOs 
at national level, the National Preventive Mechanisms (NPMs), created under the 
Optional Protocol to the UN Convention against Torture (OPCAT).  
 
Within this international legal framework, we now turn to the distinct role played by 
local and international civil society. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 On the importance of NGOs in the creation of the UDHR and the architecture of the UN system, see 
William Korey, NGOs and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: A Curious Grapevine 
(Macmillan 1998).  
2
 Nigel Rodley in Carrie Booth Wallig and Susan Waltz Human Rights: From Practice to Policy.  
Proceedings of a Research Workshop, Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy, University of 
Michigan, October 2010 (University of Michigan 2011). 
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1. Typology of human rights organisations 
 
The World Bank has classified NGOs into two broad categories, advocacy 
organisations (who attempt to influence state policies) and operational organisations 
(who focus on the delivery of projects).
3
  Organisations working on torture can be 
either, or a hybrid of both: some focus purely on campaigning, with no direct 
provision to torture survivors; some focus on delivering medical, psychosocial and 
rehabilitation services.  While this service delivery can be combined with advocacy, it 
is not invariably the case; for example, an organisation focusing on the rehabilitation 
of victims of torture under a past political regime may not undertake advocacy in 
relation to the practices of the current government. 
 
Advocacy organisations can be sub-divided further based on their orientation.  Brysk 
sees human rights movements as made up of “overlapping clusters of institutional 
reformers, advocates, affected populations and norm-promoters”.4  The first category 
often includes lawyers who document abuses and may use a strategic litigation 
strategy.  Her term “advocates” refers to the tradition of a “conscious constituency” 
prepared to lobby governments on behalf of victims who cannot speak for 
themselves, whereas “affected populations” speak on their own behalf and often 
engage in symbolic protests. While all of the above could be considered “norm-
promoters” in one form or another, she uses this term to denote normative 
constituencies mobilised around a particular principle associated with their identity, 
whether faith-based (such as the church-led liberation movements in Latin America) 
                                                 
3
 World Bank Operations Policy Department, Working with NGOs: A Practical Guide to Operational 
Collaboration between the World Bank and Non-governmental Organizations (World Bank 1995) 14. 
4
 Alison Brysk, ‘Human Rights Defenders and Activism’, in Anja Mihr and Matthew Gibney (eds), 
The Sage Handbook of Human Rights (Sage 2014) 346. 
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or professional.
5
  As noted in the introduction, Finnemore and Sikkink associate the 
involvement of professional bodies in institutionalising the norm with the 
internalisation process: these actors reinforce the point that norm compliance is not 
only desirable but it is to be expected.
6
  In other words, they strengthen a new “logic 
of appropriateness”. 
 
There are examples of all the above categories working on torture: institutional 
reformers use strategic litigation to address torture through domestic and regional 
human rights courts, through individual complaints to UN committees (a quasi-
judicial process), and cross-nationally through the doctrine of universal jurisdiction. 
This area of activity is a very significant one in relation to torture, and is considered 
at more length later in the chapter.  The classic example of advocacy by a “conscious 
constituency” is Amnesty International’s pioneering campaigning efforts on torture, 
involving new techniques such as coordinating letter-writing campaigns by concerned 
members of the public to governments responsible for torture.  An example of 
advocacy by affected populations is the vigils held by the Mothers of the Disappeared 
in Argentina. “Norm-promoters” who oppose torture on professional grounds include 
medical organisations: their involvement has led to policies and guidance such as the 
Istanbul Protocol.
7
   
 
Organisations can also be categorised based on their geographical identity.  They may 
be local or international.  The category of “local” spans a range of possibilities, from 
                                                 
5 Ibid, 346-347. 
6 See discussion in Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics and 
Political Change’ (1998) International Organization 52(4), 887-917, 898. 
7 Formally entitled the Manual on Effective Investigation and Documentation of Torture and other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment became an official UN document in 1999.   
Professional bodies such as the Turkish Medical Association, the Society of Forensic Medicine 
Specialists and medical NGOs such as Physicians for Human Rights USA played a leading role in its 
creation. 
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organisations with a grassroots base to those which are domestic but not necessarily 
community-based.  They may be confined to a particular geographical area or extend 
their interests nationwide.  Chapter one discussed why localisation is important as an 
aspect of legitimacy.  In addition, there are practical reasons why local organisations 
are valuable in combating torture: they understand the local political context, the 
priorities and the people who have influence in decision-making; they speak the local 
language, both literally and figuratively in the sense that they help translate concepts 
into local idiom.  As noted previously, they have longer attention spans and are not in 
a position to leave the country in order to redirect their efforts at a new crisis 
elsewhere in the world.  They are more accessible to victims than international 
NGOs. As will be explored in the final section below, in carrying out practical 
protection methods such as detention monitoring, they go to more places more often 
than any international equivalent ever will.  Their sheer presence, day in and day out, 
year after year, is highly important to a process I refer to as norm patrol: the 
expectation that rights are not something spoken about occasionally, in far away 
places, or during the rare visit of an international delegation, but are invoked and 
monitored regularly at the local level, so that they become integrated into ongoing 
performance expectations.  Chapter one discussed how the constructivist perspective 
emphasises the importance of internalisation of norms for the purposes of forming 
intrinsic motivation to comply: it is contended here that local norm entrepreneurs 
create and reinforce pathways for this internalisation process.  Local civil society 
actors contribute to combatting torture by encouraging state actors, over time, to 
perceive abuse as aberrant behaviour. 
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As important as local activists are, their chances of success are greatly increased 
where they are embedded in transnational advocacy networks.  This point is discussed 
in more detail in the section on inward-facing v. outward-facing strategies later in the 
chapter.  The sequencing of local and international advocacy may be important.  
Local organisations operate as a conduit of information to international organisations, 
who then act to draw international attention to the issue.
8
  This international interest 
ensures that the concerns are reflected within the national political agenda, which in 
turn opens up opportunities for local organisations to embark on an ongoing dialogue 
with local state officials.  The latter part of this dynamic in particular is explored in 
some detail in the case study chapters. 
 
2. Typology of advocacy strategies  
 
Hicks identifies the following roles played by NGOs in human rights work:  
 
- catalysts (raising issues, getting them on the political agenda);  
- advocates (mobilising information, expertise, media and public support to 
compel governments to engage with the issue);  
- shapers of the debate (framing an issue in human rights terms where it 
might previously have been framed differently, eg. as a trade issue); 
- partners in policy-making (such as direct input into the wording of an 
international treaty or national legislation);  
                                                 
8 James Meernik, Rosa Aloisi, Marsha Sowell and Angela Nichols, ‘The Impact of Human Rights 
Organizations on Naming and Shaming Campaigns’  (2012) Journal of Conflict Resolution 56(2), 233-
256.  It has also been found that a stronger local civil society has an impact on international media 
reporting of human rights abuse: see Howard Ramos, James Ron and Oskar NT Thomas, ‘Shaping the 
Northern Media’s Human Rights Coverage, 1986-2000’(2007) Journal of Peace Research 44 (4), 385-
406, although it is only one of a number of factors. 
 105 
 
- monitors (leveraging information to highlight failures to adhere to norms); 
-  legitimisers (where domestic NGOs localise the human rights debate to 
generate local buy-in – see discussion in chapter one)  
- beneficiaries (human rights defenders themselves benefit from advocacy 
on their behalf where their rights work has brought them into danger).
9
 
 
Implicit within these categories, but worth emphasising in its own right, is the need 
for relationship-building with state actors at all levels from presidents to prison 
warders, and with regional and international human rights bodies. To be effective, it 
is important for NGOs to know to whom to talk, what arguments are likely to 
resonate with domestic concerns, and the identity of potential spoilers.  Organisations 
and individual activists must develop a reputation for reliability, building up trust 
over time so that their advocacy is taken seriously.   
 
In shaping their strategies, organisations make choices whether to adopt 
insider/outsider positions; whether to prioritise depth or breadth; and whether their 
focus is inward-facing v outward-facing.  These are not sharp dichotomies, but points 
along a spectrum.  Their choices will be conditioned on organisation type, on the 
available resources (including staff skills and preferences), and on the opportunities 
available within the environment in which they operate. 
 
(i) Insider v Outsider 
The traditional image of human rights advocacy is that of the righteous outsider 
denouncing abuses.  The downside of this model is that denunciation tends not to win 
                                                 
9
 Peggy Hicks, ‘Human Rights Diplomacy: The NGO role’ in Michael O’Flaherty, Kedzia Zdzislaw, 
Amrei Műller and George Ulrich (eds), Human Rights Diplomacy: Contemporary Perspectives (Brill 
2011). 
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friends amongst those being denounced.  It will often make it harder for activists to 
work proactively with the authorities, losing the benefits of good working 
relationship with the relevant institutions.  More insider-oriented activism focuses on 
the benefits of access at all levels, both top-level decision-makers and the “frontline” 
service areas in the police and staff in prisons and other institutions.  Insiders may 
have more opportunities for actions such as advising on legislative amendments and 
providing training.  An organisation may make a pragmatic decision not to adopt a 
denunciatory tone, because it makes the calculation that it will further its reform goals 
by keeping the relevant authorities as allies rather than opponents. 
 
Evangelista contrasts the insider approach of Transparency International with the 
outsider approach of Amnesty International.
10
  Transparency International avoids 
denouncing individual instances of corruption (“muckraking”) in favour of  building 
alliances to reform corrupt systems, relying on self-interest (for example, enhancing 
the state’s attractiveness to foreign investors) as well as principle.11  By contrast, 
Amnesty International’s success in promoting human rights is attributed to its refusal 
to yield to expediency: it signals its independence, credibility and integrity by its 
willingness to be publicly critical of states.
12
  These organisations represent different 
ends of the spectrum, but many NGOs opt for something between the two, a “critical 
friend” stance. There are risks at both ends of the spectrum: working with the state 
can be highly effective, but carries the a risk of being co-opted, and unable to criticise 
where warranted, while a strategy involving public criticism of the state can be 
                                                 
10
 Matthew Evangelista, Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Movement to End the Cold War 
(Cornell University Press 1999) 365.   
11 Ibid. 
12
 Ann Marie Clark, Diplomacy of Conscience: Amnesty International and Changing Human Rights 
Norms (Princeton University Press 2001) 135. 
 107 
 
dangerous in that campaigners face threats in organisational, reputational and even 
physical terms.   
 
Where several NGOs are working in the same context, they may locate themselves at 
different points on the spectrum. There are possibilities for cooperation to exploit the 
opportunities: for example, one organisation chooses not to publicly criticise the state 
in order to maximise its access to detainees, but quietly cooperates with another NGO 
which is more willing to publicly denounce state failures, at the price of having less 
access to detainees.  Even without this cooperation, the cumulative impact of the 
different approaches may be greater than the sum of its parts, as described by 
Johnson: 
In what can look like a good cop-bad cop routine, the grassroots and public 
movement campaigns target their messages and raise expectations; the resulting 
demands and pressure make the political decision makers insecure, which 
encourages them to turn to the incrementalists for ‘reasonable’ solutions and 
reassurance.13 
 
Kitschelt notes that the strategies used by social movements, and the outcomes of 
their campaigning, are largely determined by the political openings in the state in 
question.
14
  Where it was possible to use existing political structures to demand a 
referendum on the use of nuclear power, social movements opted for this approach;
15
 
where it was not feasible, they adopted “outsider” strategies such as confrontational 
demonstrations.  He found that social movements were most effective where they had 
the most access to formal political decision-making, suggesting that where insider 
                                                 
13
 Rebecca Johnson, ‘Advocates and Activists: Conflicting Approaches on Nonproliferation and the 
Test Ban Treaty’, in Ann Florini (ed), The Third Force: The Rise of Transnational Civil Society (Japan 
Center for International Change and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 1999), 76. 
14
 Herbert Kitschelt, ‘Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest: Anti-nuclear Movements 
in Four Democracies’ (1986) British Journal of Political Science 16(1), 57-85. 
15 Ibid 70. 
 108 
 
strategies are possible, they represent a more productive choice.
16
  This point is 
reinforced by Joachim’s findings that NGO advocacy is successful where the 
organisations are embedded in a political opportunity structure which allows access to 
decision-makers.
17
 
 
(ii) Depth v Breadth 
Civil society campaigning can be “narrow and deep” or “broad and shallow”, or can 
combine both strategies.  A “narrow and deep” campaign involves a few individuals 
(often but not always working within an NGO), with technical expertise, aiming their 
message at key stakeholders with the ability to bring about change.  Haas describes 
the creation of “epistemic communities”, in which campaigners wield authority 
derived from their professional knowledge.
18
  In the case of advocacy on torture, 
NGO experts often have much to contribute by way of legal knowledge: they may 
have a more detailed understanding of an international convention than the civil 
servants drafting the domestic legislation based on it, or more knowledge of ECtHR 
jurisprudence than the national judge who must seek to apply it. 
 
A “broad and shallow” strategy typically aims at mass mobilisation, with much less 
expertise and effort being required of each individual participant.  Rather than 
focusing on technical aspects of a human rights breach, this type of communication 
tends to highlight the human angle, using an image and/or quotation from a victim, in 
line with Rorty’s recommendation to privilege sentimentality over rationality in 
                                                 
16 Ibid 74. 
17 Jutta Joachim, “Framing Issues and Seizing Opportunities: the UN, NGOs, and Women’s Rights” 
(2003) International Studies Quarterly, 47(2) 247-274; Jutta Joachim, Agenda Setting, the UN, and 
NGOs: Gender Violence and Reproductive Rights (Georgetown University Press 2007). 
18
 Peter Haas, ‘Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination’ (1992) 
International Organization 46, 1-35. 
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human rights discourse.
19
  The general public may be invited to show solidarity by 
joining a protest march, signing a petition or wearing a symbol of support.  AI has for 
decades pursued a strategies of creating opportunities for huge numbers of individuals 
outside the cadre of “experts” to signal support for human rights (sign a petition, 
write a letter, wear the t-shirt).  Schmitz notes that AI membership peaked in the late 
1980s, and he argues that from the 1990s, the public “became content with delegating 
[human rights campaigning] tasks to an elite group of activists”, both those in AI 
itself and in other organisations such as HRW. 
20
  On the other hand, the advent of 
social media has opened up ever more opportunities for “broad and shallow” 
engagement: it is the work of seconds to “like” and “share” a human rights message 
on social media, or sign an online petition.  Alston and Gillespie provide examples of 
the use of social media for human rights purposes, such as the live streaming of 
protests from Syria and Libya in 2012, but note that the sector lags well behind the 
humanitarian sector, which operates large-scale digital networks for the purpose, 
amongst others, of early warning of impeding disasters.
21
  They note the potential of 
social media to offer more meaningful participation and a less top-down approach.
22
   
 
There are limits to the breadth of audience than can be reached using this type of 
strategy.  Cohen shows how state denial of atrocities is facilitated by the public’s 
unwillingness to engage with the issue.
23
  Feeling powerless to solve the problems 
that surround us, people look away.  He notes that “[e]ven the most populist 
                                                 
19
Richard Rorty, ‘Human Rights, Rationality and Sentimentality’, in Stephen Shute and Susan Hurley 
(eds), On Human Rights: The Oxford Amnesty Lectures 1993 (BasicBooks 1994), 185. 
20 Hans Peter Schmitz, “Transnational NGOs and Human Rights in a Post-9/11 World”, in Human 
Rights in the 21st Century: Continuity and Change since 9/11, eds. Michael Goodhart and Anja Mihr 
(Palgrave 2011), 203 and 206. 
21 Philip Alston and Colin Gillespie, ‘Global Human Rights Monitoring, New Technologies, and the 
Politics of Information’ (2012) European Journal of International Law 23(4), 1089-1123,1110. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Stanley Cohen, States of Denial: Knowing about Atrocities and Suffering (Polity Press 2001). 
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organizations only reach a restricted section of the population: well-educated, of high 
socio-economic status, liberal in their political views, already belonging to the 
‘conscience constituency’”.24  As increasing numbers of people use personalized 
news feeds as their source of information about the world, it becomes ever more 
challenging to bring human rights stories to the attention of new audiences.  One 
commentator on new media observes:  
People’s self-defined information feeds could limit their exposure to anything that 
falls outside of their interests, preferences and yes, their biases.  It could be the 
Balkanization of information….We already make choices about what we expose 
ourselves to.  We already filter.  Personalized news feeds have the potential of 
providing us with a new and more powerful filter.25 
 
The “broad and shallow” engagement can be criticised for its superficiality and even 
derided as mere virtue-signalling, but when engaged in en masse, and despite the 
challenges of engaging a wide audience, it has the potential to open up political space 
for NGO human rights experts to be heard.  “Broad and shallow” engagement can 
create an environment in which politicians will listen to NGOs; expert-led “deep but 
narrow” engagement ensures that the NGOs have something to say that is worth 
listening to. The “broad but shallow” strategy goes some way to addressing the 
concerns sometimes raised with regard to legitimacy discussed previously.  Where 
there is some demonstrable public support for the cause, NGOs have a more 
straightforward claim to be heard by governments.  
 
                                                 
24 Ibid 196. 
25 Mike Hoban, ‘Personalized News Feeds: The Dark Side of “Have It Your Way”, Fast Company, 
online article dated 28 Feb 2011, https://www.fastcompany.com/1732527/personalized-news-feeds-
dark-side-have-it-your-way (accessed 7 January 2018). 
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The importance of public buy-in to the issue has been mentioned in chapter one in 
relation to the lack of public opposition to torture in India and the resulting obstacles 
to reform.  Lokaneeta and Jesani observe that, in order to fully eradicate torture, 
activists must tackle underlying social attitudes about the way in which torture is used 
“to impose and perpetuate power relationships (such as caste, gender, class, sexuality, 
ethnicity)”.26  To this end, they view as a “significant development” the fact that a 
national anti-torture campaign has achieved a higher profile as it presses for 
legislation containing measures aimed at preventing torture.
27
 
 
Across the sector, not all human rights campaigns engage in both expert lobbying and 
popular mobilisation.  In some times and places, human rights issues have more 
purchase on the public imagination than in others.  In many social and political 
contexts, preventing the ill-treatment of detainees is a low priority for the public, 
particularly where those detainees are perceived as criminal and non-deserving.  In 
such situations, the “narrow and deep” technocratic advocacy tends to predominate.   
 
The same organisation may do both (as in the AI example); organisations might 
consciously work together, with one focusing on the broad but shallow end to build a 
case for the government to pay attention, and another organisation providing the 
expert input.  There are risks attached to both extremes: some popular campaigns may 
drum up support but fail to make sufficiently targeted political demands and therefore 
no policy change takes place; or the experts may have a useful contribution to make 
but find themselves able to achieve political access because politicians have little 
incentive to ally themselves with an unpopular cause.   
                                                 
26
 Jinee Lokaneeta and Amar Jesani, ‘India’ in Richard Carver and Lisa Handley, Does Torture 
Prevention Work? (Liverpool University Press 2016), 545. 
27 Ibid. 
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(iii) Inward-facing v outward-facing 
Political elites are performing for both a domestic audience and for an audience of 
other states and inter-state institutions.  Advocates against torture thus have two 
fronts on which to campaign, the inward-facing and the outward-facing.    It is not an 
either/or choice, and it is common for organisations to do both, shifting their attention 
depending on the available opportunities.   Where an organisation has little traction 
domestically, the boomerang model proposed by Risse et al explains how advocacy 
will be directed to an external audience (other states and international institutions) so 
that those external audiences will re-direct the advocacy back at original state.
28
  The 
information exchange between domestic and transnational activists helps to put norm-
violating states on the international agenda, so those states are pressured to improve 
their human rights both from “below” (domestic protest) and “above” (pressure from 
other states and from intergovernmental institutions).  Risse and his co-authors evoke 
the image of a boomerang: when domestic activists find that their advocacy is not 
having an impact on their own political leaders, they hurl information outwards 
across borders so that it can curve back homewards to reach its domestic target.  They 
see this process as serving a number of ends: it legitimizes domestic protest, offers a 
degree of protection to domestic activists and over time, helps to open the political 
space for them to operate.
29
  Not every boomerang throw will be successful: if 
activists in state X direct their advocacy at state Y, state Y’s own agenda (maintaining 
trade relationships, military alliances) affects the return of the boomerang.   Chapter 
one  referred to a state’s vulnerability to pressure as a scope condition: the boomerang 
only works if state X wants to please state Y more than the other way round.   
                                                 
28 Thomas Risse, Stephen C Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink (eds), The Power of Human Rights: 
International Norms and Domestic Change (Cambridge University Press 1999); Thomas Risse, 
Stephen C Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink (eds), The Persistent Power of Human Rights: From 
Commitment to Compliance (Cambridge University Press 2013). 
29
 Ibid. 
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Human rights organisations may direct advocacy at external bodies such as regional 
institutions and donor bodies in order to bring pressure to bear on their real target, the 
state.  One such mechanism for bringing external pressure to bear is aid 
conditionality.  The EU uses conditionality in its agreements with non-accession 
states, particularly within the framework of development cooperation, but also in 
other contexts such as trade, the environment and security.  Since 1995 it has included 
an “essential elements” clause, including provision for suspension, into its 
agreements with third countries.  This clause states that the agreement rests on a 
foundation of respect for human rights and democratic principles.  Donno’s research 
indicates that essential elements clauses are “modestly effective” in improving 
physical integrity rights, including torture, where the state in question is heavily 
reliant on EU trade and aid (again reinforcing material vulnerability as a scope 
condition).
30
   
 
(iv) Choice of strategy 
 
As Kitschelt points out, NGOs select an approach based on the political opportunities 
open to them.
31
  This is not to claim that NGOs will always optimise the political 
niches potentially available.  NGOs have their own characters and internal politics.  
NGO orientation may be influenced by the individuals leading the NGOs, their 
education, professional background (an NGO leader who has practised as a lawyer 
may instinctively favour one strategy, while one who rose through the ranks of a trade 
union may lean towards another) and personal preferences.  It is not unusual for there 
to be tensions within and between NGOs, for them to be critical of each other’s 
                                                 
30
 Daniela Donno, Legalization and Leverage: Human Rights Conditionality in the European Union’s 
Economic Agreements.  (Report of APSA Annual Meeting 2012). 
31 Herbert Kitschelt, ‘Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest: Anti-nuclear Movements in 
Four Democracies’ (1986) British Journal of Political Science 16(1), 57-85. 
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approaches, and for individuals working within an NGO to become alienated by the 
approach within the organisation.  Those individuals might leave and found an 
organisation with a different approach.   The NGO sector is not a monolith, and 
neither are individual organisations.  The civil society sector can be dysfunctional, its 
work complicated by competition, duplication, and a lack of coordination.  As in any 
ecology, a vacant niche offers opportunity for new contenders: where barriers to entry 
are high, however, there is less likelihood that that will happen. 
 
3. Human rights activities carried out by NGOs  
 
While not necessarily exhausting the possibilities for human rights activism, the 
activities typically undertaken by NGOs can be broadly categorised as follows: 
information-based strategies, dialogue, strategic litigation, and practical safeguards 
including monitoring. 
 
(i)  Information-based strategies 
Activism is often understood as a set of activities relating to the “naming, framing, 
blaming and shaming” of state abuse.32  These have been described as the “principal 
weapon of choice” for many international organisations.33  It is often an outsider, 
reactive model: the activist identifies shortcomings in human rights protections, 
frames them in the context of legal obligations, attributes responsibility, and brings 
these shortcomings to the attention of the state, the public and other audiences, 
particularly international institutions.  The rationale is that if states run the risk of 
                                                 
32
 Shamima Ahmed and David M Potter, NGOs in International Politics (Kumarian Press 2006). 
33
 James Meernik, Rosa Aloisi, Marsha Sowell and Angela Nichols ‘The Impact of Human Rights 
Organizations on Naming and Shaming Campaigns’ (2012) Journal of Conflict Resolution 56(2), 233-
256 at 233. 
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moral, legal or political censure in response to human rights violations, the political 
costs increase domestically and/or internationally, which has a dissuasive effect. The 
denunciation may involve analysis of varying levels of depth and sophistication, 
varying from identifying individual acts of abuse to deeper analysis of root structural 
causes and societal cleavages (for example, the underlying prejudices against Roma, 
the poverty and lack of access to education by many in this community that put them 
at greater risk of abuse while in detention).
 34
   
 
Antonio Cassese, leading scholar in international law and first President of the 
European Committee for the Prevention of Torture, believed that public opinion was 
key to reigning in state abuse, but for this to happen, the public needed information.  
He believed that the mass media alone could not be expected to serve this purpose, as 
its attention to human rights was insufficiently detailed and sustained over time.  
NGOs could fill this gap, by collecting relevant information and disseminating it; 
bringing issues to public attention and being the “moral voice of the international 
community”.35  This is not to underplay the value of media coverage:  in particular for 
the “broad but shallow” style of campaigning discussed above, traditional media and 
new forms of social media are essential in order to reach a wide audience.  Video 
footage of a police beating will bring abuses to public attention more vividly and 
immediately than any number of human rights reports ever will.  “Information” in this 
context is broader than the mere communication of facts.  Symbolic actions – a 
candlelight vigil, a mass demonstration – convey a message to the public: “Something 
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is happening here that requires your attention”; they are another facet of the politics 
of information. 
 
Hafner-Burton has expressed scepticism about the success of naming and shaming 
strategies.  In her statistical analysis of state practices from 1975 to 2000, she finds 
that abusive leaders may simply “adjust their methods of abuses in economical ways 
in reply to the spotlight”.36 In response to international criticism, political leaders 
might agree to hold elections, but then attempt to minimize the risk to tenure posed 
by those elections by terrorizing voters and the opposition.
37
  Conrad and DeMeritt 
agree that naming and shaming strategies in relation to torture may have unintended 
negative consequences.  They set out the converse position to the one posited by 
Hafner-Burton, whereby states may respond to international shaming on their torture 
record by “squelch[ing] civil and political rights in an effort to minimize situations in 
which torture would otherwise prove useful as a tool of government control”.38  If a 
political elite can reduce the threat to its tenure by limiting the political space for 
dissent, the logic runs, it thus reduces its “need” to use torture to combat any such 
threat.  As noted in Chapter two, this is a plausible explanation for the existence of a 
number of low-democracy states with low openness to activism which also appear to 
have a low prevalence of torture. 
 
Chapter one set out the evidence that democracies are less likely to torture, and more 
likely to reform their torture practices, than autocracies, at least once a threshold level 
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of democracy is met.  Hendrix and Wong argue, somewhat counter-intuitively, that 
international NGO advocacy is therefore more likely to improve the practices of 
autocracies than democracies.
39
  Their logic is that in deciding whether to permit 
torture, leaders carry out a cost-benefit analysis regarding the potential impact on 
their political tenure. Leaders in less autocratic/more democratic states will have 
already taken into account that information about torture will emerge via political 
opponents, the media, and domestic civil society.  Their cost-benefit analysis remains 
therefore largely unchanged. For autocratic leaders, this reporting and shaming may 
not have been previously incorporated into the cost/benefit analysis, and it may 
change the calculation.  The problem with this logic is that it assumes that political 
elites treat criticism as a dichotomous measure in their cost-benefit analysis: “We 
expected some criticism” versus “We did not expect criticism”.  Political elites may 
also be surprised by the volume of criticism received, domestically and 
internationally, and this change in volume may itself be enough to change their cost-
benefit calculation. 
 
Alston and Gillespie express concern about the “fragmented” nature of information 
gathering and dissemination by activists.
40
  They pose the question: when 
organisations such as AI and HRW research and publish reports, are their methods 
“sufficiently collaborative, transparent and self-correcting as to warrant such weight 
being placed upon them?”41  From a legal viewpoint, the fact that a credible 
allegation of torture has been made creates an obligation on the state to carry out an 
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investigation – it is common in ECtHR cases for a state to be found in breach of the 
duty to investigate rather than to have actually committed torture.  From a 
reputational point of view, however, an organisation that repeatedly makes 
unsubstantiated allegations will quickly lose credibility.    
 
Cohen notes the risk of human rights reports being treated as an end in themselves: 
their usefulness depends on how well the information is communicated to others with 
the power to drive change.
42
  In an analysis of government responses to human rights 
reports, he found little evidence that governments improved their practices as a result 
of the criticisms found in them.
43
  Civil society reports needs to be the starting-point 
for civil society dialogue with the state, not the end-point. 
 
As a genre, human rights reports may be couched in technical language and focused 
on detailed policy analysis and recommendations (the “narrow but deep” approach 
based on what Rorty terms “rationality”) or feature emotive stories, pictures and 
quotations relating to individual victims (a more “broad but shallow” approach, albeit 
that few human rights reports are ever likely to reach a mass audience, using Rorty’s 
preferred “sentimentality”).  As noted earlier in the chapter, activists do not always 
choose the path of denunciation.  In addressing external audiences, activists can ask 
international partners for investment in and technical support for the state as well as 
political pressure on the state.     
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(ii) Dialogue with state officials 
Dialogue is usually an insider, expert strategy: moving away from denunciation of 
abuse towards a pragmatic seeking of solutions.  It encompasses the sub-category of 
advocacy often called lobbying; a classic example is that of a NGO proposing 
changes to the wording of draft legislation.  To be effective, all parties to the dialogue 
need to recognise each other as valid interlocutors.  Risse is particularly emphatic 
about the link between dialogue or “communicative action” and the internalisation of 
norms.
44
  This internalisation of norms is, as discussed in chapter one, central to the 
constructivist understanding of why states improve their performance on human 
rights.   He argues that dialogue (or “arguing”) enables “actors [to] develop a 
common knowledge concerning both a definition of the situation and an agreement 
about the underlying ‘rules of the game’”.  It also contributes to “problem solving in 
the sense of seeking an optimal solution for a commonly perceived problem”.45  
According to this reasoning, through dialogue with human rights advocates, the state 
becomes persuaded by the “logic of appropriateness” and learns to adopt it in its own 
right.
46
  It is not contended that dialogue invariably leads to such an outcome, but 
rather than “persuasion and discourse” is an important sub-process within the larger 
process of socialisation.
47
  
 
There is an overlap between categories: for example, an NGO might contribute a 
technical analysis how domestic legislation fails to fully reflect the state’s 
international commitments on torture.  The same report can be presented by the 
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organisation and perceived by different audiences as outsider denunciation (“The 
state is failing to meet its obligations in these ways”) and/or insider expert input into 
technical processes such as the drafting of legislation (“The wording of paragraph 
section 31(d) should be amended as follows”).  Much depends on tone, which is 
mediated by the organisation’s existing and desired relationship with state officials.  
As noted above, NGOs may attempt to invoke both positions, for example by issuing 
a short press release aimed at a wider audience, outlining why the state must make a 
change, along with the detailed expert report which indicates to the state how it can 
make the change. 
 
(iii) Strategic litigation 
Strategic litigation, or “cause lawyering” as it is also called, is an important subset of 
the denunciation model.  Legal narratives of human rights very often emphasise 
groundbreaking cases that changed legal understandings, or drew attention to an 
issue.  Once again, the logic is that the likelihood of judicial challenge increases the 
costs of torture to political elites who promote or tolerate that torture.
48
  The problem 
with this account is that a case might set an important legal precedent without 
resulting in any obvious change in state practice, at least in the short term.  In the 
famous Filártiga case, a US court upheld a civil claim made by a Paraguayan family 
against the individual who tortured their relative.  For lawyers, it is a significant case 
on extraterritorial jurisdiction: the successful plaintiffs, years later, reportedly felt that 
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“nothing happened” as a result; there was little evidence of change in Paraguay; the 
case was a “dead-end street”.49 
 
Lutz and Sikkink, who quote the Filártiga family’s disappointment, nevertheless 
argue for the existence of a “justice cascade”.50  They believe that a legal cause 
celebre can change the public discourse about an issue, which in turn changes the 
political climate. Change may not be immediate, but may be observable over the mid- 
to long-term.  Chile is often cited as an example of the value of strategic litigation.  
Litigation was not the sole strategy pursued in that country: it was undertaken 
alongside popular mobilisation in the form of demonstrations.  In the nineteen 
seventies, in the face of widespread human rights abuses by the military junta, an 
alliance of religious and legal bodies, co-led by the Catholic and Lutheran bishops, 
created the Cooperative Committee for Peace in Chile.  In 1974, this body filed a total 
of 1568 habeus corpus petitions on behalf of detainees.  Not one was successful in 
securing the release of the detainee, but cumulatively, the sheer number of cases 
effectively publicised the scale of violations being carried out.
51
  Even after Chile’s 
ratification of UNCAT and the fall of Pinochet, both in 1988, Chilean courts 
demonstrated reluctance to convict the perpetrators of torture.  This changed after 
1998, when Pinochet was arrested in London.  The attempt at prosecuting Pinochet in 
the UK did not result in a successful conviction, but opened up debate in Chile: Lutz 
and Sikkink argue that the case was a turning point which “lifted psychological, 
political and juridical barriers to justice by weakening the powerful forces blocking 
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such trials in Chile since the return to democracy”.52  Pinochet’s initial arrest in the 
UK sparked off further arrests in Chile, with twenty-five Chilean officials 
subsequently being charged with torture, kidnapping and murder.  Simmons finds it 
“suggestive” that Chile’s performance on torture begins to improve from 1999.53 
 
Israel offers another example of activists using litigation to challenge torture.  Grosso 
reports that from the mid-1990s, NGOs and their legal partners made the decision to 
refer cases of suspected torture or ill-treatment to the Israeli courts on almost every 
possible occasion, leading to hundreds of petitions being filed.
54
 As with the Chilean 
courts, the Israeli courts were initially reluctant to condemn state policy, but by 1999, 
“the flood of cases….finally encouraged the High Court to address it directly”.55  The 
court reiterated the absolute nature of the prohibition on torture, and ruled against the 
use of a number of abusive practices.  Unfortunately, the High Court judgement also 
counter-productively established that the legal authorities might create guidelines 
setting out the circumstances in which interrogators might use these practices with 
immunity from prosecution.
56
  This litigation did not lead to an end to torture in 
Israel. According to the CIRI scores, Israel remains at the lowest end of the scale 
(chapter 3 notes a country score of 0 for the years 2006 of 2010).  From a brute 
quantitative perspective, this indicates no major change.  While remaining in the same 
CIRI category, however, many observers do indicate that the overall number of 
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individuals subject to severe torture has fallen significantly since the High Court 
ruling of 1999.
57
   This is an instance where the foreshortening of measurement scales 
may under-represent actual change on the ground, a measurement challenge explored 
in more detail in the previous chapter. 
 
Turning to the treatment of torture in the European regional system, the case of 
Ireland v UK drew attention to British abuses in Northern Ireland.  The European 
Commission initially considered the five techniques under consideration, including 
hooding, stress positions and sleep deprivation as torture.  The ECtHR re-classed 
them as ill-treatment rather than torture; nevertheless, this still amounted to a 
violation of Art 3 ECHR, and the decision ended the use of the techniques in 
Northern Ireland, although their use would re-emerge three decades later by the 
British army in Iraq.
 
 
 
Anagnostou argues that cause lawyering supports rather than replaces other forms of 
advocacy: activists “draw leverage from the rising volume of condemnation of abuses 
by the court”.58  The large number of ECtHR cases protesting against torture by the 
Turkish state is one such example.  Carver and Handley, who are by and large 
sceptical about the value of litigation, concede:  
 
In practice, Turkey’s compliance with [ECtHR] judgments has often been tardy, 
half-hearted or selective, but the Court’s rulings are nevertheless widely understood 
in Turkey to be an important benchmark of respect for human rights.59 
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Anagnostou concludes: “ECtHR judgements do matter in multi-faceted ways, even if 
their implementation is at times resisted or evaded by national authorities”.60  The 
same author notes in addition that cases have a cumulative impact: subsequent cases 
exploit “points of judicial receptivity” from earlier cases.61  Efforts to challenge 
security forces in Northern Ireland in the 1970s created precedents and experience 
that later contributed to efforts to challenge abuses in Turkey in the 1990s.  In an 
example of the transnational networks highlighted by Risse et al, a number of 
individual lawyers who had honed their expertise in the earlier cases shared their 
knowledge with the activists who followed: Anagnostou provides the example of 
individual lawyers involved with the earlier Northern Irish cases who later went on to 
provide support to the Kurdish Human Rights Organisation with regard to the cases it 
took against Turkey.
62
  
 
Where activists strategically bring large numbers of complaints to the ECtHR relating 
to the same state (or region within the state), the Court can begin to “acquire a 
thorough knowledge of the local situation and therefore to recognise the systemic 
nature of abuses and to identify systematic practices, thereby moving beyond the fact-
specific and strictly individualised approach to cases”.63  The ECtHR uses the “pilot 
judgement” procedure as a way of identifying structural problems underlying 
repeated cases against particular states.  Where several applications are made to the 
ECtHR with the same root cause, the ECtHR can select one as the pilot, and in that 
case, decide not only if a violation has taken place on the specific facts of the case, 
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but whether there is a systematic problem underlying it, and what the state needs to 
do to remedy it.   
 
As well as the courts in the regional human rights systems, activists may also make 
use of the UN individual petition mechanisms in an attempt to get justice for 
individuals, and with the broader aim of raising awareness of rights issues both with 
the public at large, and with the specific audience of lawyers and judges.  Where 
individual petitions lead to a finding that the state was at fault, NGOs can publicise 
this finding and pressure the state for compliance, not just with compensation to the 
individual, but by improving its practices.  Cannoy-Smith cites the precedent created 
by the individual petition in the case of AT v Hungary to the Committee against the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.
64
  Hungary accepted that 
its legal provisions on the issue of domestic violence were inadequate: after the 
decision, local NGOs were in a strong position to push for the state to adopt improved 
legislation in this area, which it subsequently did. 
 
Where complainants have the option available, the ECtHR is more likely to be the 
forum of choice, given the enforceability of its judgements as compared to the non-
enforceability of Committee views.  Under the principle of subsidiarity, states have 
the discretion to decide how to implement decisions.  ECtHR judgements are 
monitored by the Council of Ministers (Art 54 ECHR).  When a decision is made that 
there has been a breach, states must provide an individual remedy (eg. payment, 
reopening of domestic proceedings etc).  States are also expected to implement 
general measures to tackle the causes of the violation in order to prevent future 
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repetition (Art 46 ECHR).  This could take the form of legislative reform and/or 
executive measures; in light of the discussion on the localisation of human rights, it is 
worth noting, in the context of the importance of localisation strategies, that other 
measures that may be ordered include translation and dissemination of the judgments 
domestically.  The Council of Ministers reviews progress, in which it may draw on 
national human rights institutions and NGOs for information about the execution of 
judgements; if satisfactory, it terminates its supervision through the adoption of a 
final resolution and if it is not satisfactory, it may instead adopt an interim resolution 
highlighting the state’s failure to take satisfactory action. The EU, amongst others, 
may refer to ECtHR judgements and Council of Minister resolutions when creating 
policy related to the state in question.   
 
Anagnostou and Mungiu-Pippidi note a legal case does not usually solve the problem 
in and of itself: as per a Council of Ministers report, “clone or repetitive cases make 
up 80-85% of the Court’s caseload, suggesting that major structural problems persist 
and require more effective and timely domestic implementation”.65  Potential barriers 
to local reform include “outright resistance, political reluctance, or mere inertia on the 
part of national authorities”; mobilisation of non-state actors and/or domestic 
constituencies can help to address these problems.
 66
    
 
(iv) Practical safeguards 
Where there is a lack of political will to combat torture, there tends to be a failure to 
implement safeguards in the form of “ex ante or ex post controls on supervision and 
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interrogation processes”.67   Sir Nigel Rodley, former UN Special Rapporteur on 
Torture, has described torture as a “crime of opportunity”.68  Reducing torture 
requires not only generating political will to oppose it, but taking away the 
opportunities for it to occur.  The first chapter noted the principal/agent problem that 
may hinder torture reform: the demand for the creation of practical safeguards is 
fundamentally a demand for the state to take effective measures to constrain its 
agents. 
 
Amnesty International adopted a12-Point Program for the Prevention of Torture in 
October 2000.  Alongside official condemnation of torture by state authorities, the 
ratification of international conventions, and the prosecution of torturers domestically 
or internationally, the plan emphasises the importance of practical safeguards, 
including: 
 Limits on incommunicado detention, when detainees are most vulnerable;  
 No secret detention/detention in undisclosed locations; 
 Safeguards during interrogation and custody, including informing detainees of 
their rights and ensuring independent inspection of places of detention; 
 Training for all officials involved in custody, interrogation and detention. 
 
Miller agrees that to eliminate torture, it must be prohibited by law, it must be made 
clear that political leaders are against the practice, there needs to be appropriate 
training of police and others, and accountability mechanisms must be put in police, 
including the use of close-circuit television cameras in cells and interview rooms, as 
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well as external oversight bodies.69  Delaplace and Pollard similiarly emphasise the 
importance of training and of reinforcing normative frameworks,
70
 although Carver 
and Handley add an important caveat: they find that training which educates police on 
alternative forms of investigative techniques and evidence-based methods of 
constructing criminal cases has more of an impact than training that simply reiterates 
human rights norms.
71
  They also note that police reform in some post-Soviet states 
had an unintended consequence:  after a large-scale exodus of experienced, Soviet-
trained police investigators, “[t]he new police forces of independent Georgia and 
Kyrgyzstan made widespread use of torture in criminal investigations for the simple 
reason that they were not equipped to identify perpetrators by other means”.72  
Equipping the police with more appropriate investigative skills is key element of the 
solution.   
 
 It is vital to ensure that detainees are informed of their rights: they need to know that 
they have rights and that these have been violated, and what mechanisms exist to 
report abuse, or monitoring becomes redundant.  Where ill-treatment is common, it 
may be so normalised to victims that it is perceived as part of the sentence.
73
  The 
previous chapter emphasised the importance of internalisation of norms by the state, 
but it is important for victims to also internalise expectations regarding the treatment 
they should receive.  The role of victims and their families as key informants must not 
be under-estimated:  information gathering relies in a large part on their perception 
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that they have been wrongfully treated.  Where strategic litigation is pursued, it relies 
heavily on victims’ tenacity and willingness to pursue justice for years on end, a task 
that may involve great psychological strain and potentially state hostility.
74
   
 
In their survey of torture prevention initiatives in 16 different countries, Carver and 
Handley consider the effectiveness of four groups of preventative measures:  
 monitoring 
 complaint mechanisms  
 prosecution of torturers, including the assertion of state jurisdiction  
 the application of laws, rules and procedures regarding the detention and 
interrogation of criminal suspects.
75
 
 
According to their analysis, the most effective of these preventative measures is the 
last one, and in the particular the safeguards applying in the hours and days after 
arrest.  Individuals are safer from torture where they are held only in lawful, 
acknowledged places of detention; where family and friends are promptly notified; 
where they have access to a lawyer and to medical examination by an independent 
medical professional; and where they are brought promptly before a judge.  These are 
the type of mechanisms that AI predicted would be useful in its 12-Point Plan from 
2000.   For there to be a genuine increase in safety, the above measures must, 
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unsurprisingly, actually be implemented in practice, as opposed to appearing only on 
the statute books.
76
  Access to a lawyer and/or doctor has much less of a preventative 
effect where the professionals in question lack technical competence or 
independence.
77
 
 
Carver and Handley find that the second most important on the above list is the 
prosecution of torturers.
78
  If politicians retreat from torture when the political costs 
increase, it is unsurprising that individual perpetrators retreat from torture when the 
cost, in the form of exposure to criminal sanctions, increases to them.  Carver and 
Handley’s survey does not extend to high-level prosecutions, such as those 
undertaken by the International Criminal Court: prosecutions at this level are as yet 
sufficiently rare that they cannot be expected to have much deterrent power. Outside 
the criminal sphere, Carver and Handley find little evidence regarding the benefit of 
complaint mechanisms, ie. opportunities for individuals whose rights were violated to 
complain to human rights ombudsmen or similar body.
79
   
 
With regard to monitoring mechanisms (ie. visits to places of detention to observe 
conditions and make recommendations for improvement), Carver and Handley note 
that they have some effect on torture, but a less significant effect than the procedural 
safeguards described above.  Their case studies include states where procedural 
safeguards exist and where they do not.  For the case studies in this research, where 
procedural safeguards by and large do exist in principle, the question being whether 
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they apply in practice, it will be seen that detention monitoring assumes more 
prominence in relation to reducing ill-treatment.    
 
While torture and ill-treatment prevention initiatives focus on places of detention, 
further evidence regarding the inhibitory effect of monitoring comes from findings 
that equipping police officers with body-worn cameras significantly reduces 
allegations of ill-treatment by them in their encounters with the public.  One 12-
month experiment in the US found that when body cameras were worn, the number of 
complaints against officers dropped markedly.  Several factors may be at play: 
knowing that they were being filmed may have inhibited aggression by members of 
the public towards the police, so that the police response was in turn less forceful; it 
may also have reduced the rate of false complaints of policy brutality.  However, the 
authors make a compelling case that wearing the body cameras and knowing that 
their conduct can be scrutinised in and of itself changes police behaviour for the 
better.
80
   
 
Of these practical safeguards, some may be delivered by civil society organisations: 
training for police officers, for example, or posters and leaflets telling detainees about 
their rights.  NGOs may provide legal or medical services directly to detainees.  They 
often carry out detention monitoring, in addition to monitoring by NPMs and by 
international bodies such as the CPT, the SPT and the Special Rapporteur on Torture.  
                                                 
80
 Barak Ariel, William Farrar and Alex Sutherland, ‘The Effect of Police Body-Worn Cameras on the 
Use of Force and Citizens’ Complaints against the Police: A Randomized Controlled Trial’ (2015) 
Journal of Quantitative Criminology 31, 509-535.  Reservations about the downsides of body-worn 
cameras are expressed in Mike Rowe, Geoff Pearson and Elizabeth Turner, ‘Body-Worn Cameras and 
the Law of Unintended Consequences: Some Questions arising from Emergent Practice’ (2017), 
Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice, pax011 although the authors still accept that they may 
improve the quality of police-citizen interactions. 
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However, in many cases, the NGO role is to advocate that the state legislate for and 
implement the safeguards in question: for the state to install audio-visual systems to 
record interrogations; for the state to ensure that there is appropriate provision of 
legal aid and medical services; and for the state to put in place an effective complaint 
mechanism for when violations occur. 
 
 
4. Norm entrepreneurs and norm patrol  
 
 
In exploring the role of activists as norm entrepreneurs, much has been said about 
how they contribute to the establishment and dissemination of norms.  To this, we can 
now add another concept, that of norm patrol, which centres on their ongoing 
reinforcement of the fact that norm-compliant behaviour is expected.   Monitors 
undertaking visits to places of detention may detect abuses (for example, they may be 
given information about such abuses by interviewees, and witness injuries and 
equipment used to inflict those injuries); they may deter abuses, because they raise 
the likelihood that a sanction will ensue, but beyond detection and deterrence, 
monitors have a symbolic aspect in that they reinforce expectations of norm-
compliant behaviour.  From this perspective, punctual visits are important because of 
their reinforcement value.  Unannounced visits are particularly valuable for the 
purpose of detection and deterrence, but even pre-announced visits, which allow for 
the potential concealment of abuses, remain useful for their symbolic value in 
reinforcing a shared expectation about the standards to be observed.  Chapter one 
discussed the process of internalisation of the norms – it is contended that the iterative 
nature of the monitoring visits and other forms of contact contributes over time to this 
internalisation process.  
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As noted before, domestic NGOs are particularly important in this regard.  The value 
is partly symbolic (there are local voices restating the norm; the norm is framed as a 
locally-sought goal) and partly pragmatic (local staff can access more places of 
detention more frequently, and their offices are more likely to be accessible to 
potential complainants).  Of course, the symbolism of a common purpose may be 
inhibited by class, ethnic, political, even gender tensions between monitors and 
police/prison staff; similar cleavages between victims and activists may inhibit how 
accessible they seem to victims; activists may find it difficult to access remote or 
dangerous areas of the country.  NGOs are challenged by resource limitations and 
staff retention, and not all organisations achieve longevity.  Despite these potential 
limitations, local NGOs play a role that cannot readily be replicated by international 
organisations. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
NGO identity and positioning can be represented as follows: 
 
 
 
Location 
•Local 
•International 
Type 
•Institutional 
Reformer 
•Advocate 
•Affected population 
•Norm-promoter 
Strategy 
•Insider v. outsider 
•Depth v. breadth 
•Inward-facing v. 
outward-facing 
Activity 
Information 
collection & 
dissemination 
Dialogue 
 Strategic litigation 
 Practical safeguards 
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The available choices do not represent rigid categories, but rather positions on a 
spectrum.  Some of the choices logically cluster together: strategic litigation is a 
depth strategy (ie. drawing on narrow technical expertise rather than popular appeal); 
it is also an outsider strategy, a form of righteous denunciation.  Before a case is taken 
to the ECtHR, domestic remedies must be exhausted, so the action is first local and 
then potentially international, first inward-facing and then outward-facing.  Activities 
focusing on the implementation of practical safeguards are often going to be led by 
local organisations (notwithstanding monitoring by international bodies).  As they 
rely on developing good relationships with local officials, to some extent they are 
insider strategies (working together on developing good practice rather than 
denouncing poor practice).  However, this clustering of features should not be 
overstated: organisations may use one strategy in order to open up space for another.  
The outward throw of the boomerang hits its target on its inward return.  The 
international court case becomes a domestic cause celebre, changing local views on 
accountability, and opening up political space for organisations to be accepted as 
insider advisers on the implementation of practical safeguards. 
 
In each of the case studies considered in chapter five onwards, the main organisations 
carrying out advocacy on torture will be considered in light of how they position their 
choices. Before turning to the individual case studies, however, it is first necessary to 
do some scene-setting to justify the selection of cases and to consider the shared 
political context.  This is the subject of the next chapter. 
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   Chapter 4  Introduction to the Case Studies 
 
Chapter 2 demonstrated that states with more political space for civil society activism 
tend to perform better on torture and CIDT.  While the findings are consistent with a 
hypothesis that more activism leads to better state performance on torture, they tell us 
little about the causal process involved.  To supplement the quantitative findings, we 
therefore turn to more detailed case studies.  The next four chapters undertake a 
process tracing exercise in four states to attempt to identify how far activism 
contributes to any reduction in torture and ill-treatment, and/or how far civil society 
freedom and a reduction in torture and ill-treatment co-occur simply because they 
have a mutual causation. As pointed out in chapter 2, there may of course be an 
element of both: a state’s desire to qualify for EU membership may ensure that it both 
improves police training, thereby reducing incidents of ill-treatment, and it also 
increases its willingness to cooperate with prominent NGOs, both national and 
international.  So far, the prospect of EU membership is the causal factor for both.  
But once given space to manoeuvre – access to carry out fact-finding, freedom to 
report, political space to propose changes to legislation, the opportunity to carry out 
training to relevant groups, the chance to litigate violations – civil society may then 
play a role in accelerating progress and embedding good practice.    The purpose is to 
trace whether and how civil society contributes to and plays a distinct role within the 
improvement of state practice on torture, and not necessarily to establish that it is the 
sole cause of progress.  Following on from the discussion in the first chapter about 
extrinsic motivation for reform (the rationalist approach) versus intrinsic motivations 
(the constructive approach), the case studies offer some insights into the questions of 
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if and how local civil society in particular can play a role in the state’s internalisation 
of norms.   
 
Before embarking on the case study chapters, this introductory chapter has a number 
of purposes: it justifies the case selection, explaining that all four cases have 
important common features, enabling us as far as possible to isolate activism as the 
key independent variable and minimising alternative explanations for variance in 
torture performance. The following section outlines the very distinct political context 
of accession to the EU, which carries a specific set of incentives for reform.  The next 
section examines the context for civil society in the four states, including the regional 
(and indeed, global) challenge of shrinking space for civil society.  The final section 
of the chapter outlines the methodological issues specific to this case study research. 
 
1. Selection of Case Studies 
One of the classic problems in case study research is “too many variables, too few 
cases”.  States differ from one another in many complex ways; it is not possible to 
identify states that are identical save for one single characteristic which can be then 
used to explain differing outcomes.  The best that the researcher can hope for is to 
identify states that are reasonably similar in important ways (control variables) so that 
differences in the independent variable (level of activism, in this case) carry at least 
some degree of explanatory power with regard to differences in the dependent 
variable (state performance on torture). The four states selected as case studies were 
chosen on the basis that they demonstrate different trajectories in relation to activism, 
but also because they are comparable in a number of ways that we know to be 
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important, based on the literature review in chapter one and the findings from the 
quantitative analysis in chapter two. 
 
The selection criteria were as follows: 
(i) The states should be medium democracies 
Simmons notes that yet-to-be consolidated democracies make good case studies, as 
they offer both an opportunity for reform (compared with the most entrenched 
autocracies, where there is less opportunity) and a need for reform (compared with 
entrenched democracies, where good practice is already observed and so there is less 
perceived need).
1
   Chapter two supports this insight, finding that high democracies 
generally perform reasonably well on torture, and most (although not all) low 
democracies perform badly in this regard; medium democracies show the widest 
variation, creating an opportunity to search for explanations. 
 
(ii) The states should not be experiencing conflict 
Chapter one explains how conflict impacts on the likelihood that a state will use 
torture, and this finding is borne out by the analysis in chapter two.  If comparing 
torture in state A, where there is conflict, to torture in state B, where there is no 
conflict, it is unsafe to attribute any differences to activism.   
 
(iii) The states should be of comparable population size 
Chapter 2 found that the states with the smallest populations generally perform much 
better on torture than the states with the largest populations.  It was important, 
therefore, that all case studies had reasonably comparable population sizes. The fact 
                                                 
1 Beth Simmons, Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics (Cambridge 
University Press 2009). 
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that they were all in the same category (large, medium or small population) was more 
important than which of the categories applied. 
 
(iv) The case studies should be from the same region 
In order to make meaningful comparisons, the case studies must be subject to the 
same international obligations on torture.  While much of this transcends region, 
particularly in relation to obligations occurred under UN treaties, regional human 
rights frameworks differ in relation to the commitments required of states and the 
strength of their enforcement mechanisms.  To isolate activism as a variable, it is 
important to control for these differences by selecting states from within a single 
region.  Furthermore, chapter 1 pointed to the existence of the regional contagion 
effect, both in relation to the adoption of norms and also in relation to the backlash 
against human rights.  For these reasons, it was important that the four case studies 
belong to the same region.   
 
 
(v) The states should have a similar degree of vulnerability to influence 
Chapter one sets out the argument that openness to influence is a scope condition for 
positive change, suggesting that the case studies should be comparable in their 
material and social vulnerability.   
 
 
(vi) Ethical considerations 
In accordance with the “do not harm” principle, the researcher attempted to identify 
case studies where interviewees (and indeed the researcher) would not be put at 
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unnecessary risk by the research.  The decision was made to avoid including states 
where public criticism of the state would be likely to lead to reprisals. 
 
Taking all the above factors into account, the following states were identified as 
appropriate case studies: Albania, Bulgaria, the Former Yugolav Republic of 
Macedonia (hereafter Macedonia) and Romania.   
 
According to the USAID scores on CSO advocacy (described previously in chapter 
2), each of the four states demonstrates a distinctive trajectory on advocacy over the 
period from 2000 to 2016.
2
   
 
 
Figure 1 CSO Advocacy scores (Source: USAID) 
 
                                                 
2
 Data taken from USAID, CSO Sustainability Index for Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia, 20th 
edition, July 2017.  In the USAID report, lower scores for advocacy represent a better performance; for 
ease of comparison with the CIRI torture score in later graphs, this depiction has been reversed so that 
higher scores represent better advocacy performance; this was achieved by subtracting the original 
USAID score from 4.5.  The original scores are provided in the appendix. 
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The contrast in their advocacy trajectories suggest that they offer a good test of the 
hypothesis that more advocacy means better state performance on torture.  The 
prediction would be for Bulgaria to be performing best on torture by 2016, given that 
it has consistently had the highest score for CSO advocacy.  While Albania has a 
number of low points, the overall trajectory from 2002 is a positive one, and by the 
end of the period, it has the second highest score, suggesting that its performance on 
torture should improve over the period.  Macedonia and Romania both have 
extremely low scores for CSO advocacy at the start of the period, in 2000 and 2001 
respectively.  Both then improve until 2007 and decline thereafter, with the decline in 
Macedonia being particularly precipitous.  The prediction from the hypothesis is 
therefore that Romania and Macedonia will perform less well on torture than the 
other two states by the end of the period.  The following chapters will examine 
whether this is indeed the case. 
 
2. Matching the states to the case study criteria  
 
(i) Medium democracies 
All four states are post-Communist, and are classed as emerging or newly-emerged 
democracies, part of the so-called “third wave” of democratisation.3  The Democracy 
Ranking Association ranks 112 states in order of democracy for the years 2011-12 
and 2014-15: during both of these periods, all four states were ranked as middle 
performers.
4
   
 
                                                 
3
 Samuel Huntingdon, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (University of 
Oklahoma Press 1991). 
4 A middle position in the ranking implies a ranking between 37th and 74th of the states surveyed: in 
2011-12, Albania was 60th and in 2014-15 it was 55th; Bulgaria was 43rd and then 41st; Macedonia 
66th and then 74th; Romania was 41st and then 40th.  See Democracy Ranking Association, 
www.democracyranking.org/wordpress/2016-full-dataset/ (accessed 14 January 2018). 
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(ii) Absence of conflict 
During the period in question, conflict was largely absent, with the exception of 
Macedonia in 2001.
 5
  The cessation of conflict in 2001 in this state must be borne in 
mind as a likely explanation for any improved performance on torture in the years 
immediately afterwards.  However, as we have seen, Macedonia also demonstrates a 
declining advocacy score from 2007, not directly linked to conflict: if state 
performance on torture also worsens after this date, as predicted by the hypothesis, 
the 2001 conflict cannot explain this decline, leaving the change in advocacy as a 
more persuasive explanation for the change in torture performance.  It is contended 
that this one year of conflict, early in the period under scrutiny, does not invalidate 
the use of Macedonia as a case study.   Pragmatically, it was not possible to identify 
an alternative case study where the state matched all other criteria set out here as well 
as being conflict-free throughout the period, so this compromise in case study 
selection was deemed necessary. 
 
(iii) Population size 
All four states are considered here to be medium-sized: Albania and Macedonia each 
have a population of under 3 million, Bulgaria just over 7 million, while Romania is 
the largest with a population of just under 20 million. This range is arguably not 
insignificant, and it should be borne in mind that Romania’s relatively large size may 
cause greater challenges in implementing reforms than those faced by the smaller 
states.  However, comparisons between Bulgaria and Romania are of particular 
                                                 
5 As in chapter 2, the threshold for conflict is deemed to be at least 25 battle-related deaths per calendar 
year, across the categories of intrastate, interstate, one-sided and non-state conflict, with data drawn 
from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program.  Chapter 2 noted that this can be seen as a relatively high 
threshold for conflict; a certain amount of social unrest and upheaval may exist under this threshold.  
The intention is to exclude only countries in a state of war; social unrest is not uncommon, and we are 
looking here for torture reform that has a degree of robustness in the face of such challenges. 
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interest due to the fact that they acceded to the EU at the same time (see below), 
justifying a degree of compromise on the population size aspect. 
  
 (iv) Region  
The states chosen were all in south-east Europe; all are members of the UN and the 
Council of Europe and are participants in OSCE.  Their accession to international and 
regional commitments with regard to torture is set out in the following table: 
Date 
acceded to: 
ICCPR ICCPR 
First 
Optional 
Protocol 
UNCAT OPCAT ECHR ECPT 
Albania  1991 2007 1994 2003 1996 1996 
Bulgaria 1970 1992 1986 2011 1992 1994 
Romania 1974 1993 1990 2009 1994 1994 
Macedonia 1994 1994 1994 2009 1997 1997 
 
Although Bulgaria was the earliest adopter of all the Conventions, with the exception 
of OPCAT, one limitation is worth noting: it has made a declaration, under Art 28 
UNCAT, that it does not recognise the competence of the Committee against Torture 
to carry out the special form of investigation mandated by Art 20 UNCAT in cases 
where there are credible accounts of systematic torture within a state’s boundaries.  
 
On a practical note, the choice of four states within the south-eastern region of 
Europe, in reasonable proximity to the UK-based researcher, offered logistical 
advantages in relation to accessibility and cost of field visits. 
 
(v) Vulnerability to influence  
The four states were, over the period under scrutiny, particularly susceptible to the 
influence of the European Union; two acceded to the EU during the period, while the 
two others remain aspiring members as of the time of writing.  The details of how this 
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influence operates are sufficiently important to given their own extended section 
below. 
 
(vi) Ethical considerations 
It should be observed that critics of the state have on occasion faced risks, as explored 
in each of the case study chapters.  At the same time, civil society activists can and do 
publish reports pointing out state shortcomings in this area with a reasonable degree 
of freedom and safety, at least in comparison to a state such as Turkey, at the time of 
writing.  The view was taken that the research would not create additional risks for 
any of the participants. 
 
Other points of comparison 
While not in themselves selection criteria, it is worth noting that the states have 
further similarities.  All are middle income countries: the World Bank classifies 
Albania as lower-middle-income and the three others as upper-middle-income.
6
 A 
state’s resources are relevant in that reform often requires a degree of investment.  
Ensuring detainees have access to medical care and legal advice carries a cost, as 
does the purchase of equipment such as closed circuit television.  As discussed 
previously, ensuring police have access to forensic investigation techniques (eg. 
DNA) means they are less likely to resort to forcing confessions.   Another 
                                                 
6 The World Bank lists GNI per capita for 2013 as Albania 9950; Bulgaria 15,210; Macedonia 11,520 
and Romania 18,390: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.PP.CD (accessed 2 May 
2015).  Data represent Gross National Income per capita, converted to international dollars, calculated 
on purchasing power parity with what a US dollar buys in the US. Relative prosperity has been found 
to affect a state’s performance on physical integrity measures: Steven C. Poe, C. Neal Tate and Linda 
Camp Keith, ‘Repression of the Human Right to Personal Integrity Revisited: A Global Crossnational 
Study Covering the Years 1976-1993’ (1999) International Studies Quarterly 43(2), 291-315. See also 
Todd Landman, Protecting Human Rights: A Comparative Study (Georgetown University Press 2005). 
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commonality is the existence of Roma populations in of each of the four countries.
7
  
Roma communities tend to be socially disadvantaged and disproportionately affected 
by human rights abuses including torture and ill-treatment.   
 
3. The regional effect: human rights in Europe and EU accession 
 
There are three layers to the European human rights system: the Council of Europe, 
which includes the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and its human rights arm ODIHR,
8
 and 
the EU.  The different bodies draw on each other, and in particular the EU builds its 
human rights norms on the principles and definitions established by the Council of 
Europe.   All of the actors in turn interact with local and international civil society, 
which often takes the lead in implementation.  For example, in an OSCE report on its 
activities to combat torture, it repeatedly notes how it uses local NGOs: its 
monitoring of places of detention “often involves the facilitation of this work by 
NGOs rather than direct activities by the field operations”;9 one of its methods of 
dealing with complaints by individual victims is “directing individuals to the relevant 
NGOs”;10 it sees its advocacy role as including “facilitation of dialogue between the 
                                                 
7 “Roma” is used here as an overarching term to include groups who consider themselves Roma, Sinti, 
Gypsies or other terms.   
8
 The focus of the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is on the promotion of 
political dialogue rather than the creation of legal norms.  It is not a human rights-specific body, but 
carries out some human rights activities as part of the so-called “human dimension” of its political 
work.  A number of its Documents include commitments to eradicate torture, including the Vienna 
Document of 1989, the Copenhagen Document of 1999, and the Istanbul Charter of 1999.  Albania and 
Macedonia have OSCE Field Operations, while Bulgaria and Romania participate in OSCE, without 
having field offices.  The mandates of field offices vary, but in Albania and Macedonia, the mandates 
align closely with torture prevention work, as they include elements such as rebuilding the legal 
system, enhancing the professionalism of the police, and supporting the work of the NPM. 
9
 OSCE/ODIHR, The Fight against Torture: The OSCE Experience ODIHR (2009) 14. 
10 Ibid 15. 
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government and NGOs”.11  In highlighting obstacles to reform, ODIHR specifically 
noted “[a] weak or non-existent NGO community, or one in which none of the actors 
focuses on torture issues”.12  The point to note is that the avowed aim is to support 
and work with domestic civil society, and not to supplant it. 
 
The importance of the ECtHR for strategic litigation has been discussed in the 
previous chapter.   It is worth noting here the relative use made of the ECtHR by each 
of the four states.  In 2015, the Court received 4,439 applications concerning 
Romania, 1,213 applications concerning Bulgaria, 101 applications concerning 
Albania and 340 applications concerning Macedonia.
13
  Compared to their relative 
populations, Bulgaria and Romania see a broadly similar use of the Court, while it is 
much less used in the context of Macedonia and notably less with regard to Albania.  
This suggests that local civil society strategies differ in their use of strategic litigation, 
at least in this forum.  If Albania is more of a success story in reducing torture than 
Romania, as predicted by the hypothesis, then it also suggests that strategic litigation 
may not be associated with the greatest success in ending torture.  This should not 
necessarily be understood as indicating that strategic litigation is a poor choice of 
strategy: NGOs may resort to strategic litigation where the state is otherwise 
unreceptive to their demands for torture reform, so strategic litigation co-occurs with 
state reluctance to reform rather than causes it.  On the other hand, we should be alert 
to the possibility that strategic litigation in a regional forum is a choice of strategy 
that is coercive and external, and has the effect of “crowding out” internal motivation 
to reform, as predicted by Goodman and Jinks (see chapter one).  The case studies 
                                                 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid 23. 
13 Numbers taken from the European Court of Human Rights Press Country profile for each state, as 
updated July 2016, available www.echr.coe.int (accessed 15 September 2016). 
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will allow us to examine the dynamic more closely, and to identify if the rationalist 
perspective (with its focus on an external locus of demand, often using coercive 
strategies) or the constructivist perspective (focusing more on persuasion and the 
process of internalising norms) has more explanatory power in relation to state reform 
on torture. 
 
Accession to the European Union 
Chapter one noted that a state’s social and material vulnerability to external influence 
acts as a scope condition for reform.  The four states operate in a particular political 
context that would be expected to render them especially “vulnerable” or receptive to 
the influence of the EU.  Bulgaria launched its bid for EU candidacy in 1992, 
Romania in 1993, and Albania and Macedonia in 1995.  The first two acceded to the 
EU in 2007 and the latter two were recognised as official accession candidates in 
2010 (Macedonia) and 2014 (Albania). The accession process means that human 
rights and reform of the justice and security sector are placed firmly on the state’s 
agenda: states have a strong incentive to demonstrate reform within this sector, and 
NGOs working on these issues have traction for their arguments to be heard.  This 
phase represents a moment in the state’s history when there is a particular opportunity 
for change to happen, at least in principle – it cannot be denied that political 
expediency plays a role in the accession process, and at least some commentators 
view the accession of Romania and Bulgaria to the EU as premature, a political 
payoff for cooperation with the NATO bombing of Serbia in 1999 rather than 
recognition that these two states had indeed met EU standards on institutional 
readiness and the observation of human rights norms.       
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The European Commission monitors accession states to ensure that they meet the 
criteria for admission, known as the Copenhagen criteria.  These include the stability 
of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for 
and protection of minorities. The EU’s inward-facing policy on human rights, 
including the right not to be tortured, is commonly phrased as the EU’s commitment 
to being an area of “freedom, security and justice” (from the Lisbon Treaty article 
3.2).
14
  Member states are required to abide by these principles, and accession states 
are expected to reform their justice and security sectors to conform to them.  During 
the negotiations, an Accession Partnership is agreed between the state and the EU, 
setting out the areas in which the candidate state needs to make progress in the short 
and medium term.  The aspiring member state creates a corresponding National 
Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis.  The Accession Partnership also includes 
commitments made by the EU to provide financial and technical support to enable the 
state to make the necessary changes, drawing on the EU Instrument for Pre-accession 
Assistance (IPA).
15
  
 
Does the EU really care whether its member states torture?
16
  Some of its long-
standing members, such as Italy and Greece, themselves have poor records in this 
                                                 
14 “The Union shall constitute an area of freedom, security and justice with respect for fundamental 
rights and the different legal systems and traditions of the Member States”, Art. 67(1) Treaty of the 
European Union.  This area of governance involves a number of additional pan-European agencies, 
outside the main EU bodies, which are sources of EU soft law.  These include agencies responsible for 
operational activities (Frontex, Eurojust, Europol, CEPOL) and those primarily oriented towards 
networking and information exchange (EMCCDA, ENISA, FRA).   
15 Information available through the Official Journal of the European Union, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/accession_partnership.html (accessed 19 August 2016).  The original 
IPA had a budget of €11.5 billion from 2007-2013 (note that the period post-dates Bulgarian and 
Romanian accession; the accession process has evolved over the years) while its replacement, IPA II 
has a similar budget for 2014-2020.  Amongst the investment areas is democracy and governance 
(which includes a reference to empowering civil society) and rule of law and fundamental rights.  IPA 
II emphasises performance measurement using agreed criteria.   
16 Chapter 1 pointed out that “what the state wants” is an artificial construct, given that state 
institutions are made up of individual actors with their own preferences.  This applies even more to the 
EU, which incorporates a vast array of actors with often competing preferences.  Asking what the EU 
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regard, leaving it open to a charge of hypocrisy.
17
  In relation to the justice sector, the 
questions of corruption and organised crime in the region loom larger in the EU’s 
concerns than the ill-treatment of detainees.  At a minimum, however, the EU itself is 
subject to rhetorical entrapment in relation to human rights.  Left entirely to its own 
devices, the EU and aspiring member states might not prioritise the issue of torture 
when deciding eligibility for accession.  However, having committed itself 
rhetorically both to human rights, and to the principle of civic participation, the EU 
has created a space for civil society actors to assert that improving its record on 
torture does matter to a state’s “Europeanisation” process. 
 
CIVICUS summarised the changes brought by joining the EU (the reference is to 
Bulgaria, but the principles apply to all four of the states): 
 
The process of EU integration considerably changed the contextual environment, 
adding three new dimensions: a new level of decision-making; EU leverage over 
domestic reforms; and new partners in decision- and policy-making, in the shape of 
EU institutions.  This offers a new momentum for civil society organisations…in 
shaping their agenda and role in society and policy-making.18   
 
CIVICUS also noted that funding patterns changed in Bulgaria after EU accession, 
with “traditional donors” reducing their contribution to CSOs;19 the same 
phenomenon is noted in the Romania chapter.  EU accession brings to bear new 
                                                                                                                                           
wants in relation to torture means attempting to determine the extent to which torture reform emerges 
as a priority amongst the many other priorities held by EU institutions and by the states constituting the 
bloc. 
17 CIRI torture scores for all states 2006-2010 are provided in the appendix.  Spain and Greece both 
received the lowest possible score for four out of those five years, indicating a worse performance than 
Bulgaria, Albania and Macedonia over that period. 
18
 CIVICUS and Open Society Institute Sofia, Civil Society Index 2008-2010.  Civil Society in 
Bulgaria: Citizen Actions Without Engagement (Open Society Institute 2011) 13. 
19 Ibid 14. 
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opportunities to influence state policy and practice, including on torture, but it may 
also represent a period of adjustment for organisations, as previously relied-on donors 
take the view that their funding is now more appropriately directed elsewhere. 
 
While the EU accession process represents a highly important opportunity for reform, 
there are two counter-trends that may impede this process: backlash and backsliding.  
Although not a new phenomenon, Euroscepticism and backlash against the European 
project gained a new level of prominence in 2016 with the UK referendum decision to 
leave the EU.  The rhetoric of national sovereignty has political traction in many 
states, particularly where a majority of the population perceives that the EU’s 
handling of economic and migration challenges has been disadvantageous to them.  
Where EU membership is unpopular, reforms aimed at meeting the Copenhagen 
criteria, include reforms of state practice on torture, are more likely to be resisted, at 
the political level and/or or by state agents (in line with the principal/agent problem, 
discussed in chapter one).   
 
At the time of writing, the balance of public opinion remains in favour of EU 
membership in the majority of states, including the four states that form the case 
studies here.  In a 2017 survey for the European Parliament, nearly 28,000 EU 
nationals were questioned whether they felt their country had benefited from EU 
membership: in 25 out of 28 states, more than half of those surveyed responded that 
on balance, EU membership was of benefit to their country, with 56% of Bulgarians 
and 61% of Romanians answering to this effect.
20
  In the two states that have yet to 
                                                 
20 European Parliament, Directorate-General for Communication, Public Opinion Monitoring Unit, 
October 2017, Parlemeter 2017, A Stronger Voice, Citizen’s Views on Parliament and the EU. Part II 
Complete Survey Results. PE608.759, 23.  The average for respondents in all countries was 64%. It is 
also worth noting that within the survey, respondents were asked which values European Parliament 
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accede, Macedonian support for EU accession was reported as 77% of the population 
in 2016.
21
  Public support for EU accession was estimated to be even higher in the 
same year in Albania, at 80-90%.
22
 The popularity of EU accession indicates that 
demands for torture reform are likely to find political traction.  Furthermore, 
governments used the promise of EU accession as a legitimation strategy, with the 
concept of “returning to Europe” revealing the importance of this development for the 
state’s self-identification as a modern European nation.  The lure of the EU relates not 
only to the benefits of economic development and freedom of movement, but to the 
state’s view of itself.  As Risse et al point out, from the constructivist perspective, this 
process of “identity transformation” is key to lasting state reform in which, over time, 
human rights are increasingly observed “for reasons of belief and identity”.23  
Negative reports about persisting abuses impact on the state not only because they 
potentially jeopardize a decision by the EU that the state is ready for full membership 
(a rationalist motivation).  From a constructivist angle, the prospect of EU 
membership is also tied in with a state’s self-image: its identity as a modern European 
rights-respecting state, distanced from its communist past and anxious to demonstrate 
that it now behaves differently.  Of course, such a new self-image is not universally 
sought-after or cherished: a competing discourse based on national sovereignty is 
discussed in the next section. 
 
                                                                                                                                           
should defend as a matter of priority: 55% of respondents from both Bulgaria and Romania said that 
the protection of human rights should be prioritised: ibid, 21.  The average for respondents in all 
countries was 56%. 
21 Ivan Damjanovski, Analysis of public opinion on Macedonia’s accession process to the European 
Union (2014-2016) (IDCS 2016). 
22 Konrad Niklewicz, The Long March Towards the EU: Candidates, Neighbours and the Prospects 
for Enlargement (Wilfred Martens Centre for European Studies 2016), 35. 
23
 Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink in Thomas Risse, Stephen C Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink (eds), 
The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change (Cambridge University Press 
1999) 18. 
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Concerns have been expressed in relation to Bulgaria and Romania that once 
accession was achieved, backsliding took place.  Romanian commentator Mungiu-
Pippidi argues that for states in Central and Eastern Europe: “the day after accession, 
when conditionality has faded, the influence of the EU vanished like a short-term 
anaesthetic”.24    Conant criticizes the EU for rewarding promises of reform rather 
than action, and accuses it of “anaemic oversight” as to whether legislative changes 
are followed by genuine change in practice.
25
  She concludes that the commitments 
by new EU states to human rights standards remain “shallow” and such progress as 
has been attained is reversible.
26
  Similarly sceptical, Guasti and Mansfeldová note 
that while states in the region have demonstrated levels of enthusiasm for joining 
international organisations, “the process of these complex changes [has not been] 
linear or unidirectional”, carrying the risk that citizens lose enthusiasm for the 
project.
27
  Levitz and Pop-Eleches are more optimistic: they acknowledge that the 
pace of reform may slow after accession, but they do not accept the charge of 
complete backsliding.  While states no longer have to demonstrate progress in order 
to achieve the goal of accession, EU membership itself carries “alternative leverage 
and linkage mechanisms”, most obviously in the form of increased EU aid and trade, 
but also the ongoing socialisation both of elites and ordinary people. New 
opportunities to work and travel in the more established EU states lead them to raise 
                                                 
24
 Alina Mungiu-Pippidi ‘Is East-Central Europe Backsliding?  EU Acession is No “End of History”’ 
(2007)  Journal of Democracy 4, 8-16. 
25 Ibid 76. 
26 Lisa Conant, ‘Compelling criteria?  Human rights in the European Union’ in R. Daniel Kelemen, 
Anand  Menon and Jonathan Slapin, eds. The European Union: Integration and Enlargement, 
(Routledge 2015) 71.   
27
 Petra Guasti and Zdenka Mansfeldová (2013), Central and Eastern Europe after Enlargement: 
Successes and Failures.  Paper proposed for 41st ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Workshop 12, 
“From the Outside In – International Relations’ Effects on Domestic Public Attitudes”, Johannes 
Gutenburg Universität, Mainz, 11-16 March 2013, 1. 
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their expectations of government performance and their own right to play a part in 
political decision-making.
28
   
 
There are some structural protections against backsliding.  In response to criticisms 
that Bulgaria and Romania had not fully addressed concerns in the area of justice and 
home affairs at the time of their accession, the European Commission created a 
follow-up instrument, the Mechanism for Cooperation and Verification, with the aim 
of continuing scrutiny over the reform process; it was given leverage by including 
conditionality related to Schengen area membership.  Continuing monitoring also 
takes place through the European Commission and European Court of Justice 
infringement procedures.  Examining environmental case studies from Romania and 
Bulgaria after their accession to the EU, Dimitrova and Buzogany find that accession 
had not negated governmental sensitivity to naming and shaming in the eyes of EU 
institutions, and this ongoing sensitivity could still be leveraged by NGOs to enable 
more democratic policy-making and implementation, even in a non-acquis issue such 
as forestry policy.
29
 They found that, drawing on their transnational links, domestic 
NGOs acted as “conduits for norm diffusion”.  They “participated in two-level games 
in which they sought to use EU rules and involve the EU or other international actors 
to change policy practices and prevent or limit effective state capture”.30  Activists 
had greater success in Bulgaria, where environmentalists were able to draw on a long 
tradition of political mobilisation, while weaker mobilisation in Romania hampered 
                                                 
28
 Philip Levitz and Grigore Pop-Eleches, ‘Why No Backsliding?  The European Union’s Impact on 
Democracy and Governance Before and After Accession’ (2010) Comparative Political Studies 43(4), 
457-485, 457.  
29 Antoaneta Dimitrova and Aron Buzogany, “Post-Accession Policy-Making in Bulgaria and 
Romania: Can Non-state Actors Use EU Rules to Promote Better Governance?” Journal of Common 
Market Studies, 2014 52(1), 139–156. 
30 Ibid, 152. 
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progress.
31
  Their findings highlight the fact that differing local opportunities for 
activism result in different outcomes, even where the external oversight mechanisms 
are the same. 
 
The case studies in subsequent chapters allow us to compare and contrast states in 
both a pre- and post-accession phase.  If EU accession encourages states to improve 
their performance on torture, we would expect Bulgaria and Romania to consistently 
perform better than Albania and Macedonia. If states merely attempt to create the 
appearance of reform, and then backslide once accession is achieved, we would 
expect Albania and Macedonia to out-perform Bulgaria and Romania.  Both 
outcomes contrast with the prediction that activism levels affect outcomes on torture, 
which predict one EU member state and one non-EU member to be the better 
performers (Bulgaria and Albania) and one EU member state and one non-EU 
member state (Romania and Macedonia) to be the worse performers.  If the latter 
prediction turns out to be the case, we can reach the following conclusion: the period 
before and after EU accession is one in which the state has heightened extrinisic and 
intrinsic motivation to be seen to be doing the right things.  This sensitivity can be 
exploited to improve state performance on torture.  Success is predicated on how well 
civil society activists are positioned to capitalise on this opportunity. 
 
A state can be denied EU membership for failing to achieve sufficient reform,
32
 but to 
date it is unprecedented for EU membership to be suspended or withdrawn for failure 
                                                 
31 Ibid, 152-3. 
32 The ongoing reluctance of many EU states to grant Turkey accession status is often attributed to its 
poor human rights record, although some see this as a fig-leaf to cover the real concern about large-
scale migration and troublesome external borders. 
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to implement the reforms on an ongoing basis.
33
 Article 7 of the Treaty on European 
Union allows for such a suspension if a country “seriously and persistently breaches 
the principles on which the EU is founded”, including respect for human rights. This 
article has not to date been invoked, although a 2015 report by Amnesty International 
proposed that it be activated in respect of Hungary in response to its refusal to allow 
asylum-seekers access to its territory, and the use of force by security forces in border 
areas.
34
  Amnesty’s director for Europe and Central Asia, John Dalhuisen, has been 
quoted as saying “The EU needs to lose its virginity when it comes to Article 7”.35  
As seen in the case of Macedonia, however, a state perceives that its prospects of EU 
membership are receding, the weakening of this extrinsic motivation can lead to a 
decrease in its respect for human rights, and invoking Article 7 could have unintended 
negative consequences.   
  
4. Civil Society Context 
 
While advocacy levels vary across the four states, as shown above, none of the states 
is without its own challenges in relation to citizen engagement in human rights issues.   
During the Communist era, the police were used as an instrument of state repression; 
all four states entered the post-Communist phase with a legacy of low public trust, 
transparency and accountability. Police and others were used to committing abuses 
                                                 
33 Unprecedented for the EU, although not the Council of Europe: Greece voluntarily left the Council 
of Europe in 1969 to pre-empt a decision of the Human Rights Commission relating to torture and 
other abuses under the military government then in power.  The junta had fallen by the time Greece 
joined the then European Community in 1975. 
34 Amnesty International, Fenced Out: Hungary’s Violations of the Rights of Refugees and Migrants, 
EUR 27/2614/2015. 
35 Quoted in Hervey Ginger and Livingstone Emmet, “What is Article 7?” Politico website, 
https://www.politico.eu/article/hungary-eu-news-article-7-vote-poland-rule-of-law/ (accessed 4 March 
2018). 
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with impunity.
36
  Citizens were accustomed to so-called “civic organisations” that 
were in fact sponsored by the Communist state and had little faith in the 
independence and probity of such institutions.
37
  Independently of the Communist 
legacy, the political culture in these states includes other challenges: client-patron 
relations; clan culture; ethnic tensions, and widespread corruption.
38
  Corruption is 
linked to impunity (perpetrators of abuse can use financial or other leverage to escape 
accountability) and lack of trust in authorities, which in turn tends to interfere with 
human rights advances.  The issue of corruption is also likely to occupy so much of 
public, media and political attention, both domestically and internationally, that it 
narrows the space available for consideration of issues such as the fight against 
torture.   
 
Human rights organisations often have relatively shallow local roots, and rely on 
international donors to support their existence.  A 2011 CIVICUS report on Bulgaria 
assesses civic engagement in the form of participation of CSOs as being low; citizens 
do not feel a great sense of trust in CSOs and are apathetic towards their activities.
39
  
Those CSOs that do operate score fairly well, a fact that is to some extent attributable 
to the support (financial and capacity-building) received via foreign donors and 
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transnational networks.
40
  Despite this technical competence, CSOs lack financial 
stability, which affects employment stability.
41
 This affects the retention of expertise, 
which in turn hinders an organisation’s effectiveness.  There is a lack of sustainable 
coalitions/networks amongst CSOs at national level, reducing their ability to impact 
on government policy.
42
  
 
Regarding Albania, CIVICUS noted a similar distrust by citizens towards civil 
society activism, along with concerns about a donor-driven agenda.  More positively, 
the report praised civil society’s “networking potential”, its “resistance to political 
pressure”, and the fact that it had knowledge and expertise.43  Financial and thus 
employment stability is also a challenge in this state.   
 
For Romania, civil society activism was likewise hampered by “[l]ow citizen 
participation…a poor level of organization and limited inter-relations 
amongst…CSOs”.44  It was “affected by lack of financial resources and qualified 
personnel”, leaving it reliant on international financial support.45  Its activities 
“continue to remain invisible to the majority of the population, and CSOs and more 
oriented to the donors’ priorities and unable to build local constituencies”.46   
 
In Macedonia, as of 2011, civil society was evaluated as “moderately well-
developed”; “sectoral communication and cooperation is highly rated, as well as 
                                                 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid. 
43
 CIVICUS, IDM and UNDP, Civil Society Index for Albania: In Search of Citizens and Impact, 
(IDM 2010) 2. 
44
 CIVICUS and Civil Society Development Foundation, Dialogue for Civil Society: Report on the 
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networking”, although the unsustainability of human resources posed challenges.47  
From 2008 onwards, civil society faced a particularly high level of hostility from the 
government: this difficult political context will be explored in some detail in the 
relevant chapter. 
 
Advocacy on torture is concentrated in each of the states in a small number of 
organisations, and resources are an obstacle for would-be new entrants to the sector.  
An important actor in human rights advocacy in the four states is the national 
Helsinki Committee.   Both for historical reasons, and due to the identity of their 
main donors, these national organisations (they are more than national branches of the 
same organisation) tend to be particularly associated with politicised Western 
allegiances.  They have their roots in the 1970s negotiations on East/West relations 
which led to the Helsinki Final Act in 1975.  One of the principles set out in the 
Helsinki Final Act was “respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms” 
(principle VII of the first “basket” of issues).  A transnational activist network took 
shape around it, determined to achieve its full implementation: 
It became commonplace for an Eastern European dissident to write to an American 
diplomat asking that his plight be addressed in upcoming talks or for an American-
Polish activist to press the Polish Ambassador to the United States to free a trade 
union organizer.48 
 
Here we see a classic example of the “boomerang” model of advocacy described 
in the previous chapter.  In some cases, Soviet states found that there was less 
loss of face in yielding to the request of “world public opinion”, as expressed 
through an international organisation, than by giving in to a formal demand by 
                                                 
47 Ibid 10. 
48
 Sarah Snyder, Human rights activism and the end of the Cold War: a transnational history of the 
Helsinki network. (Cambridge University Press 2011) 8. 
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the US government.
49
  Tracing the progress of the Helsinki network over more 
than three decades, Snyder concludes that “it does demonstrate the 
nongovernmental activism can affect positive political change”, although given 
the persistence of human rights abuse in the successor states to the Soviet Union, 
she concludes that the story “is not a triumphal one”.50 
 
Over time, local Helsinki monitoring groups developed into a more formal 
transnational coalition, under the umbrella of the International Helsinki 
Federation for Human Rights.
51
  The prominent international advocacy group 
Human Rights Watch grew out of the US-based Helsinki Watch. The current 
national Helsinki Committees lay claim to this lineage.  The length of their 
presence and their international linkages lend them credibility, with the state and 
with international partners, but also leaves them vulnerable to accusations of 
serving foreign interests.   
 
Much of the antagonism to these organisations has been couched as an attack on 
the funding provided by Hungarian-American philanthropist George Soros.  
Regionally, this position has been articulated with particular force in Hungary 
and other states in the so-called Visegrad group (Poland, Slovakia and the Czech 
Republic).  As discussed in chapter one, such narratives form part of a larger 
trend of counter-rhetoric attempting to challenge and reverse human rights gains, 
the phenomenon of backlash.
52
  The attacks carry an anti-Western and in some 
                                                 
49 Ibid 126, quoting US Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs Paula 
Dobriansky. 
50 Ibid 249. 
51 Ibid 11. 
52 Stephen Hopgood, Jack Snyder and Leslie Vinjamuri (eds), Human Rights Futures (Cambridge 
University Press 2017). 
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cases, an anti-semitic subtext, Soros being of Jewish origin.  The Hungarian 
prime minister, Viktor Orbán, who came to power in 2010, is amongst those who 
portrayed George Soros as part of a conspiracy to undermine the state, 
threatening institutions founded by Soros, such as the Central European 
University, with closure, and introducing legislation restricting access to funding 
by internationally-financed NGOs.
53
  Similar anti-Soros political rhetoric has 
occurred in Poland and Macedonia, as noted by Council of Europe 
Commissioner Nils Muižnieks in 2017, alongside what he calls “harsh 
stigmatising of NGOs” in states including Bulgaria and Romania.54  Of the four 
states, Albania seems least affected by this human rights counter-narrative. 
 
Muižnieks locates this anti-CSO language within a larger context of the reduction in 
the civil space within the region.   This takes various different forms across a number 
of states: 
 
 
legal and administrative restrictions; judicial harassment and sanctions,  
including criminal prosecution for failure to comply with new restrictive  
regulations; smear campaigns and orchestrated ostracism of independent  
groups; and threats, intimidation and even physical violence against their  
members.  In some cases, the climate is so negative that it forces human  
rights work to the margins or even underground.55 
 
Such repressive strategies carry a cost in the form of international disapproval: 
Christensen and Weinstein find that states will refrain from such behaviour if they 
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feel the cost outweighs the benefit.
56
  Conversely, governments are more likely to be 
willing to accept this cost if they feel their political survival is at stake.
57
   This sense 
of vulnerability to losing control may have been heightened in states experiencing the 
“Arab spring” or the “colour revolution” in a number of post-Soviet states, including 
Macedonia.  Rutzen believes that governments felt at risk at the news of uprisings in 
other states, and instituted restrictions on domestic civil society with a view to 
avoiding similar uprisings in their own domestic setting.
58
  
 
Kreienkamp notes that there is a “sophisticated playbook” used by states to suppress 
civil society “often combining legislative restrictions with targeted delegitimisation 
campaigns”.59  These range from overly-restrictive registration requirements, to the 
strategy of harassing inspections, which disproportionately absorb the time, energy 
and resources of organisations, such as the inspections in Hungary in 2014 of 
organisations who had received Norwegian grants.  Some governments seek to 
control NGOs by controlling funding: in Poland, for example, the government 
proposed to set up a National Centre for the Development of Civil Society, to be 
supervised by Prime Minister.  Funding may be made dependent on government 
approval; states may impose a cap, or prohibit funding from certain donors or for 
certain kinds of activity, insist on it being channelled through a government bank, or 
banning foreign funding outright.  In justifying new reporting requirements, 
governments claim that these requirements are imposed in the interests of 
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transparency, as with Hungary in 2017 in respect of its proposed legislation on the 
“Transparency of Organisations Financed from Abroad”, requiring that organisations 
receiving foreign donations above a set threshold must register with the authorities. 
Another repressive use of the law includes forcing activists into self-censorship due to 
the risk of costly legal cases.   
 
One strategy used by political elites is to “crowd out critical voices” by supporting 
government-friendly NGOs or GONGOS – government-organised “NGOs”.60  States 
use these “ersatz” or “captive” groups to create the appearance of supporting civil 
society, as a safe (from the regime’s perspective) way of channelling funding and to 
delegitimize more challenging voices.
61
 Gershman and Allen cite the example of 
Slovakia, where the government has sponsored “parallel” NGOs to compete with 
their independent counterparts.
62
  A similar “crowding out” strategy underlies the 
manipulation of the media, both traditional and new, by the spreading of ‘fake 
news’.63  This phenomenon will be explored in the Macedonia chapter.  Less subtle 
strategies including the harassment of activists, including by means of physical 
attack: an example occurs in the Bulgaria chapter.   
 
The importance of transnational networking has been highlighted in previous 
chapters: there are examples of states attempting to restrict these opportunities by 
making it difficult for activists to travel and obtain visas; they may also monitor 
internet use, or restrict access to certain websites.  Such strategies do not feature to 
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any noteworthy extent in the four states examined here.  State involvement would be 
hard to deny, and the strategies would be particularly inimical to the EU, with its 
traditional emphasis on free movement of goods, services and people.   
 
5. The EU and demand for torture reform: a look back at theory of 
state motivation 
 
Given that the four states were all members of the Council of Europe, had ratified the 
ECHR and were subject to the jurisdiction of the ECtHR before joining the EU, why 
so much emphasis in these case studies on the EU accession process?  If accession to 
human rights treaties is enough in and of itself to change states’ practice, the four 
states should have improved their performance on torture after joining the ECHR; 
their subsequent entry into the EU accession process would not then require further 
major change.  The expected evolution might unfold as follows: the states accede to 
the ECHR; they are exposed to these human rights norms; they face public criticism if 
they fail to adhere to them, by having their failures exposed through ECtHR cases and 
through the monitoring mechanism of the Committee of Ministers.  Over time, they 
internalise the norms, and they start performing better.   
 
The literature review in chapter one explored the arguments of the treaty pessimists 
from Hathaway onwards, who note that ratification of a human rights treaty does not 
lead automatically to an improvement in human rights performance.  In the four case 
studies that follow, it will be seen that the trend in the years post-ratification of the 
ECHR cannot be described as a straightforward linear improvement in performance 
on torture.  If one were, somewhat arbitrarily, to select the tenth anniversary of 
accession to the ECHR, in each case the state received the lowest possible CIRI score 
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on torture (a score of 0 for Albania in 2006, Bulgaria in 2002, Romania in 2004 and 
Macedonia in 2007). 
 
Accepting a human rights treaty is evidently not sufficient to bring about reform in 
itself: further incentives for compliance are needed.  Rationalists might point to the 
greater political and economic incentives associated with EU accession: EU 
investment in its poorer regions; access to the European single market; free 
movement for citizens across the whole territory of the EU.  If states need to show 
human rights improvement in order to meet the conditions for EU accession, then 
they are hugely motivated to demonstrate such an improvement.   This argument does 
not invalidate the applicability of constructivist understandings: over time, if states 
act in rights-compliant ways, they begin to internalise the appropriateness of such 
behaviour.  For emerging democracies, as noted above, adoption of human rights 
norms may represent a break from the Communist past, and become an assertion of 
its identity as a modern European state, although this identity formation is 
complicated by a counter-narrative based on national sovereignty and an 
unwillingness to have change dictated by external actors. 
 
Both rationalist and constructivist explanations can help with understanding different 
stages of a state’s progression.  External demands for change may become 
internalised over time.  If this does not happen, and the demand for torture reform is 
perceived as emanating largely from an external source, the resulting risk is that if EU 
membership becomes less politically desirable, and/or the counter-narrative around 
national sovereignty and resistance to external demands becomes dominant, much of 
the incentive to demonstrate reform is potentially dissipated.  From a constructivist 
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viewpoint, if states have reached the point where norms have been internalised, the 
loss of external pressure should matter less: states will largely respect, protect and 
fulfil rights because they are the “done thing”.  For states not at this stage, an 
abatement of external pressure may compromise their willingness to invest in 
improving human rights performance. 
 
The following case studies will allow us to examine how NGOs and the state frame 
the demand for torture reform: is the locus of the demand external or internal?  Does 
this change over time?  If the case studies indicate that improvements are attributable 
to a state’s desire to meet EU accession criteria or forestall external criticism, then the 
rationalist explanation is more convincing, particularly if backsliding becomes 
evident once accession is achieved and the external incentive is less acute.  If it is 
possible to identify a state undertaking torture reform and maintaining it on the basis 
of internalised demands – a new self-identity as a rights-respecting state – then this 
finding will support a more constructive interpretation, perhaps as the next step in a 
sequence of state motivations for reform.  The constructivist interpretation does not 
preclude backsliding: if a state’s self-image is malleable, the implication is that this 
self-image can change again in ways that are less hospitable to human rights reform.  
The narratives around any reform process are important to the durability of that 
reform.   
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6. Methodological aspects of case study research  
 
The purpose of multiple case studies is to allow the researcher to support or falsify 
the “hypothesized contrast” between the cases.64 As Flyvberg observes, “it is 
falsification, not verification, that characterizes the case study”.65  Case studies 
involve a trade-off amongst the competing goals of “attaining theoretical parsimony, 
establishing explanatory richness, and keeping the number of cases to be studied 
manageable”.66  In this case, the hypothesized contrast is that differences related to 
civil society advocacy (the advocacy itself and/or the conditions in which it takes 
place) account at least to some extent for differences in state performance on torture.  
The case study research outlined in the next four chapters involved both primary and 
secondary data collection.  Both aspects are described below, along with some 
observations on the limitations of the research method.   
 
(i) Primary data collection 
Primary data collection involved a field trip to each of the four countries between 
2015 and 2017, in order to carry out semi-structured interviews with relevant expert 
informants.  The interviews enabled the collection of primary data, not available 
elsewhere, enabling this research to make an original contribution to the literature.  
This research strategy was chosen in preference to possible alternatives such as a 
survey, which was seen as too closed to allow in-depth exploration of the key themes, 
and the use of participant observation, which was unfeasible for logistical reasons, 
including resource limitations and lack of competence in the local languages.   
                                                 
64 Robert Yin Case Study Research: Design and Methods (Sage Publications 2003) 54. 
65
 Bent Flyvbjerg, ‘Five Misunderstandings about Case-Study Research’ (2006) Qualitative Inquiry 
12(2), 219-45, 235. 
66 Alexander L George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences (MIT Press 2005), 31. 
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These semi-structured interviews were conducted in person, in most but not all cases 
in the offices of the participants.  Due to logistical limitations, research visits were 
relatively brief and confined to the capital of each country and interviews were 
carried out in English.  Respondents were notified that they could participate on an 
anonymous basis and could withdraw consent at any point.  While no interviewee 
asked for their name to be withheld, for ethical reasons caution has been exercised 
here in identifying participants to avoid any unintended consequences for those 
individuals or the organisations for which they work.  Organisations were initially 
identified by their online visibility, and there was an element of the snowball method, 
as a number of interviewees recommended others.  While attempts were made to 
secure a range of perspectives, individuals who position themselves as pro-torture 
reform and pro-NGO voices were more likely to be willing to participate in the 
research, leading to potential selection bias.  However, this is not fatal to the 
endeavour: interviewees were being asked for their views on the circumstances under 
which they do and do not achieve their goals in relation to combatting torture (how 
civil society works rather than if civil society works), and were well-positioned to 
provide information on this matter. 
 
Attempts were made to initiate contact with police training colleges and relevant 
government ministries, but it was not possible to secure interviews.  In Albania, the 
researcher had the opportunity to attend a meeting between local NGOs, donors, the 
NPM and senior members of the police: the meeting was conducted in Albanian, but 
an English interpreter was available.  This event allowed direct observation: the 
researcher directly witnessed activists engage with the police.  It created an 
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opportunity to secure a broader range of views, although the views expressed were 
undoubtedly mediated by the nature of the event and the identity of participants. 
 
Interviews took place in February 2015 (UK-based informant); April 2015 (Bulgaria); 
May 2015 (Albania); March 2017 (Romania) and May 2017 (Macedonia).
67
 The 
primary, although not the sole, informants for this research were NGOs, which could 
arguably lead to a skewed understanding of their centrality to the fight against torture.  
It has been stated earlier that NGOs do not exhaust the category of civil society.  It is 
considerably easier to secure interviews with NGO staff than to identify and locate 
the originators of an informal demonstration.  NGOs involved in international 
networks, with English-speaking staff and English language publications on their 
websites, are considerably more visible and accessible to an external researcher than 
less formal/more grassroots initiatives.   
 
Attempts were made to interview a representative of the National Preventive 
Mechanism (NPM) in each of these states: an interview duly took place with the 
Bulgarian NPM and the researcher observed a joint meeting of the NPM, funders, 
NGOs and police in Albania as described above, but it was not possible to arrange an 
equivalent interview in Romania and Macedonia.  The difficulties besetting the NPM 
in the latter two countries are set out in the relevant chapters.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
67 Full details have been retained on file by the researcher.  
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(ii) Secondary 
A review of the secondary literature encompassed academic studies, government and 
NGO reports, including reports generated for the purposes of reporting to the UN; and 
EU and Council of Europe information, including ECtHR case law.  The researcher 
took into account the fact that these sources are not generated entirely independently 
of each other:  international NGO reports draw on the narratives created by local 
organisations; visits from the UN and European monitoring bodies also cite them; 
ECtHR judgements in turn may refer to reports by the UN and European monitoring 
bodies.  There is an extensive body of literature on the period leading up to and 
immediately after the transition from communism: this current research does not 
focus on this period, but rather on the years from 2000 onwards, as the author felt 
there was greater opportunity to make an original contribution within this temporal 
scope.  
 
(iii) Potential bias 
Prior to undertaking this research, the researcher herself spent a decade working for 
NGOs.  Given this background, and given the fact that the interviews undertaken for 
the purposes of the research involved discussion with NGO representatives who are 
usually eloquent about the value of their work, often carried out in difficult 
circumstances, and sometimes at personal risk, it should be acknowledged that there 
are psychological barriers to a potential conclusion that activism does not contribute 
in a significant way to torture reduction.  Given the attacks on the legitimacy of civil 
society and the narrowing of civil space described earlier in this chapter, there is also 
a reluctance to potentially contribute to criticism of their role and activities.  
However, the overriding ethical imperative for this research is to impartially identify 
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what factors are genuinely important in improving state practice on torture, and so as 
far as possible, the researcher has attempted to set aside assumptions of utility in 
favour of scrutinising the evidence base.  Even the most sympathetic observer can see 
that there is variability in how well-organised civil society is in different contexts, in 
the receptiveness of the political climate, and in its success in bringing about its 
goals.  It is this variability that underpins the current research. 
 
6. Conclusion 
This chapter has explained the rationale for the selection of cases.  It has set out the 
common features of the four states selected, which are sufficient to rule out a number 
of explanations why one state performs differently to another on torture (eg. very 
different experiences of conflict or democracy).  The political context of accession to 
the EU – achieved in two cases, an aspiration for the two states – has been explored.  
The prospect of EU membership creates an external incentive for state reform on 
torture, an incentive that potentially weakens once membership is achieved.  This 
allows us to examine whether and when extrinsic motivation for reform (central to the 
rationalist understandings of state decision-making) turns into intrinsic motivation 
(key to constructivist understandings).   The environment for civil society activism is 
challenging, and there is an overarching concern related to the narrowing of the civic 
space in the region and beyond.  This chapter concluded with an account of the 
methodology employed in carrying out the research.  Equipped with this background, 
we now turn to the case studies themselves.  Based on the hypothesis that higher civil 
society activism leads to a better state performance on torture, the prediction is that 
Bulgaria and Albania will see greater improvement than Romania and Macedonia.  
The next four chapters will demonstrate whether this prediction is fulfilled.  
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Chapter 5   Bulgaria 
This chapter first considers the trends in (i) civil society advocacy and (ii) torture and 
ill-treatment in Bulgaria since the turn of the twenty-first century.  It then goes on to 
consider the role of civil society in driving change, juxtaposed against the theoretical 
framework set out in previous chapters.   
 
Along with Romania, Bulgaria became an EU member in 2007.  The poorest EU 
member state, it is the second wealthiest of the four and, after Romania, the second 
largest.  As noted in the previous chapter, of the four case studies, Bulgaria is the state 
where civil society has strongest record of influencing public policy, taking into 
account network-building opportunities, communication with the public, and access 
to government officials, along with monitoring of state performance.1  The question is 
whether this relatively strong space for civil society is translated into improved state 
performance in relation to torture. 
 
1. Trends in Torture and Advocacy 
 
 
Figure 1 Torture in Bulgaria (CIRI scores) and CSO Advocacy in Bulgaria (USAID scores)  
                                                 
1 See chapter 2 for more on these scores, which are taken from the USAID Civil Society Organization 
(CSO) Sustainability Index.  An upward trend is positive for both measures. 
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Bulgaria signed an EU accession treaty in 2004 and formally became an EU member 
state in January 2007. Civil society advocacy notably increased from 2002 onwards, 
peaking in 2006 and 2007.  The timing suggested that civil society was galvanized by 
the EU accession process, seeing this period as a particularly important opportunity to 
influence the state.  With regard to torture, Bulgaria demonstrated its first year of 
improved performance in 2005, and then repeated its improved performance on 
torture in 2008, this time retaining its improved score for the following three years, 
when the CIRI dataset ends.  Up until 2011, therefore, the data suggest a period of 
heightened advocacy, alongside an improved performance on torture. 
 
Uniquely amongst the four states, there is a further and very specific survey-based 
dataset for Bulgaria.  Every year since 1999, the Bulgarian Helsinki Committee 
(BHC) has carried out its own survey in a number of prisons across the country.  The 
chart below represents the percentage of interviewees reporting ill-treatment during 
arrest and in police custody.  Some limitations should be noted: BHC reports state 
that survey sample is representative of the prisons surveyed (which usually include 
the same four prisons, but sometimes additional ones) and not necessarily of the penal 
system as a whole.  The survey also relies on self-reporting by detainees, without a 
further verification process.    
 
  
 172 
 
Bulgarian Helsinki Committee Survey Data 
 Force 
used 
during 
arrest % 
Force used 
while in 
police 
custody % 
Source  
1999 51.0 53.0 Survey in Jan and Feb 1999 – unspecified 
prisons. 
2000 49.0 44.0 309 interviewees in all prisons in the country.  
2001 45.0 45.0 155 interviewees. 
2002 31.0 43.0 4 Bulgarian prisons, interviewed Aug-Sept 2002 
2003 24.0 28.0 Sample of 620 prisoners 
2004 17.0 17.0 Plovdiv, Pleven and Belene (Jan 2005) 
2005 23.2 23.2 Plovdiv, Pleven and Belene 
2006 20.1 20.8 Plovdiv, Pleven, Belene and Bobovdol. 
2007 17.1 22.9 140 inmates in 4 prisons: Plovdiv, Pleven, 
Belene and Bobovdol (interviewed Nov-Dec 
2007) 
2008 23.1 23.1 121 inmates in 4 prisons: Plovdiv, Pleven, 
Belene and Bobovdol (interviewed Dec 2008) 
2009 24.0 22.3 121 inmates interviewed in 4 prisons: Plovdiv, 
Pleven, Belene and Bobovdol (Nov and Dec 
2009) 
2010 26.2 17.4 271 inmates interviewed in 8 prisons: Plovdiv, 
Pleven, Bobovdol, Belene, Vratsa, Pazardzhik, 
Lovech and Stara Zagora (interviewed Oct 2010 
and Jan 2011). 
2011 27.1 25.5 Prisons: Vratsa, Pazardzhik, Lovech and Stara 
Zagora (Jan 2012). 
2012 24.6 18.0 Survey of convicted inmates in the prisons in 
Vratsa, Pazardzhik, Lovech and Stara Zagora 
(interviews Jan 2013) 
2013 22.0 23.3 Survey of convicted inmates at the prisons of 
Vratsa, Pazardzhik, Lovech and Stara Zagora 
(interviewed Dec 2013 and Jan 2014) 
2014 23.0 22.4 Survey of convicted inmates at the prisons of 
Vratsa, Pazardzhik, Lovech and Stara Zagora 
(interviewed 2015) 
2015 15.5 21.8 1691inmates from all Bulgarian prisons, 
interviewed May-June 2015 
2016 19.4 24.0 survey carried out between November 2016 and 
February 2017.2 
Table 1: Survey data on force used on criminal detainees.3 Data drawn from BHC annual reports.4 
                                                 
2 Reported in BHC “Written Comments of the Bulgarian Helsinki Committee Concerning Bulgaria for 
Consideration by the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination at its 92nd 
Session”, March 2017, 4-5.  All other figures are extracted from the BHC annual reports. 
3 Reports from interviewees who had been convicted and whose pre-trial proceedings began since 1 
January of the year preceding the reporting year. 
4 At two points the reports are contradictory: the 2003 BHC report says that 30% of interviewees said 
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Represented in graph form, the trend is displayed below.  Unlike the CIRI scores, 
where a higher score indicates a better performance on torture, here a lower score 
indicates a lower use of torture. Although the CIRI and BHC trendlines go in different 
directions, they indicate the same finding, ie. Bulgaria’s performance in this area has 
improved. 
 
Figure 2  Reported use of force by police, BHC survey 
 
The BHC survey findings demonstrate a dramatic decrease in the use of force during 
arrest and while in police custody, particularly from 2003 onwards. (Recall that figure 
1 in this chapter showed that advocacy levels increased from 2002 onwards).  Apart 
from 2015, the two best performing years are 2004 (signing of EU accession treaty) 
and 2007 (acquiring EU membership).  While reform seemed to stall in the years after 
2007, the use of force did not revert to the levels seen in 1999 and 2000.   
 
Based on this evidence, we can be confident that a positive change has occurred in 
Bulgaria in relation to state performance on torture since 1999.  The success is 
                                                                                                                                           
they were subject to violence during arrest, and 37% of detainees said they were subjected to violence 
in custody in 2003.  The 2004 report gives figures for 2003 of 24% and 28% respectively.  The 2005 
report cites complaints at 17% in both categories for the year, whereas the 2006 report gives figures of 
23.2% in both categories for 2005.  In both cases I have used the latest-reported figures on the 
assumption that they are most likely to be accurate. The 2005 report gives a figure of 11% for use of 
force in police stations, but this seems to be a simple error – mistaking the percentage decline in 
complaints for the overall percentage of complaints – and has been ignored.  The figures from 2010 are 
taken from the 2011 report. 
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relative: the state remains overall a poor performer in this regard.  Ill-treatment has 
become less ubiquitous rather than eliminated.  The European Committee for the 
Prevention of Torture (CPT) released a public statement on Bulgaria on 26 March 
2015 noting that individuals detained by the police continued to face a “significant 
risk” of ill-treatment.5  The UN Committee against Torture expressed concern in 
December 2017 that one-third of detained persons underwent physical abuse in police 
stations, with the abusers generally remaining unpunished, and with individuals of 
Roma origin being twice as likely to face abuse as ethnic Bulgarians.
6
  Given this 
ongoing level of abuse, the prohibition on torture cannot be described as fully 
internalised by state agents.  Nevertheless, the statistics indicate that individual state 
agents who used to commit violations now do so less often.  A discernible change has 
occurred over the last 15 years: this chapter will explore why and how. 
 
2. Civil Society in Bulgaria 
 
The number of organisations working on the issue of torture in Bulgaria is limited.  
As an indication of organisations active in this area, listed below are those who met 
with the CPT during its monitoring visits. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 CPT, Public Statement concerning Bulgaria, Strasbourg, 26.03.15, CPT/Inf (2015) 17, paras 5, 6. 
6 UNCAT, Concluding observations on the sixth periodic report of Bulgaria, Sixty-second session (6 
November – 6 December 2017), para 11. 
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Year of 
visit 
Organisations met 
2015 Ad hoc visit 
Bulgarian Helsinki Committee (BHC) 
Bulgarian Prisoners' Rehabilitation Association 
2014 Periodic visit 
BHC 
2012 Ad hoc visit 
BHC 
2010 Periodic visit 
Assistance Centre for Torture Survivors  
“Adaptatsiya” Society  
BHC 
Bulgarian Lawyers for Human Rights  
Legal Clinic for Refugees and Immigrants 
2008 Ad hoc visit 
BHC 
Open Society Institute, Project “Civil monitoring of the police” 
2006 Periodic visit 
“Adaptatsiya” Society  
BHC 
Bulgarian Lawyers for Human Rights  
Human Rights Project  
Association for the development of psychosocial rehabilitation 
2003 Ad hoc visit 
BHC 
2002 Periodic visit 
BHC 
Bulgarian Psychiatric Association  
Human Rights Project 
1999 Periodic visit 
BHC 
Bulgarian Lawyers for Human Rights  
Bulgarian Psychiatric Association  
Human Rights Project 
Table 2: CSOs with whom the CPT held meetings during its monitoring visits  
 
Although detailed information is not available on all the above organisations, it is 
possible to classify at least some of them according to Brysk’s typology, described in 
chapter 3.
7
  There are the institutional reformers such as the BHC and the Bulgarian 
Lawyers for Human Rights: these organisations document abuses and use legal tools 
such as strategic litigation.  They also act as advocates, or a “conscious constituency” 
                                                 
7
 Alison Brysk, ‘Human Rights Defenders and Activism’, in Anja Mihr and Matthew Gibney (eds), 
The Sage Handbook of Human Rights (Sage 2014) 346-347. 
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prepared to lobby governments on behalf of victims who cannot speak for 
themselves; the contribution of international organisations in this regard will be 
covered below.  The Bulgarian Prisoners’ Rehabilitation Association was set up by an 
individual who is himself a detainee, with the mission to criticise prison conditions 
and offer detainees information about their rights, and so comes into Brysk’s category 
of affected populations, who act on their own behalf.  Brysk used the term norm 
promoters to denote normative constituencies mobilised around a particular principle 
associated with their identity, including professional groupings, a category that would 
encompass the Bulgarian Psychiatric Association.   
 
Civil society challenges 
Chapter 4 noted the challenges facing civil society in the region.  The organisations 
listed here have not been immune to those difficulties: indeed, the fact that most of 
the organisations appear only few times in Table 2 indicates how challenging it is for 
them to work consistently on the issue of torture.  Only one organisation met the CPT 
during all of its visits between 1999 and 2015, Bulgarian Helsinki Committee (BHC) 
and for three of the CPT visits, it was the only civil society representative.  Many 
organisations face problems due to lack of funding and consequent problems with 
staff retention.  For example, the CPT met the Human Rights Project a number of 
times during its earlier visits, but not in later years.   This organisation, focusing on 
the rights of Roma, including the provision of legal support to Roma victims of ill-
treatment, seems to have been affected by key staff departures, and by the time of the 
research visit conducted for this study in 2015, it appeared to be largely dormant, and 
did not respond to requests for an interview.   
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In 2010, the CPT met the Assistance Centre for Torture Survivors, an organisation 
providing rehabilitation services for torture victims amongst the refugee and asylum-
seeker populations.  In 2013, one of its employees reported that the team was 
experiencing “serious funding-related challenges and difficulties”: all team members 
were by that time working part-time, which meant a lack of clinical supervision or 
difficulty holding weekly team meetings, as well as reducing the number of clients 
assisted.  Support from the IRCT international peer support project in 2012/13 offered 
“an opportunity for overcoming the fragmentation of the team and its gradual 
marginalisation” and led to the “decrease of tension among the team members”,8 but 
problems persisted, and a 2017 report says that the organisation “recently…ceased to 
operate in this sphere”.9  It is not clear whether this is a temporary difficulty or a 
permanent closure. 
 
BHC has faced a slightly different set of problems, related to backlash and political 
hostility to human rights organisations, which has led to a narrowing of civic space in 
the region and beyond.  As discussed in the previous chapter, the national Helsinki 
Committees are associated with a “Western” agenda and with the controversial figure 
of George Soros.  BHC has found itself vulnerable to the counter-rhetoric that 
associates foreign-funded organisations with a lack of patriotism.  In 2014, after BHC 
challenged a march by a far-right party, Bulgarian National Movement party 
(VMRO), the same party successfully persuaded the National Revenue Agency to 
carry out a tax audit on BHC.
10
  While no irregularities were found, such audits can 
                                                 
8 Gologanova, Kristina, ‘No state support, little funding: how Bulgaria centre manages to treat torture 
victims in trying times’, https://worldwithouttorture.org>2013/03 (accessed 14 February 2018). 
9 Refugee Solidarity Network, ‘2017 Bulgaria Field Report’,2 March 2017, 3, footnote 7. 
10
 Bulgarian Helsinki Committee, ‘BHC Condemns Authorities' Inaction against Harassment and 
Discriminatory Rhetoric’, Liberties, 25 September 2014 https://www.liberties.eu/en/news/ngo-
harassment-bulgaria/1744 (accessed 20 February 2018). 
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be abused to divert an organisation’s attention from its human rights work, and to 
impugn its reputation.  Later the same year, another political party with xenophobic 
leanings carried out a demonstration in front of the BHC offices, where BHC staff 
members were threatened with physical violence.  Police were present but did not 
intervene.
11
  In October 2016, BHC President Krassimir Kanev was physically 
attacked by two men, who punched him in the face and stomach.  The assailants were 
not identified.  Kanev was reported in the media as saying “There have been many 
such cases of people insulting, threatening me or spitting at me on the streets”, and 
that this had increased since the Patriotic Front entered government in 2014.
12
   
 
The combination of hostility and financial constraints make it a challenging 
environment for civil society organisations to focus on their activism on torture.  
Despite these difficulties, however, the BHC has continued to undertake its activities 
without any obvious gaps. 
 
Civil society strategies 
Unsurprisingly in this context, popular mobilization is not a noteworthy feature of 
civil society strategies on torture.  The emphasis is on depth (expert advocacy) rather 
than breadth (appeal to popular sentiment).  It is a professionalized technocratic 
model of NGO advocacy, with relatively weak links with the wider society. This is 
representative of civil society more generally in Bulgaria, which has been described 
as “civil society without the citizens”.13   There is generally low sense of solidarity 
with groups at particular risk of ill-treatment, such as Roma and suspected criminals 
                                                 
11 Ibid. 
12Cheresheva, Mariya,’Bulgaria Helsinki Chief Links Assault to Nationalism’, Balkan Insight, 
www.balkaninsight.com, 28.10.16 (accessed 22 May 2017). 
13CIVICUS, Civil Society Without the Citizens: As Assessment of Bulgarian Civil Society2003-
2005(CIVICUS 2005). 
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(categories which are often conflated),
14
 which limits the opportunity to rally the 
wider community behind the cause of ending torture.   
 
As will be seen in the description of civil society activities below, organisations 
pursued a mixture of insider and outsider strategies.  BHC is willing to adopt an 
outsider stance in that it frequently publishes public criticism of Bulgarian state 
practice on torture and undertakes strategic litigation, but it has also used an insider 
approach, for example when it was invited to take part in the official process for 
reforming legal aid.
15
   
 
The fact that the above organisations were recognised by an international body such 
as the CPT as potential interlocutors tends to indicate that they are outward-facing at 
least to some degree.  Their flagging of concerns to the CPT is an example of the 
boomerang model in action, where organisations raise their concerns with an 
international body in order for the international body to turn them back in the 
direction of the state target.  Many of the organisations demonstrate their interest in 
reaching an audience beyond state borders, by publishing their websites and issuing 
their publications in both English and Bulgarian.   
 
Local and international activism 
The organisations listed above are primarily local groups, although many are part of 
transnational networks that Risse et al see as so important. BHC reports are quoted in 
the USAID annual reports on state practices on human rights, by Amnesty 
                                                 
14 Interviews with author, Sofia, April 2015. 
15 Interview with author, Sofia, April 2015.  The government invitation to participate in the legal aid 
review process followed work by BHC, Open Society Institute and others in 2005/6 to identify flaws in 
the existing legal aid system. 
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International, by the ECtHR in its judgments and elsewhere, and the organisation lists 
donors on its website that include US, UN, Dutch, Swiss, UK and EU sources of 
funding.
16
  Bulgarian Lawyers for Human Rights reports a not dissimilar list of 
funders on its website.
17
  As noted above, the Assistance Centre for Torture Survivors 
is part of the International Rehabilitation Council for Torture Victims network. 
 
International organisations have also played a role in advocating for state reform in 
relation to torture in Bulgaria, particularly at the time when Bulgaria became an 
official EU candidate in 1995.  Local organisations such as BHC and Bulgarian 
Lawyers for Human Rights were founded at the start of the 1990s (1992 and 1993) 
and initially found it difficult to be heard by the state authorities.  International 
organisations were important in getting torture onto the agenda for the Bulgarian 
government at this time.  Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch both 
issued strategically-timed reports on torture and mistreatment in 1996.  The Human 
Rights Watch report focused on police mistreatment of Roma street children.
18
  The 
AI report described 17 cases of torture and dozens of cases of mistreatment, and 
found there was "a pattern of casual violence and illegal acts by police officers 
throughout the country."  According to AI, the government was sufficiently 
concerned about its report that a month after its June publication, the Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs wrote to AI, expressing the “wish to develop a cooperation as well as 
to conduct a constructive dialogue with your organization in order to contribute to the 
further improvement of the human rights situation in Bulgaria". On 8 October 1996 
                                                 
16 BHC website, ‘Funding’, available at http://www.bghelsinki.org/en/about-us/funding/ (accessed 16 
February 2018). 
17 BLHR website, ‘About us’, available at http://blhr.org/p/za-nas/ (accessed 16 February 2018). 
18 Human Rights Watch, Children of Bulgaria - Police Violence and Arbitrary Confinement , 1 
September 1996, 1-56432-200-9, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a7dc4.html 
(accessed 11 May 2014). 
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AI received from the Bulgarian Embassy in London a second letter from the Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs which contained information on investigations into 16 cases 
described in the June report.
19
 The European Commission therefore had a range of 
evidence before it when issuing its own Opinion on Bulgaria’s application for 
Membership of the EU in 1997.  It expressed concern that “[s]everal organisations 
have reported numerous instances of the police inflicting inhuman and degrading 
treatment on persons in detention”.20  Under pressure to show progress, the Ministry 
of Interior produced statistics showing that it was attempting to tackle impunity, and 
that there had been a sharp increase in the number of penalties imposed for police 
brutality.
21
 
 
By 1999, civil society actors were reporting an attitude shift by police and 
government authorities, in the form of “a new receptivity and a more meaningful 
dialogue” in relation to human rights concerns.22  In that year, the National Police 
Service invited the BHC to conduct a human rights awareness training seminar with 
500 senior police officers, including the police deputy commander. In the same year, 
the BHC, the Human Rights Project and representatives of the Council of Europe 
delivered a smaller training seminar on international law and police practice.  The 
government reported that the police academy was providing human rights training 
(although it was criticised in some quarters as inadequate)
23
, and from 2000 the 
                                                 
19 AI, ‘Bulgaria: Bulgarian Authorities respond to Amnesty International’s June 1996 Report’, 
http://www.amnesty.org/fr/library/info/EUR15/016/1996/en  (accessed 29 December 2014). 
20 Ibid 17. 
21 US State Dept 1998.  The government produced statistics showing that in 1996 there were 21 
complaints, 3 of which were found justified, whereas in a 12-month period in 1997 and 1998, there 
were 106 complaints, leading to 44 legal cases, with 4 officers being convicted, 26 dismissed, and 63 
sanctioned. 
22 US State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1999: Bulgaria (2000).  
Available at http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ (accessed 5 February 2015). 
23 US State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2000: Bulgaria (2001).  
Available at http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ (accessed 5 February 2015). 
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government was reportedly making “a significant effort” to train officers in 
investigative techniques.
24
  This combined pressure for reform from local and 
international civil society, at a moment when the state was particularly vulnerable to 
such pressure (incentivized by the need to demonstrate readiness for EU 
membership), laid the groundwork for the steep reduction in abuse seen in the years 
after 2000. 
Further safeguards followed.  In July 2003, the Ministry of the Interior made 
provision for medical personnel in places of detention to investigate and document all 
injuries suffered by detainees, and for prosecutors to be informed if the medical staff 
believed the injuries or traumas were a result of torture or mistreatment.
25
 In 2004 an 
Ombudsman was appointed, and would formally assume the role of NPM in 2011 
(the year Bulgaria ratified OPCAT).
26
  As noted above, a project to reform legal aid 
was undertaken from 2005/6 onwards. 
Once accession was achieved in 2007, the government continued to respond to 
pressure to improve its record.  In 2009, the Council of Europe rapporteur for 
Bulgaria, Mr. Holovaty, had discussions with the Ministry for the Interior in the 
context of post-accession monitoring, including with regard to the police use of 
force.
27
  In 2012, the government passed legislation to restrict the use of force by the 
police to cases of absolute necessity, and prohibiting the use of force against minors, 
                                                 
24 US State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2001: Bulgaria (2002).  
Available at https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2001/ (accessed 6 February 2015). 
25 US State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2004: Bulgaria (2005).  
Available at https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41674.htm (accessed 6 February 2015). 
26 Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights, ‘National Preventive Mechanisms’, undated, 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/OPCAT/Pages/NationalPreventiveMechanisms.aspx (accessed 11 
May 2014). 
27BHC, ‘Police Brutality’ August 2011, available at 
http://www.bghelsinki.org/en/publications/obektiv/obektiiv/2011-08/police-brutality-between-
collegial-solidarity-and-public-interest/ (accessed 20 December 2014).  
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pregnant women, and nonviolent offenders.  The government worked in partnership 
with domestic human rights organisations to draft this legislation.
28
  
As of 2014, when reporting on the measures it was taking to eradicate police ill-
treatment in accordance with its obligations under ICCPR, the Bulgarian state 
reported that inter alia: 
 Open Society Institute (OSI) had implemented a project on civil monitoring of 
the police between 2004 and 2011.  This monitoring project allowed citizens 
to visits places of detention at police stations without prior notice, with the 
aim “to build trust between the police and the local community and ensure the 
transparency of police work”. At the end of the project, OSI presented a series 
of recommendations to the Ministry of Interior and the Standing Committee 
on Human Rights and Police Ethics. 
 NGOs continued to contribute to the training of police officers.  Those 
organisations included the Bulgarian Gender Research Foundation, the Diva 
Foundation for Care in the Community, Plovdiv, the Demetra Association of 
Bourgas, Nadia Centre, OSI, Bulgarian Lawyers for Human Rights, BHC and 
others. 
 In 2011, a training seminar was held for members of the Standing Committee 
on Human Rights and Police Ethics. on “Recent decisions of the European 
Court of Human Rights in the context of police ethics”, with lectures from the 
OSI and Bulgarian Lawyers for Human Rights.
29
  
                                                 
28 US State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2012: Bulgaria (2013).  
Available at https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2012/  (accessed 8 February 2015). 
29
 UN Human Rights Committee, Concluding observations on the third periodic report of Bulgaria, 
Addendum, Information received from Bulgaria on follow-up to the concluding observations, , 13 
January 2014,  CCPR/C/BGR/CO/3/Add.1, Paras 27-30. 
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This account shows how international and local organisations worked together to 
ensure that the issue of torture was on the agenda for the government.  International 
organisations such as AI and HRW (Brysk’s “advocates”) were important in the early 
years, at the time when Bulgaria was being recognised as a potential EU member.  
The Bulgarian government was under pressure to make improvements to reform its 
practices on torture.  Local organisations were then in a position to flesh out the detail 
of those commitments (for example, the reforms needed to the legal aid system); to 
carry out ongoing training for police and others, and to monitor and report on 
implementation.  While local organisations took the lead, international organisations 
became much less.  HRW, for example, seems to have undertaken little or no 
advocacy related to torture on Bulgaria between 2002 and 2013.
30
  
Once the state embarked on the reform process, it became drawn into an ongoing 
dialogue about the need for continuous improvement and escalating demands for it to 
fulfil its commitments: NGOs played a key role in this dialogue.  Here we see the 
ingredients coming together – a political environment in which the state was keen to 
show the European Commission that it was making progress; criticism by 
international organisations ensuring that the topic of torture was on the agenda for the 
EU Commission and the state; the readiness of local organisations such as BHC and 
Human Rights Project to contribute training and provide expert input into the 
question of what changes needed to be made.  In more recent years, international 
organisations such as AI have been rather more hands-off: AI tends to quote from 
                                                 
30 The www.refworld.org database does not contain HRW reports related to Bulgaria between these 
years. 
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BHC in its annual country report, rather than undertake its own investigations and in-
country advocacy.
31
  
Local organisations made it difficult for the state to confine itself to lip service 
regarding its commitments to reform on torture.   It was not enough to have an 
increased availability of avenues of complaint about police brutality: human rights 
organisations continued to criticise the inadequacy of the investigations.
32
 It was not 
enough for the state to make provision for medical personnel to carry out 
examinations in prisons: the state was publicly criticised for the fact that medical 
examinations were often not carried out.
33
  It was not enough to grant monitors access 
to prisons: the state was reprimanded for the fact that human rights monitors did not 
have access to all places of detention, and they needed a prosecutor’s permission for 
access to pre-trial detainees.
34
  This is the phenomenon I describe as norm patrol: the 
everyday process of monitoring how the state’s performance matches its rhetoric, and 
calling attention to the state promises that are not fulfilled.  
 
3. Categories of activism 
 
The above account illustrates civil society’s use of strategies.  Using the typology set 
out in chapter 4, it is possible to categorize them as follows. 
 
 
                                                 
31 Although in August 2013, it did release a special report: Amnesty International, Bulgaria: 
Investigations into alleged excessive use of force during Sofia protests must be prompt and thorough, 1 
August 2013, Index number: EUR 15/001/2013. 
32 US State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2012: Bulgaria (2013).  
Available at https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2012/  (accessed 8 February 2015). 
33 Ibid. 
34 Committee against Torture Concluding observations of the Committee against Torture: Bulgaria, 
Forty-seventh session, 31 October–25 November 2011, 3. 
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(i) Information-gathering and dissemination 
As described above; BHC undertakes an annual survey on the use of force during 
arrest and police investigation.  It publishes annual reports covering ill-treatment in 
places of detention.  The organisation also issues shadow or alternative reports 
alongside the state’s own periodic reports on its implementation of the ICCPR and 
UNCAT.  These reports are widely quoted, as has been noted, by USAID, AI, the 
ECtHR and others.  They are a powerful mechanism to keep pressure on the state to 
fulfil the commitments it has made. 
 
(ii) Dialogue  
Dialogue strategies are also in evidence in the above account.  In 2005/6, BHC, OSI 
and others undertook a survey to identify the gaps in the existing legal aid system, 
and issued a publication on access to legal aid at exactly the time that the government 
was under pressure from the European Commission to act.  The government then 
issued invitations to NGOs to contribute to the reform process.  The resulting legal 
aid system is not ideal: Problems remain – individuals held in police custody still do 
not have access to legal aid, and the quality of legal aid is not always very high, with 
lawyers acting ex officio and too often having low motivation to tackle ill-treatment.   
Despite these deficiencies, the provision of legal aid once an individual is charged 
helps to prevent ill-treatment, and enables a response when it does occur.  An 
interviewee for this research estimated it to be one of the most significant advances in 
protecting detainees against ill-treatment.
35
 
 
                                                 
35 Interview with author, Sofia, April 2015.   
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The OSI project on “Civil Monitoring of the Police” described above is another 
project involving civil society dialogue with the state authorities.  The project was 
based on a methodology approved by the Ministry of Interior’s Security Police Chief 
Directorate and one of the outcomes was state-civil society dialogue on recommended 
actions.
36
  
 
(iii) Strategic litigation 
Litigation is a strategy much-used by Bulgarian activists in this area, particularly 
using the ECtHR.
37
  A 2011 study carried out by a lawyer at the Bulgarian Helsinki 
Committee listed 27 ECtHR rulings on police brutality in Bulgaria during the period 
1998-2010.
38
  In all 24 cases (of which 16 cases related to torture and inhuman and 
degrading treatment, involving 20 victims), the ECtHR found that the state’s 
investigation was inadequate and ineffective.   
 
 In another large group of cases, Bulgaria has been found in breach of Art 3 ECHR 
due to conditions of condition deemed inhuman or degrading.  In its 2015 Chamber 
decision on conditions of detention, Neshkov and others v Bulgaria,
39
  the ECtHR 
decided it was appropriate to use its “pilot judgement” procedure, noting that at the 
time when the case was heard, the court had already decided more than 20 similar 
                                                 
36 UN Human Rights Committee, Concluding observations on the third periodic report of Bulgaria, 
Addendum, Information received from Bulgaria on follow-up to the concluding observations, , 13 
January 2014,  CCPR/C/BGR/CO/3/Add.1, Paras 27-28. 
37
 As well as the ECtHR, complaints have on occasion been directed to other international 
mechanisms: see for example UNCAT Communication  no. 257/2004, submitted by Kostadin Nikolov 
Keremedchiev  The complainant was beaten by police in 2003.  The Committee found it amounted to 
CIDT under Art 16 CAT and that the state had also violated art 12 by its failure to carry out a proper 
investigation (November 2008). 
38 Margarita Ilieva, ‘Police violence in Bulgaria through the ECHR’s eyes – unlawfulness and lack of 
punishments’ (Полицейското насилие в България през погледа на Европейския съд по правата на 
човека– безправие и безнаказаност), available in Bulgarian at: 
http://policebrutality.bghelsinki.org/about/   As this report does not appear to be available in English, I 
rely here on the account given in Slavka Kukova, The Normative and Practical Obstacles to Effective 
Prosecution of Ill-Treatment by Official Persons, BHC 2016, 15-16. 
39 Chamber decision 27.01.2015.   
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cases and a further 40 applications on the same issue were pending.  Using this 
procedure, the Court undertakes to identify the underlying structural problems leading 
to so many cases, and what the state should be required to do to fulfil its obligations. 
The Court proposed specific legislative measures, including provision for 
independent investigation of complaints, giving the state 18 months to remedy its 
defects.  The Bulgarian authorities set up a working group to execute the judgement, 
and its members include the NPM along with NGOs such as BHC, the Centre for the 
Study of Democracy, and Bulgarian Lawyers for Human Rights.  Anagnostou and 
Skleparis applaud the Committee of Minsters’ increased emphasis on NGO 
involvement in the execution of ECtHR judgments, which offers “a different and 
critical picture of the government’s proposed and actual measures”, often 
substantiated by the NGOs’ insights derived from their own experiences in detention 
monitoring.
40
   
 
Litigation is one mechanism by which Brysk’s category of “affected populations” can 
push for reform.  In 2017, the Bulgarian Prisoners’ Association praised Svetlomir 
Neshkov for pursuing the above case and demonstrating to the state the need to make 
changes, announcing that he was taking on the role of Vice Chairman of the 
Association.
41
  The organisation noted that in February 2017, new laws governing the 
Bulgarian penitentiary system came into force, and that it (along with other NGOs) 
had been able to take part in the drafting of the legislation, and in discussions with the 
                                                 
40
 Dia Anagnostou and Dimitris Skleparis, ‘Human Rights in European Prisons: Can the 
Implementation of Strasbourg Court Judgements Influence Penitentiary Reform Domestically?’, in 
Daems T and Robert L (eds), Europe in Prisons: Assessing the Impact of European Institutions on 
National Prison Systems (Palgrave Macmillan 2017) 69. 
41 Bulgarian Prisoners’ Association, The New Bulgarian Penitentiary System Law, 14 March 2017, 
available at http://bpra.info/en/the-new-bulgarian-penitentiary-system-law/ (accessed 16 February 
2018). 
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Minstry of Justice and the Commission for Legal Questions.  Here we see the 
strategies of litigation and dialogue working together in mutual reinforcement. 
 
In 2016, BHC sought legal standing in its own right either as an indirect victim or as 
the representative of two children with mental disabilities who had died in special 
homes where they had been placed by the state.
 42
  The application was deemed 
inadmissible due to lack of ratione personae. While it may not have achieved its 
immediate legal goal, the case served its political goal of drawing attention to a 
human rights violation that would not otherwise have come to court.  
 
Alongside NGOs, a number of individual lawyers have energetically pursued 
strategic litigation at the ECtHR: individuals such as Mihail Ekimdzhiev
43
 and 
Yordanka Vandova
44
 re-occur in the case reports. One of the most active litigants in 
recent years has been Yonko Grozev, who was appointed Bulgarian national judge at 
the ECtHR in 2015.
45
  There is considerable crossover between individuals acting as 
lawyers in private practice and NGOs.  Grozev, for example, was a founding member 
of the Bulgarian Helsinki Committee and involved with a number of other human 
rights NGOs in addition to practising as a lawyer. 
                                                 
42 Bulgarian Helsinki Committee v Bulgaria, ECtHR Chamber decision 21 July 2016. 
43
 Art 3 cases in which he represented the applicant include Gutsanovi v Bulgaria, ECtHR App. No. 
34529/10;  Iordan Petrov v Bulgaria ECtHR App. No. 22926/04; Yankov v Bulgaria  ECtHR App. No. 
39084/97; Rashid v Bulgaria ECtHR App. No. 47905/99; Boyko Ivanov v Bulgaria ECtHR App. No. 
69138/01.  While not an Art 3 case, another significant case is The Association for European 
Integration and Human Rights and Ekimdzhiev V Bulgaria, ECHR App No. 62540/00.  Mr 
Ekimdzhiev acted for the first-named applicant and he himself was the second applicant, with both 
applicants arguing that they were at risk a violation of their rights as a consequence of the secret 
surveillance measures permitted under Bulgarian legislation.  The ECtHR found that Arts 8 and 13 had 
indeed been violated.   
44
 See for example Bekirski v Bulgaria ECTHR App. No. 71420/01 2 September 2010; Toteva v 
Bulgaria ECtHR App. 42027/98.   
45
 See for example Anguelova v Bulgaria ECtHR App. No. 38361/97; Vasil Petrov v Bulgaria ECtHR 
App. No. 57883/00; Ivan Vasilev v Bulgaria ECtHR App. No. 48130/99; Ognyanova and Choban v 
Bulgaria ECtHR App. No. 46317/99; Georgi Dimitrov v Bulgaria ECtHR App. No. 31365/02; 
Vladimir Georgiev v Bulgaria ECtHR App. No. 61275/00. 
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(iv) Practical safeguards 
Civil society participation in training has been noted above.  An important safeguard 
for detainees is access to legal aid.  NGOs have contributed to this safeguard in a 
number of ways: through information-gathering and dissemination about gaps in the 
legal system, by taking part in dialogue with the authorities about what a better 
system of legal aid involves, and by directly providing legal expertise to bring court 
cases about abuses. 
 
A key practical safeguard is detention monitoring.  Detention monitoring can be seen 
as key to the other types of activism: it enables information-gathering, which in turn 
allows organisations to engage in dialogue from a position of authority.  Monitors 
find out whether safeguards that exist in principle, such as access to medical 
examinations, are honoured in practice.  The OSI project on “Civil Monitoring of the 
Police” from 2004 to 2011 has been mentioned above. BHC has had an even longer 
engagement with detention monitoring, dating back to the mid-1990s.  The 
organisation has an agreement with the Ministry of Justice allowing it to interview all 
convicted prisoners in private.  However, it requires permission from a prosecutor 
before it can access and interview pre-trial detainees. BHC notes that this hinders its 
effectiveness, given that most ill-treatment by law enforcement officers is known to 
take place during the first hours of arrest.
46
  In 2017 the organisation was also 
reporting a deterioration in its opportunities to monitor other closed institutions.  
While previously it had been able to monitor psychiatric hospitals, children’s 
institutions and social care homes for adults with mental disabilities, the relevant 
                                                 
46 BHC, ‘Alternative Report on the Implementation of the UN Convention against Torture and other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Bulgaria’, July 2017.  Available at 
http://www.bghelsinki.org/media/uploads/documents/reports/special/2017-alternative_report_cat.pdf 
(accessed 16 February 2018) 52. 
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government departments had refused to renew the agreements which made this 
monitoring possible.
47
  This lack of access increases the risks to the most vulnerable 
persons deprived of their liberty.  At the time of writing, it is too early to identify 
whether the reduction in access for monitors has resulted in a measurable rise in 
torture and ill-treatment. 
 
As noted above, the involvement of civil society in prison monitoring seems to have 
become embedded in the “logic of appropriateness” used by the Ministry of Justice, at 
least.  On the constructivist view, this demonstrates the internalisation of the norm by 
this part of the state.  The recent refusal by the Ministry of Health and others to 
restrict BHC monitoring of closed institutions demonstrates that this internalisation is 
not universal across all areas of the state, and that gains can be reversed. 
 
The National Preventive Mechanism (NPM) can still access closed institutions where 
it is difficult for CSOs to enter, being authorised to visit all places of detention.  The 
CPT noted at the time of its 2015 visit that the NPM was only able to carry out a 
limited number of visits as its budget had been reduced.  In another sign of straitened 
resources, NPM activities were being carried out by staff members of the 
Ombudsman’s office who also had other non-NPM duties.48  Despite these 
difficulties, the NPM continued to publish frank criticisms of the government’s 
                                                 
47 Ibid. 
48 CPT, Report to the Bulgarian Government on the visit to Bulgaria carried out by the European 
Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) 
from 13 to 20 February 2015, p.9, available at http://www.cpt.coe.int/documents/bgr/2015-36-inf-
eng.pdf.  Footnote 6 states “The delegation noted that in 2012 the budget of the Ombudsman’s Office 
had been increased by approximately 180 000 euro in order to fulfil the NPM functions but the budget 
for 2014 had been reduced by almost the same amount.” 
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failure to meet its obligations to detainees.
49
  Where NGOs find their path is blocked, 
a good relationship with an effective NPM is hugely important in order to keep the 
reform work moving forward.  
Besides physical visits to places of detention and interviews with detainees, there are 
other important ways in which NGOs monitor state treatment of detainees, such as to 
call for the creation and implementation of procedural safeguards.  As discussed in 
chapter 3, such safeguards include tackling impunity for torturers (which means 
effective complaints mechanisms), and access by detainees to a lawyer and to medical 
services, along with deterrence measures such as the recording of interrogations.  
While in some cases NGOs might directly provide some of these services, given the 
greater reach and resources of the state, it is a better long-term strategy for 
organisations to push the state to ensure that these safeguards are consistently applied. 
The contribution of BHC and others to the legal aid reform process has already been 
discussed above.  In addition, BHC has researched the implementation of these 
procedural safeguards.  In a 2011 report, it noted that none of the police officers who 
perpetrated the violence in the cases reaching the ECtHR was sentenced 
appropriately.
50
  In 2016, it reported on the relatively light sanctions applied in cases 
of police abuse.
51
 
                                                 
49 See for example Annual Report of the Ombudsman as a National Preventive Mechanism 2014, 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/OPCAT/NPM/BulgariaAnnualReport2014.pdf (accessed 
16 February 2018). 
50 Margarita Ilieva, ‘Police brutality in Bulgaria through the ECHR’s eyes – unlawfulness and lack of 
punishments’ 2011.  As this report in available in Bulgarian only, I rely here on the findings as 
presented in Slavka Kukova The Normative and Practical Obstacles to Effective Prosecution of Ill-
treatment by Official Persons, (BHC Sofia 2016), 13.  The author reports that in 27 ECtHR cases, none 
of the officers who participated in abuse was subject to disciplinary action. Some of the officers were 
in fact promoted. 
51Slavka Kukova, The Normative and Practical Obstacles to Effective Prosecution of Ill-treatment by 
Official Persons, (BHC Sofia 2016), p10-11.  In 2000-2015 military and civil courts reportedly dealt 
with 212 allegations of ill-treatment, resulted in 101 fines and 28 prison sentences; only 42 courts 
replied out of 144 polled.  For the same period, the Ministry of Interior reported 138 criminal 
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The 2016 report noted that while in principle detainees have the right of access to a 
lawyer, to medical care, and to have a third party notified of their detention, in 
practice this is not always respected.  Detainees are not always informed of their 
rights and their attempts to exercise them are not necessarily successful: “sometimes, 
the police officers just dictate to the detainee to check “No” in the fields related to 
asking for a lawyer, doctor, or third person to be informed in order to avoid a larger 
workload”.52  Even where the request for a lawyer is noted and acted on by police, 
legal representation is likely to be difficult to secure in small towns at night, where 
there may be a lack of lawyers on duty or willing to take action.
53
  Medical 
examinations are generally “superficial”, and although doctors are likely to ask about 
the cause of any injuries, “the record [tends to] reflect the explanations of the police 
officers” rather than the account provided by the detainee.54 
Finally, the 2016 BHC report says that while the law provides for video and audio 
recording of interrogations, in practice this seems not to be happening.  Abuse takes 
place in areas where there are no cameras, or where they have been turned off.  If 
abuse has been recorded, the recording is likely to be “lost”. It quotes the 2014 NPM 
report, which noted that there were still places of detention where no video 
monitoring system is installed, and highlighted the need to install such systems in 
order to ensure the safety of the detainees.
55
  
It may be recalled that in chapter one, reference was made to the need for human 
                                                                                                                                           
proceedings against police officers, leading to 48 fines and 11 conditional sentences. In cases where 
internal disciplinary procedures were applied, 3 officers were reprimanded, 18 received a written 
warning, 75 were sanctioned with written warnings for dismissal, 7 were prohibited from applying for 
a job promotion and 18 were dismissed. 
52 Ibid 17. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid 20. 
55 Ibid 18-19. 
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rights organisations to have an ongoing commitment to the issues with which they 
deal.   Alston and Gillespie raise the concern that where rights advocates move on to 
another issue, they can misleadingly imply that problems have been solved when this 
is not the case, and they can give the impression that measures to address a concern 
are more useful than they are.56  BHC here offers a powerful example of what can be 
achieved by a local organisation, alongside other local organisations and within the 
context of a transnational advocacy network, which has maintained its focus on the 
issue of torture over more than two decades.  It can be contrasted with international 
organisations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, which did 
important work in drawing attention to the issue in the mid-1990s, but which have not 
paid sustained interest to the issues over the interim.  This description adds an extra 
nuance to the account of transnational activism set out by Risse et al, unpacking the 
distinct contribution of national and international actors.  The international 
organisations did what the local organisations could not by putting the issue on the 
international agenda: the local organisations did what the international organisations 
could not, by devoting their attention on daily basis over the decades to the detail of 
what changes were needed. 
 
 Its work illustrates the value of “norm patrol”.  The dogged reiteration of the 
question “Is this working to reduce torture?” is important not just for identifying 
individual violations or even for deterrence, but because of the power of making this 
question an ever-present one in the minds of state officials.  In regularly asking 
detainees whether force was used against them, the organisation is sending a powerful 
message to detainees that abuse should be an anomaly, and worthy of complaint. This 
                                                 
56 Philip Alston and Colin Gillespie, ‘Global Human Rights Monitoring, New Technologies, and the 
Politics of Information’ (2012) European Journal of International Law 23(4), 1089-1123, 1105. 
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persistent local pressure is a channel for state internalisation of the norm forbidding 
torture.  Internalisation is clearly far from complete; there are countervailing 
pressures, as can be seen from the attacks on BHC, and reverses remain possible.  
Measured over two decades, however, progress is significant. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
As a case study, the Bulgarian experience bears out many of the theories discussed in 
previous chapters.  There is sufficient data to conclude that the state use of torture has 
greatly declined since 2000.  The prospect of EU membership was clearly an 
important incentive for the state to undertake reform.  International organisations such 
as HRW and AI helped to ensure that in the mid-1990s, at the time when Bulgaria 
was being considered as a potential accession state, torture was on the agenda. Local 
organisations stepped in to require the state to do more than pay lip service to the 
need to reduce torture, by persistently highlighting the gap between state rhetoric and 
the reality for detainees. 
 
The chapter has illustrated the constraints facing civil society: the relative lack of 
opportunity for mass mobilisation on torture; the financial difficulties that have made 
it impossible for some organisations to maintain their activities; the challenge in 
accessing some closed institutions for the purposes of monitoring; and the attacks on 
organisations such as BHC.  For BHC, its embeddedness in an international network 
give it strength and credibility, at the same time as it exposes the organisation to 
attack for perceived lack of patriotism.  Its local dimension is crucial to the length and 
depth of its engagement with the problem of torture in Bulgaria.   
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Bulgaria’s desire to join the EU has been a powerful motivating factor for the 
improvement in its performance on torture, less because the EU was directly 
demanding improvement, and more because both the EU and Bulgaria were 
rhetorically entangled in a commitment to human rights and civic participation, which 
created an opening for civil society to exploit.  EU accession was not sufficient in 
itself to bring about the improvement: it created an opportunity, but civil society 
involvement played an important part in making use of the opportunity.   It benefited 
from the fact that the state has been willing, if sometimes begrudgingly, to allow civil 
society access, both to places of detention (detainees and staff) and to policy-makers 
(as for the consultation on legal aid).  This access made it possible for BHC to make 
innovative use of annual surveys, which yield particularly compelling data in relation 
to ill-treatment.  Whereas references to individual abuses (often the bedrock of human 
rights reporting) can be dismissed as individual incidents, annual survey data is 
harder to dismiss.  Given the value of access, recent restrictions in access to other 
closed institutions (psychiatric hospitals, children’s institutions and social care homes 
for adults with mental disabilities), is a particular concern.  
 
Civil society experienced a degree of success in its efforts to combat torture because 
the conditions were such that this was possible.  However, NGOs such as BHC are 
not mere passive beneficiaries of a congenial political climate (to the extent that it can 
be described as such): the demands they have made over the decades and their 
leverage of opportunities has helped to shape the civil space in which they operate. 
 
As noted earlier in the chapter, the existence of ongoing levels of abuse mean that it 
cannot be contended that Bulgaria has fully internalised the prohibition on torture.  
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Using the indicators of internalisation set out in the introduction, can it be said that 
Bulgaria has made progress along this path?   
 
Indicator Situation in Bulgaria Progress? 
Actors invoking the norm Norm invoked by NGOs such as 
BHC, by international and regional 
bodies such as UNCAT and CPT, 
by Bulgarian lawyers, including in 
the context of the ECtHR   There is 
some evidence of involvement by 
professional bodies such as the 
Bulgarian Psychiatric Association.   
Progress 
Domestic accountability As noted by the UN Committee 
against Torture in its December 
2017 report, impunity for abusers 
continues to be a significant 
problem.  A large body of ECtHR 
cases demonstrate that there is an 
ongoing issue with the state failing 
to investigate credible allegations 
of torture.   
Limited progress 
Positive role played by 
NPM 
Resource constraints, but good 
relationship with NGOs and 
willingness to criticise state.   
Progress 
 
Bulgaria’s improved score in relation to torture is matched by evidence that the state 
has taken some steps along the path towards internalisation of the norm.  The state 
may not welcome the involvement of NGOs such as BHC (see the anti-Soros 
rhetoric, the tax inspections, the failure to protect it against attacks), but although it 
may be grudging, it has accepted the legitimacy of BHC participation: its access to 
prisons and police stations, its annual survey and reports, and its interventions in legal 
aid reform.  The evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that access by local civil 
society to decision-makers, frontline staff and detainees acts as a precondition to 
internalisation of the norm. Once access is achieved, progress may not be inevitable 
or irreversible, but the foundations have been laid. 
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Chapter 6 Albania 
 
This chapter first examines trends in (i) advocacy and (ii) torture and ill-treatment in 
Albania, particularly since the turn of the twenty-first century.  The chapter then goes 
on to consider the role of civil society in driving change, juxtaposed against the 
theoretical framework set out in previous chapters.   
 
Albania was notorious for its particularly isolationist regime during the communist 
era. Its early years of independence were marked by the collapse of financial pyramid 
schemes in 1996-97, leading to civil unrest.  The police and army were unable to cope 
with this unrest, bringing international attention to the need to support and rebuild 
these forces.  It remains the poorest of the four states examined here.  Its civil society 
advocacy score has varied, but the overall trend from 2000-2016 has been positive, 
and at the end of the period, it had the second highest score after Bulgaria. 
 
1. Trends on torture and advocacy 
 
Figure 1 Albania performance on torture (CIRI data) and advocacy (USAID data) 
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Apart from a short-lived spike in 2001, advocacy in Albania began to rise from 2003, 
peaking from 2005 onwards, ahead of Albania’s 2006 signing of a Stabilization and 
Association Agreement with the EU.  Advocacy declined somewhat from 2008, only 
to increase again from 2014 onwards, the year Albania became an official candidate 
for accession to the EU.  As with Bulgaria, the timing of advocacy  increases suggest 
that civil society perceives the prospect of EU accession as an opportunity to develop 
and exploit the state’s “rhetorical entanglement” in human rights norms and 
commitment to encourage civil participation.  Prison reforms, including the need to 
protect detainees from torture and ill-treatment, have been explicitly included as one 
of the elements in the agenda of the EU accession for Albania.
1
   
 
According to the CIRI scores, the state’s record on torture improved from 2004, 
declined briefly in 2006, then improved from 2007 and remained at this level.  As 
with Bulgaria, an increase in advocacy levels preceded an improvement in torture 
performance.  But was this improvement maintained after CIRI data ends in 2011?  
Unfortunately there is no Albanian equivalent of the Bulgarian Helsinki Committee 
annual survey on the use of force by police (see previous chapter).  In order to 
determine the trajectory of state performance since 2011, the US State Department 
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices are used here.  As described in Chapter 
2, the existing datasets on torture rely on a codification exercise in which the 
language used in the reports is used to derive a torture score for that year.
2
  A 
codification exercise is not undertaken here, but the wording is scrutinised for 
                                                 
1 Council of Europe, ‘Enhancing the Protection of Human Rights of Prisoners in Albania’, available at  
https://www.coe.int   (accessed 18 February 2018). 
2 CIRI also uses the Amnesty International annual reports for its coding, but AI reports for Albania in 
the relevant years tend not to use the language on which coders rely where absolute numbers of 
violations are unavailable, eg. “widespread”, “systematic”, “epidemic”, “extensive”, “wholesale”, 
“routine” “regularly”, “numerous”, “many”, “various”, “dozens” or “multiple”.   See chapter 2 for a 
fuller account of the challenges related to such coding exercises. 
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indications as to how the situation might have changed over the time period in 
question. 
 
Year US State Dept Country Report description of the use of torture in Albania 
2000 “often” 
2001 “often” 
2002 “at times”, but local NGOs reported a decrease in the number of cases  
2003 “at times”, but local NGOs reported a decrease in the number of cases 
2004 “at times”, but local NGOs reported a decrease in the number of cases 
2005 “at times” 
2006 “at times” 
2007 “sometimes” 
2008 “sometimes” 
2009 “sometimes” 
2010 “sometimes” 
2011  “sometimes”  
2012  “sometimes”; CPT report  says that most interviewees report being correctly treated 
while in custody, although there were a “significant” number of reports of physical abuse 
2013 “sometimes” 
2014 “sometimes”; NGOs quoted  as saying that police and prison authorities' treatment of 
detained juveniles and women improved from 2013. NGOs reported fewer complaints 
from juvenile detainees about physical abuse or violence 
2015 “sometimes” 
2016 “sometimes”; release of CPT report for 2014 visit: still a significant number of credible 
reports of abuse  
Table 1  Reporting on torture in US State Department Country Reports on Human Rights 
Practices 2000-2016 
 
The language of the reports suggests that there was an initial series of improvements 
over the years 2002 to 2004, and that by and large the situation has remained static at 
least since 2007, although with an improvement for some categories of detainees in 
from 2013/2014.  Clearly ill-treatment continues to be a concern in Albania, but 
viewed against the situation in 2000, it seems reasonable to conclude that a degree of 
improvement has occurred and has been sustained.  
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2. Civil Society in Albania 
 
As in Bulgaria, the number of organisations working on the issue of torture in 
Albania is limited.  During its monitoring visits, the Committee for the Prevention of 
Torture (CPT) met the following civil society organisations: 
 
Year of 
visit 
Organisations met 
2014 Periodic visit 
Albanian Helsinki Committee (AHC) 
Albanian Rehabilitation Centre for Trauma and Torture  
European Institute of Tirana 
2011 Ad hoc visit 
No reference 
2010 Periodic visit 
AHC 
Albanian Rehabilitation Centre for Trauma and Torture  
European Institute of Tirana 
2008 Ad hoc visit 
Unspecified NGOs 
2006 Ad hoc visit 
No reference 
2005 Periodic visit 
Albanian Association of Psychiatrists  
AHC 
Albanian Human Rights Centre   
Albanian Human Rights Group  
Albanian Rehabilitation Centre for Trauma and Torture  
Children’s Human Rights Centre of Albania  
2003 Ad hoc visit 
No reference 
2001 Ad hoc visit 
No reference 
2000 Periodic visit 
AHC 
Handicap International 
Table 2 CPT meetings with NGOs during field visits to Albania 
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As with Bulgaria, it is possible to categorise the organisations in accordance with 
Brysk’s typology.3  There are the institutional reformers such as the Albanian 
Helsinki Committee (AHC), who overlap with the advocates, speaking on behalf of 
those who cannot speak for themselves (Albanian Rehabilitation Centre for Trauma 
and Torture Victims, which also works with networks of former political prisoners, so 
there is, albeit indirectly, some involvement by affected populations).
4
  There are also 
norm promoters, normative constituencies mobilised around a principle associated 
with their identity (Albanian Association of Psychiatrists).  Not all of the 
organisations maintained a focus on torture throughout the period, but at least some 
have demonstrated a consistent engagement.  In 2009, the National Preventive 
Mechanism (NPM) signed cooperation agreements with three of these organisations, 
allowing it to call on their specific expertise for its work: Albanian Rehabilitation Centre for 
Torture and Trauma, AHC and the European Institute of Tirana.5 
 
Challenges 
Civil society organisations face similar levels of public apathy and distrust as in the 
other case studies explored here.  One local activist, Alida Karakushi, describes how 
even individuals involved in activism want to disassociate themselves from the NGO 
sector, as otherwise the public accuse them of being “paid to protest”.6  She also notes 
that many civil society actors go on to enter government, which in her view leads to 
                                                 
3
 Discussed in chapter 3.  See Alison Brysk, ‘Human Rights Defenders and Activism’, in Anja Mihr 
and Matthew Gibney (eds), The Sage Handbook of Human Rights (Sage 2014) 346-347.   
4 See for example ARCT Annual Report 2011 44 which describes the organisation “working with a 
Network of 6-8 organizations of former political persecuted.”   
5 Youth Initiative for Human Rights, International Rehabilitation Council for Torture Victims,  
Rehabilitation Centre for Trauma and Torture, Youth Initiative for Human Rights, Mechanisms for the 
Prevention of Torture in the Western Balkans, Sub Regional Report: Albania, Montenegro and Serbia 
2016, 13-14. 
6 Alida Karakushi, ‘Albania: Shrinking Spaces, Battles and Striving to Foster Trust in Civic Activism’ 
in Shrinking Spaces in the Western Balkans (Heinrich Böll Foundation 2016), 47-52, 51. 
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“hemorrhaging” of civil society.7 This movement of actors between the civil society 
and political spheres has been noted elsewhere for its tendency towards “blurring the 
boundaries….in the public’s opinion” between government and non-government 
bodies, which can negatively impact the perception of NGOs.
8
  More optimistically, 
the movement of individuals between sectors is potentially a channel by which norms 
promoted by civil society can be absorbed by the state (the internalisation process 
emphasised by constructivist theories).  It indicates a degree of collaboration between 
the state and civil society, a term which can have both positive and negative 
connotations, depending on the observer.  On the insider/outsider spectrum, it 
suggests that at least some elements of civil society in Albania position themselves on 
the insider end of the spectrum. 
 
Civil society organisations do not seem to have been subject to official hostility in the 
form of tax audits aimed to discredit them and distract them from their mission, as 
seen against the BHC in Bulgaria, and as will be seen again in subsequent chapters, 
and there have not been reports of physical attacks on NGO staff.  In the mid-1990s, 
after an initial period of over-closeness between AHC and the ruling party,
9
 the 
relationship between the organisation and the governing party began to demonstrate 
some strain: in 1995, there were accounts of AHC activists coming under personal 
attack in the ruling Democratic Party newspaper,
10
 and a year later, during the 1996 
election year, the organisation reported heightened levels of criticism in pro-
                                                 
7 Ibid 50. 
8
 CIVICUS, IDM and UNDP, Civil Society Index for Albania: In Search of Citizens and Impact, (IDM 
2010) 9. 
9
 US State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994: Albania (1995). 
Available at http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ (accessed 5 April 2015).   At this time, AHC was criticized by 
the International Helsinki Federation and individual Helsinki representatives from other countries for 
its perceived close association with the ruling Democratic Party. 
10 US State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1995: Albania (1996). 
Available at http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ (accessed 6 April 2015).    
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government newspapers and by government officials.
11
  The tensions subsequently 
seemed to abate, although the AHC 2016 report does express concern that: 
[s]tatements or reactions made in some cases that civil society organizations  
misuse donations, have an unjust impact on reducing the public’s trust on the  
activity of civil society and divert attention from the causes that civil society  
defends…12 
 
It does not provide further details.  Despite such concerns, at the time of writing, there is 
little evidence of the backlash seen in some other countries in central and Eastern 
Europe, and in particular of the anti-Soros rhetoric used by right-wing parties to 
attack foreign-funded NGOs in other countries in the region.  An anonymous hostile 
media report from Macedonia reports that “a network of people and organizations 
influenced, funded and controlled by George Soros in Albania has an almost total grip 
on the government and on the state institutions” up to the level of the prime minister.  
The author criticizes “the unlimited, unchecked and largely unchallenged control of 
the Soros network on the funding of what is considered as ‘civil society’ in Albania”, 
and the article is complete with a picture of Soros’ face superimposed on tentacles 
stretching out across a map from America to Europe.
13
  Right-wing voices in 
Macedonia accuse Soros of trying to damage the integrity of the country with his 
support for the Albanian minority there.
14
  His perceived pro-Albanian stance may 
help to explain why anti-Soros rhetoric has not gained traction in Albania in the way 
it has done in other countries in the region. 
                                                 
11 US State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1996: Albania (1997). 
Available at http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ (accessed 6 April 2015).    
12 AHC, Report on the Situation of Respect for Human Rights and Freedoms in Albania during 2016, 
34. 
13 Anonymous, ‘”Soros” network in Albania has a strong influence in Macedonia’, Republika website, 
11 February 2017, http://english.republika.mk/soros-network-in-albania-has-a-strong-influence-in-
macedonia/ (accessed 18 February 2018). 
14 Anonymous, ‘A Macedonian breakdown gets Europe’s attention”, 9 May 2017, The Economist, 
https://www.economist.com/news/europe/21718549-tensions-countrys-albanian-politicians-could-
deteriorate-conflict-macedonian (accessed 18 February 2018). 
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CIVICUS research has found that civil society has made “great strides” since the 
1990s.
15
  From the turn of the millennium, it notes an increasing willingness by the 
government to consult CSOs when drafting laws and policies.
16
  In 2016, CIVICUS 
reported that “[a] combination of energetic advocacy by civil society and the granting 
of European Union Candidate Status in 2014 resulted in important recent gains for 
civil society organisations in Albania.”17   
 
Civil Society Strategies 
Given the public attitude to civil society outlined above, it is unsurprising that 
organisations tend not to rely on popular mobilization, in the sense of asking the 
public to petition the government for change.  Albanian Rehabilitation Centre for 
Torture and Trauma’s mandate does include increasing public awareness of the issue, 
as part of its work focuses on preserving the historical memory of torture committed 
against political prisoners during the Communist era.
18
  A narrative based on the 
suffering of political prisoners in the past is potentially more attractive to the public 
than present-day issues affecting individuals in the criminal justice system (often seen 
as less sympathetic victims, less deserving of support).   
 
As in Bulgaria, the bulk of civil society activism on torture emphasizes depth (expert 
advocacy) rather than breadth (appeal to popular sentiment).  While the organisations 
publicly criticize violations by the states and undertake strategic litigation (outsider 
                                                 
15
 CIVICUS, IDM and UNDP, Civil Society Index for Albania: In Search of Citizens and Impact, 
(IDM 2010) 1. 
16 CIVICUS, IDM and UNDP, Civil Society Index for Albania: In Search of Citizens and Impact, 
(IDM 2010) 9. 
17 CIVICUS Monitor, Albania Overview, 14 April 2014, available at 
https://monitor.civicus.org/newsfeed/2016/04/14/Albaniaoverview/ (accessed 18 February 2018) 
18 Other organisations such as the Albanian Human Rights Group have drawn attention to the problems 
facing former political prisoners, including delays in compensation measures. 
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strategies), there is also considerable emphasis on constructive working relationships 
between CSOs and state institutions (a more insider-focused approach, as noted 
above).  Rather than an extreme insider or outsider approach, it is somewhere in 
between: civil society acting as a kind of critical friend to the state.  An insider tone 
of finding common cause with the state – reform as a joint project - can arguably be 
detected in at least some of AHC’s reports.  See for example the AHC 2016 report:   
AHC appreciates the reduction of the number of claims by detainees or convicts  
for the use of violence in Institutions for the Execution of Penal Decisions. 
 
AHC submitted to relevant institutions a large number of recommendations and  
Suggested the undertaking of measures for the implementation of legislation in  
force, which were generally considered constructively. Institutions such as the  
General Prosecutor’s Office, the Ministry of Justice [and others] responded to raised  
issues about the activity in the context of respect for the rights of persons deprived  
of their liberty, informing them about measures taken or their follow up. In particular,  
we point out the cooperation with the General Directory of Prisons, the transparency 
demonstrated and the reflections of this institution toward problems raised by AHC.19 
 
Similarly, in the AHC 2014 report: 
[I]t is worth applauding the leaders of this system for having the right concepts in  
terms of monitoring of operations in their institutions by outside actors. They  
should be thanked for their understanding and cooperation in this regard.  
In reviewing 2014 developments, we also need to highlight as positive the  
investments for the construction of new institutions….20 
 
                                                 
19 AHC, Report on the Situation of Respect for Human Rights and Freedoms in Albania during 2016, 
Tirana May 2017, 23.  Emphasis added. 
20 AHC, Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Albania during 2014, Tirana December 2014, 30. 
Emphasis added. 
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The organisation is keen to give credit for improvements by the state and its agents 
where it can.  It notes the practical challenges facing police and prison staff, and 
advocates for what staff need to do their jobs well, including more resources, job 
security and an acceptable working environment.  The organisation strikes a note of 
solidarity with state agents: it notes that providing training is not enough, and that 
retaining trained staff is equally important.  It flags concerns about staff downsizing 
in some prisons and encourages the prison service to improve job security and operate 
a meritocratic system.   
 
The same tone featured in a meeting in May 2015 between police, the NPM and civil 
society, attended by the researcher.  Police representatives discussed the logistical 
difficulties that made it difficult to implement better practices, to which an NGO 
representative replied, “We are on the same wavelength.  We understand the problem 
and you do too – I feel good about your intentions.”21   
 
The impression created by the tone of these reports and these exchanges is that on the 
spectrum of insider/outsider approaches, Albanian civil society situates itself to some 
extent on the insider side, although it is not a fully insider approach to the extent that 
it no longer publicly criticises state breaches of its commitments (ie. it is not captured 
by the state and does not fall into the category of GONGO or government-organised 
“NGO”).  As noted in chapter 4 and explored further below, Albania is subject to 
proportionately fewer cases of strategic litigation at the ECtHR, another indication 
                                                 
21 Researcher’s note from meeting with police, NPM and civil society, Tirana, May 2015.  The 
discussion was in Albanian, but simultaneous interpretation into English was provided.  The police 
spoke of their frustration at being overworked and underpaid and lacking sufficient resources to meet 
the demands on them. 
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that an insider strategy is preferred over an outsider one: attempts to persuade on the 
merits rather than attempts to force compliance based on sanctions. 
 
Given the fact that the prospect of EU accession is a powerful incentive for state 
reform, NGOs unsurprisingly have a strong outward-facing element to their 
advocacy.  An entirely inward-facing approach would miss out on the leverage 
available through external demands for reform.  Local organisations publish websites 
and reports in English.  There is evidence of close partnerships between local NGOs 
and international organisations such as Amnesty International.  For example, in 2004, 
AHC, Albanian Human Rights Group and the Albanian Rehabilitation Centre for 
Trauma and Torture (ARCT) issued a joint press release with AI asking the 
government to provide information about the fate of an individual who was 
disappeared.
22
   The following year, AI released a detailed report on torture in 
Albania citing the work of all these organisations, and using photographic evidence of 
injuries caused by torture supplied by the Albanian Human Rights Group.
23
   Local 
organisations are part of international networks – for example, ARCT is a member 
both of the World Organisation against Torture network and the International 
Rehabilitation Council for Torture Victims.  Its website acknowledges funding from 
the Danish Institute against Torture, Civil Rights Defenders (a Swedish NGO), the 
UN, Austrian Development Cooperation, the EU, the US and the Open Society 
Institute. 
 
                                                 
22 Amnesty International and others, Albania: What happened to Remzi Hoxha? 21 Oct 2004, AI Index 
EUR 11/004/2004. 
23 Amnesty International, Albania: Obligations under the UN Convention against Torture – a gap 
between law and practice, 2005, EUR 11/001/2005, 8. 
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As noted in chapter four, EU accession entails an adjustment for NGOs, as previously 
relied-on donors take the view that their funding is now more appropriately directed 
elsewhere.  CIVICUS noted concerns in relation to Albania: the sector relied on 
internal donors as its “main lifeline”, so with those donors withdrawing from the 
region, civil society was turning to EU programmes and the Albanian state for 
support. CIVICUS warned: 
Neither of the two is taking full responsibility – either because the Government  
is unprepared for such a step, or because of a lack of capabilities on the CSOs’  
side to cope with the bureaucratic application and grant procedures under  
various EC programs.24 
 
At the time of writing, when EU accession has not taken place, at least some of the 
key organisations working on the issue of torture are continuing to secure funding 
from their traditional donor base.  This is likely to change if and when accession takes 
place: as discussed in the Bulgaria chapter, there may be a consequent impact on the 
sustainability of some NGO activism if NGOs are not prepared to make the necessary 
transition with regard to their funding base.   
 
Local and international activism 
In the chapter on Bulgaria, we saw that international organisations such as AI and 
Human Rights Watch played an important role in getting the issue of torture on the 
agenda during the 1990s, after which point local organisations were in a stronger 
position to take the lead in demanding reform.  A similar sequence can be observed in 
Albania.  The state ratified UNCAT in 1994.  The period immediately before and 
after saw heightened levels of national and international interest in the issue.  In 1993, 
                                                 
24 Ibid 18. 
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Amnesty International wrote to the Albanian President to express concern about 
police abuses and published a report on the issue.
25
  Two years later, AI published a 
second report, concluding that for all the attention it was receiving, the situation had 
yet to improve.
26
  It continued to report cases of mistreatment into 1996, particularly 
at the time of the elections and post-election protests.   In a 1996 report HRW 
reported that it had collected testimony documenting “many instances of excessive 
force used by the Albanian police and security forces”, and quoted concerns flagged 
up by AHC.
27
 
 
Despite some resentment of public criticism,
28
 the government indicated a degree of 
willingness to respond to these calls for reform.  In 1996, the Interior Minister opened 
a number of offices where citizens could lodge complaints against the police, and 
introduced human rights training courses for police.   Matters came to a head in1997, 
a period of great volatility, as massive public unrest followed the collapse of pyramid 
investment schemes and the resulting economic trauma.  Prisons were stormed, and 
the detainees escaped.  Observers disagreed about the police response to the unrest.  
AI claimed that “[h]undreds of people were tortured or ill-treated by police”29 while 
the US State Department said there was “considerable praise for the police force's 
efforts to handle difficult situations in a tense and unstable atmosphere” and that the 
police showed “great restraint many times.”30  Whichever account is accepted, 
                                                 
25 AI, Albania - Human rights abuses by police (AI Index: EUR 11/05/93. 
26 AI, Failure to End Police Ill-Treatment and Deaths in Custody EUR 11/04/1995, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a9cf0.html (accessed 24 May 2014). 
27 Human Rights Watch, Human Rights in Post-Communist Albania, 1 March 1996, 1606, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a7f30.html (accessed 18 February 2018). 
28 US State Dept 1996 reports “Some organizations [reported]… they were harassed and intimidated 
once they had made direct criticisms of the Government”. 
29 AI, Amnesty International Report 1997 – Albania, 1 January 1997. 
30
 US State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1997: Albania (1998).  
Available at http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ (accessed 12 April 2015). 
 211 
 
international attention was drawn to the inadequacy of the Albanian police force, and 
the case for reform became urgent. 
 
Despite the upheaval, 1997 was also the year that Albania ratified ECHR and ECPT 
and aimed to show it was on track to meet European standards.   Although large-scale 
plans for police training had to be curtailed by the security crisis, a few police officers 
attended international training.   The Albanian Center for the Documentation of 
Human Rights met with officials from the Interior Ministry to design a curriculum for 
seminars to train police officers in fundamental human rights principles and good 
conduct, and published a book on human rights aimed at police supervisors.
31
 
 
By the following year, the US State Department judged that the training and 
education programmes were beginning to make some headway in increasing police 
professionalism, although standards remained low.  It also reported that “virtually all 
domestic NGO leaders report that the current Government gave them significantly 
greater access and cooperation than they received from previous governments”.32  In 
1999, new legislation was introduced to create the country's first national People's 
Advocate (Ombudsman), who would later take on the functions of the NPM.
33
 
 
Over the next few years, both national and international NGOs continued to report 
abuses.  AHC, Albanian Human Rights Group and Albanian Center for Human 
Rights noted that the police continued to use torture and CIDT, but that levels were 
                                                 
31 Ibid. 
32 US State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1998: Albania (1999).  
Available at http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ (accessed 12 April 2015). 
33 US State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2001: Albania (2002).  
Available at https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2001/ (accessed 12 April 2015). 
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beginning to decrease.
34
 NGOs contributed to police training programmes, and the 
issue of impunity began to be addressed.  In September 2001 the Ministry opened a 
telephone complaints line and within the first month reportedly received 33 
complaints alleging physical ill-treatment or verbal abuse. As a result, eight police 
officers were reportedly suspended from duty or dismissed for these or other abuses.
35
  
The Albanian National Police’s Office of Internal Control began to investigate and 
punish misconduct by individual officers.
36
   
 
Amnesty International kept up its campaigning, issuing reports on torture and ill-
treatment in 2001,
37
 2002,
38
 and 2004.
39
 In 2003, the year Albania ratified UNCAT, 
HRW stopped issuing reports related to Albania, not starting again until it reported 
concerns related to the Kosovo crisis in 2008.  AI published a 2005 report on the gap 
between Albania’s legal obligations under UNCAT and what was happening in 
practice.
40
  The organisation also issued a public protest in 2008 when Shkoder Police 
Directorate initiated criminal proceedings against the People’s Advocate, claiming 
that his unannounced visit to Shkoder police station jeopardized an investigation.41  
                                                 
34 US State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2002: Albania (2003).  
Available at https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2002/ (accessed 12 April 2015). 
35 AI, Amnesty International Report 2002 – Albania, 28 May 2002, available at 
http://refworld.org/docid/3cf4bc1028.html (accessed 6 May 2015). 
36 US State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2002: Albania (2003).  
Available at https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2002/ (accessed 12 April 2015). 
37 AI, Albania: Torture and ill-treatment - an end to impunity? 18 May 2001, EUR 
11/001/2001, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3b83b6d7e.html (accessed 18 February 
2018). 
38 AI, Albania: Alleged ill-treatment of detainees by police, 1 May 2002, EUR 11/006/2002, available 
at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3d99cf0a7.html (accessed 18 February 2018) 
39 AI, Albania: Inhuman and degrading detention conditions in police stations - steps towards reform, 
19 February 2004, EUR 11/001/2004, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/42ae98910.html 
(accessed 18 February 2018). 
40 AI, Albania: Obligations Under the UN Convention Against Torture - A Gap Between Law and 
Practice, 1 February 2005, EUR 11/001/2005, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/42ae98930.html (accessed 18 February 2018). 
41
 AI Albania: Obligations Under the UN Convention Against Torture - A Gap Between Law and 
Practice, 1 February 2005, EUR 11/001/2005, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/42ae98930.html (accessed 18 February 2018). 
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While this international attention was useful, the vast bulk of monitoring and 
reporting on torture was being carried out by local organisations by this point. 
AHC and the Albanian Human Rights Group continued to note improvements in 
police behaviour into 2004.  The director of Prison 302 and the chief of the prison’s 
police were both dismissed after an investigation by the general directorate of prisons 
found that prison staff had physically and psychologically abused 24 individuals 
multiple times.
42
  The same year, Parliament passed a law enabling the ombudsman to 
inspect and monitor detention facilities and prisons, and giving him authority to 
initiate public interest cases.   
In 2005 and 2006, the CPT carried out inspection visits, finding that most of the 
detainees interviewed reported some degree of physical abuse or inhumane treatment.   
It visited again in 2008 (with the report being issued in January 2009), and while 
serious concerns remained, particularly relating to physical abuse during 
interrogation, it did find that the situation had improved compared to its previous 
visits, with the majority of detainees interviewed in 2008 saying that they had not 
been subject to abuse while in police custody.  This is a significant reversal in a very 
short space of time: from a majority reporting abuse in 2005 and 2006, to a majority 
reporting correct treatment in 2008.  In between those visits, Albania signed a 
Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU, which involved a series of 
measures to reform the legal system and to combat high-level corruption: a key 
moment during which the government is highly motivated to demonstrate to an 
international audience its willingness to make progress on achieving human rights 
                                                 
42 US State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2004: Albania (2005).  
Available at https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/ (accessed 12 April 2015). 
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progress.  One of the issues on the agenda was the need to tackle torture and CIDT.
43
   
At this point, Albania’s willingness and ability to meet EU obligations became “an 
issue of interest for all citizens”, according to AHC’s 2011 report.44   In 2007, the 
state made amendments to Article 86 of the Criminal Code to incorporate the 
definition of torture set out in the UN Convention against Torture. 
 
The improved treatment of detainees continued to be in evidence in the report of the 
CPT’s 2010 visit (published 2012), with most interviewees saying that they were not 
abused, although a significant minority continuing to report physical abuse during 
interrogation, in the form of slaps, kicks and blows to the legs with truncheons.  In 
2011, AHC carried out 17 monitoring visits to detention centres (pre-trial and penal).  
It received collective complaints in three institutions covering both conditions of 
detention and inhumane treatment by staff; despite these ongoing problems, it noted 
that overall the situation had improved, which it attributed to investment in 
infrastructure and capacity-building efforts with staff there.
45
  It found that allegations 
of physical violence from staff had declined in number from previous years to the 
point where they had become relatively rare.
46
  While numbers were few, AHC still 
noted concerns regarding institutional failures around access to medical examination, 
record-keeping and investigation of the allegations that did occur.
47
  AHC continued 
                                                 
43 See for example the 2010 Communication from the EU Commission to the European Parliament 
and Council, where it is noted on page 7 that a “serious concern relates to detention conditions and the 
treatment of detained persons in police stations, pre-trial detention and prisons.” 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2010/package/al_opinion_2010_en.pdf  (accessed 
24 May 2014). 
44 AHC Monitoring Report on the Situation of Respect for Human Rights in Albania for 2011, January 
2012, 5. 
45 Ibid 30. 
46 Ibid 37. 
47 Ibid 38. 
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to contribute to the training of prison staff at all levels (frontline, middle and senior 
management), alongside expertise contributed by foreign governments.
48
   
 
NGOs drew attention to the particular needs of vulnerable groups (including those 
with mental health problems, minors, LGBT prisoners etc).  AHC noted that 
awareness of the need for differentiated treatment had increased.
49
  In the case of 
prisoners with mental health problems, for example, AHC noted approvingly that 
prison officers were decreasingly likely to resort to handcuffs as a response to 
detainee agitation.
50
 
 
In 2014, Albania formally became an EU candidate state.  The EU specifies a number 
of key tasks carrying over from the integration process, which included the protection 
of human rights.  Political conditions were difficult, with the Opposition boycotting 
Parliament, but reforms still went through, including those targeting impunity.  AHC 
praised “[g]ood efforts [by the state]…to build bridges of cooperation with the civil 
society”.  In prisons, allegations of violence were “scarce”.51  “[C]ontinued efforts 
[by police] to respect citizens’ rights better….Police bodies are making efforts to be 
transparent in their activity and to cooperate with citizens, especially with civil 
society organizations, particularly those whose mission it is to protect human rights 
and freedoms”.52   
 
                                                 
48 AHC, Report on the Situation of Human Rights at Police Directorates and Commissariats, and Pre-
trial Facilities and Institutions for the Enforcement of Criminal Sentences, during the period of May-
November 2012, December 2012, 18. 
49 Ibid 19. 
50 Ibid 23. 
51 AHC, Report on the Situation of Human Rights at Police Directorates and Commissariats, and Pre-
trial Facilities and Institutions for the Enforcement of Criminal Sentences, during the period of June-
November 2013, December 2013, 12. 
52 AHC, Monitoring Report on the Situation of Respect for Human Rights in Albania for 2014, 
December 2014, 12. 
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3. Categories of Activism 
 
The above account provides examples of a wide range of activist strategies: fact-
finding and publication, ie. (i) information-based activities.  We can also see (ii) 
dialogue-based activities:  AHC reports that it and other CSOs have contributed to 
changes to legislation, including on laws relating to the rights and treatment of 
detainees, on legal aid, on police, on the Ombudsman, the Penal Code and on prison 
officers.
53
  NGO involvement in police training has also been described. 
 
As already noted above, (iii) strategic litigation is used much less frequently than in 
Bulgaria, perhaps in line with a more insider-leaning approach by civil society 
(although it may also be attributable to lower levels of local legal expertise in 
litigating in the Strasbourg court).  There are relatively few cases in the ECtHR where 
Albania has been accused of an Article 3 violation, and those that do often centre on 
inadequate medical treatment.
54
  The case of Ceka v Albania, arose from the death of 
Ms Ceka’s son in police custody; unusually, the government admitted violation of 
Articles 2 and 3 and proposed compensation of EUR10,000.
55
  The ECtHR felt the 
state had responded adequately so struck out the case.  One case where the court 
found an art 3 violation was in the case of Kaçiu and Kotorri v Albania,
56
 which 
concerned the beating of a suspect to extract a confession and the state’s failure to 
investigate the allegation.   
 
                                                 
53 AHC, Monitoring Report on the Situation of Respect for Human Rights in Albania for 2014 
(December 2014) 16. 
54 Grori v Albania ECtHR App. No 25336/04 concerned the absence of appropriate medical care for a 
detainee with multiple sclerosis, and Dybeku v Albania ECtHR App. No. 41153/06 concerned 
conditions of detention that amounted to ill-treatment in the context of a detainee with mental illness. 
55 ECtHR App. No.  26872/05. 
56 ECtHR App. No. 33192/07 and 33194/07. 
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(iv) Practical safeguards 
The importance of monitoring by local CSOs as well as the NPM and international 
bodies such as the CPT has already been noted in the account above.  ODIHR paid 
tribute to the value of monitoring visits to places of detention in a 2009 report.  
Noting a reduction of public police beatings, it observed that this “highlights the 
importance of exposing torture and ill-treatment to public view and ensuring it is not 
allowed to thrive un-scrutinized in places of deprivation of liberty”.57  
 
The point has been made earlier in the chapter that the tone of local NGO reports is 
often positive towards the authorities, noting the real challenges they face and 
highlighting improvements.  By the time of its 2014 report, AHC noted “few cases” 
of reported CIDT in prisons.  Where complaints did arise, AHC referred them to the 
“relevant bodies” who “often notified us” about measures taken, including instances 
where the accused official had been suspended from duty.
58
   However, this does not 
imply an unwillingness to criticise where it is due.  AHC reported that it was still 
receiving complaints regarding ill-treatment in police stations, and in at least one area 
(Berat Police Commissariat), complaints were “numerous”.  AHC notified the 
Ministry of Interior and the Internal Control Service who responded that they had 
begun investigations.
59
  The organisation said: 
In this regard, there is room for a lot more work to uproot the mentality of  
police officers to obtain confessions through the violation of the [suspect]  
or to exercise violence even when it it is not necessary.  The Interior  
Ministry’s Internal Control Service should react continuously and more  
strongly in this regard, as they have done in some cases.60 
                                                 
57 OSCE/ODIHR, The Fight against Torture: The OSCE Experience (ODIHR 2009) 24. 
58 AHC, Report on the situation of respect for Human Rights in Albania during 2014 (December 2014) 
34. 
59 Ibid 37. 
60 Ibid. 
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It expanded on these findings in its Monitoring report, also published in December 
2014, which noted for example that in Saranda police station, detainees “stated that 
they had often heard the loud noises of blows and cries of individuals who begged not 
to be hit”.61  At the police station of Tropoja, some police officers told the monitors 
that “the beating was reserved for those who deserved it”.62  In some stations, 
monitors found instruments that could be used for physical abuse: “batons, handcuffs, 
as or sticks, chair legs of iron, various twigs etc”.  Police claimed that these items 
were evidence, but the monitors noted that they were not being stored in accordance 
with the rules on material evidence, giving rise to concerns that they were used in the 
process of extracting confessions.
63
  It also observed several individuals with injuries 
they claimed were inflicted during arrest.  AHC formally wrote to the Directorate 
General of the State Police to express its concerns.
64
  AHC carried out several days of 
training with police officers from across the country and afterwards wrote to the 
Minister of Interior and the Director General of the State Police to express concerns 
that there were still “old school” police officers who resorted to unacceptable 
treatment of prisoners.
65
   
 
It is worth noting here the importance of integrating training with other types of 
activism such as detention monitoring: it would be relatively easy for an international 
organisation to provide training based on international law, but training that is rooted 
in an understanding of how and why abuses take place at local level is more likely to 
be effective in addressing the phenomenon. 
                                                 
61 AHC, Report on the Human Rights Situation of Liberty Deprived Persons in the Police Directories 
and Stations and in Detention and Prisons (December 2014) 21. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid. 
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Giving a sense of the ongoing dialogue between AHC and the state authorities arising 
from its monitoring, AHC lists 27 letters it sent to officials ranging from police and 
prison directors to the Ministry of Justice on training and on the implantation of 
detainees’ rights in a period between May and December 2014.66   
 
Other practical safeguards 
With regard to informing individuals under arrest of their rights, including access to a 
lawyer, to medical services, and to inform a third party, in its 2012 report, AHC 
noted that individuals were being given a copy of their rights in writing in most, 
although not all, police stations.
67
  AHC found that the individuals themselves did not 
necessarily understand the purpose served by this document.
68
  In its report for 2013, 
AHC noted with approval that posters with this information were being displayed in 
police stations.
69
  Its 2016 report noted however that violations of the right to be 
informed continued.
70
  
 
In 2008, the Parliament approved legislation which made provision for state-funded 
legal aid.  By 2011, AHC reported that implementation was “slow” and no individual 
had as yet benefited received this state-funded legal aid.
71
  Rather than create a brand-
new service, the State Committee for Legal Aid would commission non-profit 
                                                 
66 Ibid 77-79. 
67 AHC, Report on the Situation of Human Rights at Police Directorates and Commissariats, and Pre-
Trial Facilities and Institutions for the Enforcement of Criminal Sentences, December 2012, 45. 
68 Ibid. 
69 AHC, Report on the Situation of Human Rights at Police Directorates and Police Stations, and Pre-
Trial Facilities and Institutions for the Enforcement of Criminal Sentences, December 2013,19.  As of 
2015, there is also information about rights on the website of the Albanian state police.  OSCE has 
contributed financially to the dissemination of this information, which includes television 
advertisements. 
70 AHC, Report on the Situation of Respect for Human Rights and Freedoms in Albania during 2016, 
April 2017, 27. 
71 AHC, Monitoring Report on the Situation of Respect for Human Rights in Albania for 2011, January 
2012, 61-62. 
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organisations to provide legal aid services.  AHC noted that a few were already in 
operation and had the capacity to deliver, notably the Tirana Legal Aid Service.  AHC 
itself offers a Free Legal Clinic which offers interventions with state institutions and 
litigation right up to ECtHR.
72
 
 
A practical measure to reduce torture is to provide audio-visual recording devices in 
holding cells and interview/interrogation cells: this measure was reportedly being 
implemented in some areas but not others.  An AHC staff member noted when 
interviewed that CCTV was not a big factor to date in bringing about improvement – 
where the equipment was installed, it tended to break: attitudinal change and tackling 
impunity mattered more, although this measure could still potentially help.
73
 
 
As in the chapter on Bulgaria, there are local organisations who have been working 
for more than two decades on the issue of torture.   This long-term local dedication 
mitigates the risks flagged by Alston and Gillespie about international actors having 
too short-term a focus on human rights issues.74  We see again how international 
organisations play a key role early on in getting the issue of torture on the agenda; 
well-known international organisations such as Amnesty International can leverage 
their reputation to help local organisations be heard (see for example the joint press 
release in 2004 referenced above).  Later in the process, the international 
organisations may focus their resources elsewhere, while local organisations are in a 
position to take over the longer term duties associated with “norm patrol”.   
 
                                                 
72 Ibid 67. 
73 Interview with author, Tirana, May 2015. 
74 Philip Alston and Colin Gillespie, ‘Global Human Rights Monitoring, New Technologies, and the 
Politics of Information’ (2012) European Journal of International Law 23(4), 1089-1123, 1105. 
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With regard to the question of where Albania is located on the spectrum of rational 
choice “comply to win EU membership” versus constructivist motivation to do the 
right thing, it can be argued that both sets of motivations play a role.  Lazeri asserts 
that Albania is undergoing a process of identity formation, in which it “seeks…to 
legitimize its claims of sharing an identity with what it perceives to be the successful 
model of civilization”, the EU.75  From a constructivist standpoint, the more that 
respect for the norms against torture remains associated with this desired identity, the 
more reason there is to hope that the reform attempts will be successful over the 
longer term.
76
 
 
A more pessimistic point of view is put forward by Frasheri, who argues that: 
Domestic actors see little incentive to go all the way in meeting external  
demands when returns are not tangible and do not arrive in the short term,  
as is the case with the EU membership. 
 
As we have seen, there does seem to be tangible progress on the issue of torture to 
date, but there is a risk that if EU membership is postponed over the longer term, or if 
it becomes less desirable amongst the domestic constituency, the incentive to 
continue with reforms may be reduced.  As things stand, however, it would seem that 
there are grounds for reasonable optimism for Albania’s improved performance on 
torture to continue.  
 
                                                 
75
 Marina Lazeri, Renegotiating Albania Identity: European Transformations (unpublished manuscript, Utrecht 
University, The Netherlands), http://www.inclusionexclusion.eu/site/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Marina-
Lazeri.pdf (accessed 18 February 2018), 1. 
76
 Ermal Frasheri, Of Knights and Squires: European Union and the Modernization of Albania, 
Working Paper no 81 (Center for International Development at Harvard University 2016) 71.  He 
argues more generally that the Europeanisation project is harmful to the domestic democratisation 
project. 
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4. Conclusion 
 
The prospect of EU accession gives powerful leverage to civil society organisations 
wishing to influence the aspirant state. Again we see that international organisations 
play an important initial role in getting torture reform on the agenda, followed by 
ongoing norm patrol by local organisations to push the government to ensure that its 
rhetoric is matched by its practice.   
 
The tone of the relationship between states and CSOs is less contentious than that 
found in Bulgaria.  While Albanian organisations do report on incidences of torture 
and ill-treatment, there is less emphasis on an outsider strategy such as strategic 
litigation.  The national Helsinki Committees in the two countries have positioned 
themselves in somewhat different ways vis-à-vis the state, a choice that seems to be 
driven largely by the different environments in which they operate.  Both approaches 
seem to have met with at least some degree of success, even if there is still a 
considerable way to go in order to eliminate torture and ill-treatment entirely. 
With regard to the state’s motivation to demonstrate to the EU its worthiness to 
become a member, the question can be asked whether NGO efforts make a difference.  
Even without NGO activism, would the state not have made the improvements 
anyway?  It must be accepted that improvement in state performance may have taken 
place without immediate NGO participation, given EU assertions that it wished to see 
state reform in this regard.  However, several observations can be made.  Firstly, civil 
society has contributed its expertise: its understanding of international treaty and soft 
law commitments has underpinned the training it has provided to police and other 
state agents, along with its knowledge about what needs to be done to translate them 
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into the Albanian context.  Secondly, without local civil society monitoring and 
reporting, how would the EU bodies know whether genuine progress was being 
made?  It is relatively easy for a state to report changes to legislation: it is important 
to have independent verification of whether such changes result in better treatment for 
individual detainees.  The CPT itself can only visit a limited number of institutions, 
normally at intervals of two to three years: local organisations can visit more places 
of detention more frequently, and the CPT regularly draws on their knowledge.  
International organisations such as AI and HRW rarely conduct their own 
investigations in these countries at this time, but like the US State Reports on Country 
Practices on Human Rights, they draw on trusted local organisations.   
 
Civil society activism may not be the sole driver in state reform on torture, but given 
a state with the motivation to demonstrate reform, civil society in Albania has been 
able to position itself as an ally and a critical friend in bringing about this change.  A 
key part of being able to position itself in this way is its access to decision-makers, to 
frontline state agents (police, prison officers) and to detainees, allowing it to build its 
knowledge base, develop relationships, and contribute practical advice on how to 
deliver change. 
 
Returning to the three indicators of internalisation identified in the introduction, we 
can measure the extent to which Albania has made progress over the period under 
scrutiny.  As with Bulgaria, the prohibition on torture cannot be said to be fully 
internalised, given that breaches continue to occur. 
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Indicator Situation in Albania Progress? 
Actors invoking the norm Norm invoked by organisations 
such as AHC and the European 
Institute of Tirana, and by 
international and regional bodies 
such as UNCAT and CPT, 
although less frequently by 
Albanian lawyers in the context of 
ECtHR.   There is some evidence 
of involvement by professional 
bodies such as the Albanian 
Association of Psychiatrists. 
 
Progress 
Domestic accountability 2001: the Albanian National 
Police’s Office of Internal Control 
began to investigate and punish 
misconduct by individual officers.  
2004: a prison director and chief of 
the prison’s police were dismissed 
after an investigation by the 
general directorate of prisons 
found that prison staff had carried 
out abuse. 
2012: ECtHR case of Ceka v 
Albania where the state admitted 
responsibility. 
Some progress.  
While some 
violations 
continue to go 
unpunished, the 
risk of punishment 
has increased, 
altering the 
cost/benefit 
calculation for 
potential abusers 
and the 
authorities. 
Positive role played by 
NPM 
Good relationship with NGOs  Progress 
 
The evidence indicates that Albania has made at least some progress towards 
internalising the norm prohibiting torture.  The state seems to accept civil society is a 
legitimate partner in addressing issues of torture and ill-treatment, which in turn 
enables civil society, through its norm patrol, to make progress in ingraining better 
practices in this area. 
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Chapter 7  Romania  
As in the previous two chapters, this chapter begins by tracing the trends in (i) civil 
society advocacy and (ii) torture and ill-treatment in the state concerned over the last 
two decades.  Although Romania acceded to the EU at the same time as Bulgaria in 
2007, therefore facing the same set of external pressures for reform, there was an 
important difference with regard to domestic political conditions: a notably lower 
level of civil society advocacy, as measured by the USAID CSO Sustainability Index.  
Accompanying this lower advocacy score is a failure by Romania to improve its 
performance on torture. So does the former contribute to the latter?  This chapter 
explores civil society efforts to bring about change, and considers why such change 
has proved so elusive in practice.    
 
Romania is the largest and, relatively speaking, the wealthiest of the four states under 
consideration.  Although all four case studies have been classed as middle-sized 
territory and middle-sized population (see chapter 2), it is worth noting that Romania 
is approximately twice the size and twice the population of the next largest, Bulgaria.  
As discussed previously, this relatively larger size may create some challenges with 
regard to central government’s control over its more remote agents (see the discussion 
of the principal/agent problem in chapter 1) and for access by NGOs based in the 
capital to outlying regions for the purposes of monitoring, training, and relationship-
building.  In logistical terms, these challenges complicate the task of norm patrol. 
 
  
 226 
 
1. Trends in Torture and Advocacy 
 
 
Figure 1 Torture in Romania (CIRI scores) and Advocacy in Romania (USAID 
scores), compared with advocacy in Bulgaria 
 
After a particularly low score in 2001, advocacy scores for Romania increased 
steadily up until 2005, the year in which the EU accession treaty was signed, peaking 
in 2007, the year of formal EU accession.  The time-frame for accession is the same 
as that of Bulgaria, so the states experienced similar incentives to demonstrate reform 
at similar times, with the key difference being the fact that Romania has had a much 
lower level of civil society advocacy throughout the period.   
 
Bulgarian civil society was able to exploit the opportunity offered by EU accession, 
as shown in chapter 5, resulting in a sustained improvement in relation to torture 
practices.  Romania has not shown this degree of positive change, demonstrating a 
better performance on torture in one year only, 2005.  As noted above, this is the year 
when the EU accession treaty was signed, which can be interpreted as meaning that 
Romania adopted a purely rationalist approach to improving its performance on 
torture: it demonstrated an improvement at the point when its EU accession treaty 
required ratification by other EU member states, but once this external motivation had 
expired, the state’s performance reverted to its previous problematic level.  The 
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implication is that for some reason the state did not internalise its commitments to 
reform such that they became integrated into a new norm-compliant self-identity (in 
constructivist terms).  This chapter explores whether the reason for this missed 
opportunity is that civil society was thwarted in its efforts to make this happen. 
 
To determine torture trends since 2011, there is unfortunately no Romanian 
equivalent of the annual Bulgarian Helsinki Committee survey of abuse reported by 
detainees.  As with Albania, it is necessary to resort to the wording of the annual US 
State Department Report on Country Practices on Human Rights in order to discern 
the trend. 
 
Year US State Dept Country Report description of torture in Romania 
2000 …there were credible reports that police beat detainees and used excessive force. 
2001 …there were credible reports that police beat detainees and used excessive force. 
Human rights organizations cited numerous reports of torture and mistreatment by 
police. On at least two occasions police beat detainees to death … 
2002 …there were credible reports that police beat detainees and used excessive force. 
Human rights organizations cited numerous reports of torture and mistreatment by 
police. 
2003 As previous year 
2004 As previous year 
2005 …there were numerous credible reports of police torture and mistreatment of 
detainees and Roma, primarily through excessive force and beatings by police. 
2006 As previous year 
2007 As previous year 
2008 As previous year  
2009 …there were numerous NGO reports of police mistreatment and abuse of 
detainees and Roma, primarily through excessive force and beatings by police 
2010 …there were reports from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and the media 
that police mistreated and abused prisoners, pretrial detainees, and Roma, 
primarily through excessive force and beatings. 
2011  As previous year 
2012 … there were reports from NGOs and the media that police mistreated and abused 
prisoners, pretrial detainees, Roma, innocent citizens… primarily through use of 
excessive force and beatings. 
A report CPT report from November 2011 refers to "multiple allegations of 
mistreatment” 
2013 …there were reports from NGOs and the media that police mistreated and abused 
prisoners, pretrial detainees, Roma, and other citizens, primarily through use of 
excessive force and beatings…. 
2014 …there were reports from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and the media 
that police mistreated and abused prisoners, pretrial detainees, Roma, and other 
citizens, primarily through use of excessive force including beatings. Media 
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reported such cases …. In most cases the police officers involved were 
exonerated. 
2015 As previous year 
2016 …there were reports from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and media that 
police and gendarmes mistreated and abused prisoners, pretrial detainees, Roma, 
and other vulnerable persons… primarily with excessive force, including 
beatings. Media reported various instances of such abuse throughout the year. In 
most cases, the police officers involved were exonerated. 
The NGO Romani Center for Social Intervention and Studies (CRISS) stated that, 
in 43 cases of police brutality against Roma it documented over the previous 10 
years, there were no convictions at the national level, in part because of 
prosecutorial decisions not to send the cases to court…  
 
Unlike the Albanian reports, there is no wording indicating an improvement from one 
year to the next.  While the word “numerous” disappeared between 2009 and 2010, it 
was not accompanied by any suggestion that there had been a reduction in reports of 
ill-treatment, and no change appears in the CIRI score, so it seems unwise to attach 
too much significance to this semantic change.  On the basis of the available 
evidence, it seems reasonable to conclude that we are not observing any significant 
reform in state performance on torture in Romania over the time period in question. 
 
Unlike the other two states, CPT reports feature concerns about attempts by state 
agents to conceal ill-treatment of detainees.  In its 2014 report, it noted: 
The CPT is particularly concerned by allegations of ill-treatment inflicted  
on detainees by personnel in the three prisons visited.  Furthermore, it seems  
that detainees in Târgşor prison were warned not to talk to the delegation,  
and numerous detainees in the three prisons visited were particularly reticent  
in confiding in the delegation for fear of potential physical reprisals (in the  
prisons of Arad and Oradea) and/or disciplinary action (in the prison of  
Târgşor).
 1 
                                                 
1 CPT, Report of Periodic Visit to Romania, 05/06/2014-17/06/2014, translated from French by the 
present author.  The original French text says:  
le CPT est particulièrement préoccupé par les allégations de mauvais traitements infligés aux détenus  
par des personnels dans les trois prisons visitées. En outre, il semble que les détenues de la prison de 
Târgşor aient été mises en garde de ne pas parler à la délégation et de nombreux détenus dans les trois 
prisons visitées étaient particulièrement réticents à se confier à la délégation par peur d’éventuelles 
représailles physiques (dans les prisons d’Arad et Oradea) et/ou disciplinaires (à la Prison de Târgşor). 
 229 
 
This attempt to conceal wrongdoing offers a striking contrast with Bulgaria, where 
the BHC annual surveys freely expose the extent of ill-treatment of detainees.  
Concealed problems are inherently more difficult to address. 
 
Individuals interviewed for this research concurred that overall the state’s 
performance had not greatly improved in relation its treatment of detainees.
2
  There 
were some aspects which were better than previously: there had been some 
investment in infrastructure, meaning that physical conditions in prisons and in 
residential institutions had improved.  There has been relatively more success in 
tackling ill-treatment within prisons than by police. For prison staff, according to one 
interviewee, “the mentality has changed a lot”.  They have encountered the work of 
NGOs, not just in detention monitoring, but also NGOs working on initiatives to 
reduce the transmission of HIV and hepatitis in prison, and over time have become 
more open to concerns about the welfare of the prison population: this is an example 
of how norms can be internalised through a process of habituation.   
 
The police force reportedly shows less improvement.  The police force is much larger 
than the prison staff, and officers move around more, so it is much more difficult 
logistically to reach a critical mass in the provision of training to police than it is for 
prison staff.  Human rights topics are not a standard part of the police training college 
curriculum, and police generally have very limited exposure to human rights norms.
3
  
 
There are also structural challenges: although jurisdiction for police abuses was 
changed from military courts to civil courts, oversight remains poor.  The 
                                                 
2 Interviews with author, Bucharest, March 2017. 
3 Ibid. 
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International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights reported in 2006 that legislative 
reforms had not been matched by a change in practice: while a law had been passed 
providing for independent oversight of police operations, it was not clear whether any 
such oversight occurred in practice, and there was no reporting on the findings, if 
indeed any had been made.4  Over a decade later, an interviewee from APADOR-CH 
noted that the demilitarisation was only a partial success: even under civilian 
oversight, there is still a lack of transparency, but civil courts are easier to deal with 
than the military equivalent, so things are “slightly better”.  There are a number of 
different branches of police and gendarmes, some of which are not subject to any 
effective oversight, which remains an ongoing obstacle to reform.
5
   
 
Interviewees noted that the biggest risk for abuse is for those individuals not formally 
recognised as detainees.  In the criminal justice system, this covers an individual’s 
first encounter with the police, when he or she can be “led to a police station” where 
they remain for up to 24 hours without any formal recognition of being “detainees”.  
At this point, the only acknowledged right is for their name to be entered in a record 
held by the police station: this unrecognised detention period is the time of greatest 
risk for abuse, including for the purposes of extorting confessions. 
  
Outside the criminal justice system, the state is also unwilling to acknowledge 
residential homes for children and those with mental disabilities as “places of 
detention” (although the CPT has visited and reported on such places and the ECtHR 
has issued judgement on violations taking place there).  While an organisation such as 
APADOR-CH has been successful in negotiating access to detainees in prisons and 
                                                 
4 IHF, Annual Report on Human Rights Violations (2006): Romania, 8 June 2006. 
5 Interview with author, Bucharest, March 2017. 
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police stations, NGOs wishing to monitor residential homes face much greater 
resistance.  This is partly due to their non-recognition as “places of detention”, and 
partly structural: there are 47 local authorities which have a degree of autonomy in 
how they implement national rules/policies (on child protection and social 
assistance), and it is hard to build positive relationships with each of these local 
authorities.  With a massive increase in the numbers of refugees and migrants in 
recent years, interviewees also expressed particular concerns at the conditions in 
closed centres where people were kept pending deportation, and where access for 
civil society was all but impossible. 
 
This differential picture highlights an important point: the places of detention to 
which NGOs are most successful in negotiating access are also the places where 
improvements are most likely to have occurred.  It is logical that authorities are more 
likely to be receptive to access where there is less to hide: some improvement may be 
a precursor to access by monitors as well as a consequence of it.  As noted earlier in 
the chapter, however, shining a light on problems is an important first step towards 
addressing them; the denial of access is another form of concealment.    
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2. Civil Society in Romania 
Since the fall of the communist leadership in 1989, Romania is considered to have 
made “impressive strides in establishing political and economic institutions that are 
accountable and a free civil society”, according to Freedom House.6  As with the 
three other cases studies, Romania’s civil society is, however, negatively impacted by 
low levels of citizen engagement and lack of funding.  NGO activities were assessed 
by CIVICUS as being “invisible to the majority of the population”; the organisations 
were “more oriented to the donors’ priorities and unable to build local 
constituencies”.7  More positively, in a number of policy areas, there is good 
“specialization and professionalism” on the part of civil society organisations.8 
 
Interviewees agreed that the public had little interest in or knowledge about the issue 
of torture and ill-treatment.  Public discourse has been dominated by concerns about 
corruption rather than human rights.  Victims are generally invisible, although a few 
cases that had made it into the media did attract public sympathy for the victim and 
condemnation of the abuse.  In those cases, prosecutors acted more quickly, although 
were not necessarily more likely to prosecute.  The official response was often a 
defensive one, such as to claim that images of abuse were staged to discredit manager 
of institution rather than to investigate fairly.
9
 
 
As with Bulgaria and Albania, a limited number of organisations work on the issue of 
torture and ill-treatment. 
                                                 
6 Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2015, 518. 
7
 CIVICUS and Civil Society Development Foundation, Dialogue for Civil Society: Report on the 
state of civil society in Romania (CIVICUS 2005), 3. 
8 Ibid 4. 
9 Interview with author, Bucharest, March 2017 
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Year  Organisations met 
2018 Periodic visit 
Report not yet published 
2014 Periodic visit 
APARDOR-CH 
Centre for Legal Resources 
2010 Periodic visit 
APARDOR-CH 
Centre for Legal Resources  
Romanian Group for the Defence of Human Rights  
Independent Romanian Human Rights Society  
Transcena 
2009 Ad hoc visit 
None listed 
2006 Periodic visit 
APADOR 
Centre for Legal Resources  
Independent Romanian Human Rights Society  
Romanian Refugee Council 
League for the Defence of Human Rights  
Romanian League for Mental Health 
Representatives of the Bucharest Bar 
2004 Ad hoc visit 
None listed 
2003 Ad hoc and period visit 
APADOR-CH 
Romanian League for Mental Health 
Romanian Forum for Refugees and Migrants  
Solidarity for Abandoned Romanian Children 
2001 Ad hoc visit 
None listed 
1999 Periodic visit 
APADOR-CH 
Save the Children Romanian Association 
 League for the Defence of Human Rights  
Romanian League for Mental Health 
Table 2: CSOs with whom the CPT held meetings during its monitoring visits  
(Source: CPT reports).  Organisation names translated from the French by the author. 
 
The local Helsinki Committee, known in Romania as APADOR-CH, is the leading 
organisation dealing with detainees in the criminal justice system, while the Centre 
for Legal Resources works with inmates in residential institutions. Romani Criss has 
at times been active in relation to the rights of Roma (including taking cases to the 
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ECtHR), but did not respond to requests for an interview in March 2017 and was not 
believed to be very active at this period. 
 
Using Brysk’s typology, we see the predominance of institutional reformers and 
advocates.
10
  Affected populations
 
play a less prominent role, although some Roma-
centred organisations have been active at various points, as noted in the case of 
Romani Criss.   There is some involvement by norm promoters, such as the 
representatives of the Bucharest Bar.  
 
While Romania is the biggest country in the case study, both in terms of geography 
and population, this was not matched by a proportionately larger NGO community: 
interviewees noted that it was hard for new NGOs to establish themselves and to 
attract funding.  The NGOs that currently work in this area find it logistically 
challenging, slow and expensive to reach places of detention around the country.
11
   
 
Challenges for civil society 
None of the NGO staff members interviewed in the course of this research reported 
being directly threatened by the state in the course of their work, although relations 
were sometimes chilly.  In 2005, a Romani CRISS representative reported harassment 
by police and city hall officials while monitoring an eviction case.
12
  An interviewee 
in March 2017 said that local authorities had threatened to sue his organisation.
13
   
 
                                                 
10
 Discussed in chapter 3.  See Alison Brysk, ‘Human Rights Defenders and Activism’, in Anja Mihr 
and Matthew Gibney (eds), The Sage Handbook of Human Rights (Sage 2014) 346-347.   
11 Interview with author, Bucharest, March 2017. 
12
 US State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2005: Romania (2005).  
Available at https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005 (accessed 6 February 2017). 
13 Interview with author, Bucharest, March 2017. 
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Government wariness regarding the power of civil society increased in early 2017, 
when it attempted to pass legislation protecting state officials from investigation on 
corruption charges.  There was a huge public outcry, with over half a million people 
turning out to demonstrate.  The protest was successful, with the decree being 
repealed.  In the aftermath, the government barely survived a no-confidence vote in 
Parliament.  One NGO-based observer says that the state “panicked” at the realization 
that civil society could hold it to account.
14
  There were attempts to introduce a law 
criminalising “attempts to impede the constitutional order”, which would effectively 
make public protests illegal; another draft law mandated the closure of any NGO 
which failed to publish twice annual reports on its operating budget.
15
  In November 
2017, the Senate passed a law requiring NGOs to report their sources of revenue, and 
stripping them of eligibility for taxpayer funding if they were deemed to have 
engaged in political advocacy within the last two years.  In March 2018, an 
amendment to the NGO law (Government Ordinance no. 26/2000) increased 
reporting requirements for NGOs, requiring them to report on the detail of their work, 
including the names of their beneficiaries, with substantial fines applicable to 
organisations that failed to comply.
16
 An NGO commentator said “Romania’s civil 
society is being strangled” by these proposed measures.17  The environment is a very 
difficult one for civil society. 
 
                                                 
14 Jonathan Day,  ‘Romanian NGOs on Tenterhooks as Government Takes Aim at Civil Liberties’, 30 
August 2017, Liberties, available at https://www.liberties.eu/en/news/romanian-shrinking-space-civil-
society/12830 (accessed 18 March 2018). 
15 Ibid. 
16 CIVICUS, ‘State Proposes Further Restrictions on NGOs in Latest Amendment to NGO Law’, 13 
March 2018, https://monitor.civicus.org/country/romania/ (accessed 18 March 2018). 
17 Orsolya Reich, ‘Romania’s Civil Society is Being Strangled’, 13 March 2018, available at 
https://www.liberties.eu/en/campaigns/romanian-civil-society-freedom-under-threat-campaign/263 
(accessed 18 March 2018). 
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As common in the region, some of the anti-NGO rhetoric took the form of attacks on 
Soros: a political party leader was reported as saying of Soros in January 2017 that 
“This man and the foundations and structures he has set up….have furthered evil in 
Romania”.18  Soros was accused of the government-affiliated Romania TV of “paying 
dogs to protest” in the earlier anti-corruption demonstrations of 2016.  The television 
station was subsequently fined, but the allegations feed into the backlash rhetoric that 
civil society lacks legitimacy and independence, and is anti-patriotic.
19
 
 
Interviewees distinguished between their relationships with the central authorities, 
such as government ministries, and local authorities.  While partnerships were often 
workable with the former, relations with the latter were more contentious.  There are 
47 local authorities with a degree of autonomy in how they operate in terms of 
managing institutions, police and prosecutors, with central intervention being rare.  
Local authorities were reportedly much less willing to treat the NGOs as partners, 
slower to allow access to institutions under their control, more antagonistic, and less 
receptive to NGO recommendations.  Prosecutors often treated the NGOs as an 
adversary, not taking their evidence into consideration and not accepting that they 
have common goals.
20
   
 
As in Bulgaria, with EU accession, NGOs encountered a new set of difficulties 
involving funding.  At this point, international donors withdrew funding in the 
expectation that EU funding would be available.   EU structural funds were almost 
                                                 
18 Jacob Grandstaff, ‘George Soros’ Romanian Ghosts, Part Two’, online article, Capital Research 
Center, 8 January 2018, available at https://capitalresearch.org/article/george-soross-romanian-ghosts-
part-two/ (accessed 4 March 2018). 
19 Emily Tamkin, ‘Who’s Afraid of George Soros’, Foreign Policy website, 10 October 2017,  
available at http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/10/10/whos-afraid-of-george-soros/ (accessed 4 March 
2018). 
20 Interview with author, Bucharest, March  2017. 
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entirely directed at public agencies and companies.  Although NGOs are eligible 
beneficiaries (thanks to the lobbying of the Romanian NGOs Coalition for Structural 
Funds), in practice, the conditions for eligibility make this very difficult.  Even aside 
from the difficulty of obtaining this funding, NGOs wanting to maintain a critical 
stance regarding the state may fear being compromised by accessing money 
distributed through the state.
21
 
 
One interviewee reported that Romanian politicians were deliberately limiting NGO 
access to EU funding.  According to this view, politicians feel threatened by a strong 
civil society, and fear it will block decisions they want to take, so they make it as hard 
as possible for NGOs to get financial support for their projects.  In particular, the state 
introduced a condition that an organisation applying for funding had to implement at 
least 50% of the project.  NGOs struggled to find resources (or access credit) to pay 
for projects upfront and then claim the money back from structural funds.  Funding 
difficulties are therefore restricting the activities of the NGOs.  The difficulty in 
accessing funding was not as a result of EU rules – it should in principle have been 
easier for NGOs to access EU funding than funding from private donors, as EU rules 
only require a 2% contribution by the recipient compared to a typical 10% 
contribution required by private donors.  The difficulty was created as a result of local 
rules introduced by the Romanian government, leading to the conclusion that it 
represents a state attitude of suspicion towards NGOs, and a desire to limit the 
influence of civil society over the state. 
 
                                                 
21
 NGOs working on trafficking reportedly encountered similar problems with political interference –
NGOs that were critical of the authorities or of the national agency were less likely to be able to access 
the funding disseminated via the national agency (interview with author, Bucharest, March 2017). 
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Civil Society strategies 
 
As in Bulgaria and Albania, civil society more often pursues depth strategies (expert 
input into government strategies) rather the breadth (attempting to mobilise public 
sympathy).  However, there have been instances where abuses have received public 
attention: for example, in 2005 Viorel Gionea was severely beaten by two police 
officers in Constanta, while two other police officers watched. He died of his injuries 
several days later.   Local television stations showed amateur footage of the beating.   
The four officers were disciplined, with one being dismissed from the police force.
22
  
In 2014, a local chief of police resigned after surveillance camera footage showed 
him slapping and kicking a 14-year-old girl at police headquarters. The Directorate 
for the Investigation of Organized Crimes and Terrorism initiated an investigation.  
Tellingly, the 2014 incident also resulted in an investigation aimed at identifying the 
person who had disseminated the footage, suggesting potential victimisation of 
anyone publicising abuses in this way, and rendering it a risky approach for 
organisations.
23
  It is further evidence of a state that reacts to criticism by attempt to 
quash the criticism rather than remove the cause.  Such an attitude necessarily pushes 
civil society towards an outsider approach.  Civil society cannot take an insider stance 
where the government pushes it away.
24
    
 
The relative success of the anti-corruption protests show that an inward-facing 
strategy, ie. aimed at a domestic audience, can be successful, although the subsequent 
                                                 
22 IHF, Annual Report on Human Rights Violations (2006): Romania, 8 June 2006. 
23
 US State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2014: Romania (2015).  
Available at https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2014/  (accessed 8 February 2018). 
24 The IHF 2003 report recounts how APADOR-CH was invited to a hearing of the Senate’s Human 
Rights Committee to present cases of police misconduct it had investigated. APADOR-CH duly gave 
its testimony.  The Senate committee responded by issuing a press statement casting doubt on the 
credibility of some of the cases raised.  What might have been an invitation to a CSO to take an insider 
stance thus ended with it being pushed back into an outsider position: IHF, Annual Report on Human 
Rights Violations (2003): Romania, 24 June 2003. 
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attempts by the government to subdue civil society demonstrate the risks.  The role of 
the EU means that an outwards-facing advocacy strategy is also crucial for civil 
society.  The government is using EU anti-money laundering requirements as a 
pretext for imposing onerous reporting requirements on NGOs: civil society is 
therefore attempting to persuade the EU that it must resist the application of its rules 
by states in this manner.  The Open Society Justice Initiative produced a legal 
briefing for this purpose: drafted by an international organisation, the document was 
endorsed by over 40 local Romanian NGOs, an example of transnational activism in 
operation.
25
 
 
As seen in the previous two chapters, international organisations played a key role in 
putting concerns about torture on the agenda during the early stages of independence, 
followed by an increasingly prominent role for local organisations.  In the early 1990s 
international organisations such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International 
used their reports to draw attention to torture and ill-treatment within the country.   
The Helsinki Watch (later to become HRW) report 1993 noted a “consistent pattern 
of abuse and physical mistreatment” based on its interviews with detainees.26  In 
January 1994, the same organisation issued a report on police lock ups in Romania, 
which found that “[n]early every arrestee reported having been beaten by police 
investigators before arriving at the lockups.”  Amnesty International agreed: its 1993 
report referred to “credible accounts of police brutality contributing to the death of at 
least two detainees”.   In 1995 it released a special report on ill-treatment in 
                                                 
25 See for example Open Society Justice Initiative, Legal Briefing: European Union Law and 
Romanian Draft Law 140/2017 on Associations and Foundations, 31 January 2018, available at 
https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/romania-legal-briefing-20180205.pdf 
(accessed 18 March 2018).   
26 Helsinki Watch, Romania report 1993. 
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Romania.
27
  It reported that the Romanian authorities had taken its concerns seriously, 
responding in October the same year with reports from the Ministry of the Interior, 
the General Prosecutor’s Office and the Ministry of Justice.  These reports contained 
updates on the cases highlighted in AI’s original report, including information that 
new investigations into police abuse had been initiated in some of those cases.  AI 
welcomed this opportunity for “constructive dialogue”.28 
 
Over the next few years, these international organisations relied less on their own 
independent investigations, and provided a platform to disseminate the findings of 
local organisations.  For example, the HRW 2000 report drew on the statistics 
provided by APADOR-CH which showed that in 90 percent of the police abuse cases 
APADOR-CH had monitored over the previous six years, the Military Prosecutor's 
Office had decided not to prosecute.
29
   
 
Parau notes that while civil society had an unprecedented opportunity to change the 
behaviour of the executive in the run-up to the EU accession, the context of a weak 
domestic civil society and a strong executive meant that local activists needed 
considerable input from transnational activist networks in order to be effective.
30
  As 
grassroots organisations in particular have limited capacity to network, she observes 
that they were reliant on their transnational allies proactively initiating them into the 
right networks rather than doing so of their own initiative.
31
 
 
                                                 
27 AI, Romania: Broken Commitment to Human Rights May 1995. EUR 39/01/95. 
28 AI Romania: Update to May 1995 Report, September 1995 EUR 39/19/95. 
29 HRW, World Report 2000: Romania. 
30 Cristina Parau (2009) ‘Impaling Dracula: how EU accession empowered civil society in Romania’. 
West European Politics, 32 (1) 119-141. 
31 Ibid. 
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3. Categories of Activism 
 
(i) Information-based activities 
 
As with its counterparts in Bulgaria and Albania, APADOR-CH publishes annual 
reports on its human rights activities, including information about torture.  Whereas it 
was noted in the previous chapter that the Albanian Helsinki Committee report for 
2014 and 2016 contained language praising the state for its attempts to engage with 
the issue, the APADOR-CH report for 2015 reported that “police abuse has grown 
instead of diminishing in spite of numerous ECHR condemnations…” and features a 
photograph of a man with facial injuries resulting from a police beating.
32
 The 
difference in tone between the Albanian and Romanian reports illustrates the 
difference between organisations pushed into insider and outsider positions.  The 
same year, APADOR-CH published findings from its “Eyes on Police Abuse” project 
on the proportion of complaints of police abuse reaching the courts.
33
  In comparison 
to the Bulgarian Helsinki Committee’s survey data, this information obtained through 
freedom of information requests submitted to police and judicial authorities.  The 
General Inspectorate of Romanian Police refused to respond until APADOR-CH took 
legal action to require them to do so. Compared to Bulgaria, cooperation by the 
authorities with NGO information-gathering appears to be much more reluctant. 
 
(ii) Dialogue activities 
 
Investigating NGOs’ relationships with the Romanian Parliament in the context of 
securing the implementation of ECtHR judgements, Donald and Leach found that 
“NGO representatives almost invariably expressed scepticism about the value of 
                                                 
32 APADOR-CH, 2015 report, 9. 
33 APADOR-CH, Cu ochii pe abuzurile poliţei (July 2015) available at http://www.apador.org/en/sunt-
abuzurile-politei-descurajate-de-autoritati/# (accessed 8 July 2018). 
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engaging with parliament on matters of human rights implementation”.34  They 
reported the view of Romani Criss that it was “fruitless and inefficient” to engage 
with deputies and senators. An APADOR-CH representative explained that the 
difficulty was with the implementation rather than the letter of the law, so it was more 
important to engage with the administration and executive: the parliament was seen as 
having little influence.
35
  Where members of Parliament refer to ECtHR judgements, 
many do so in a “self-interested, partisan, and media-driven” way, and may in fact 
misrepresent the judgements where expedient to do so.
36
  In addition, “policymakers 
frequently ignore recommendations that originate from NGO coalitions”.37  The 
government has also been criticised for its frequent use of emergency ordinances, 
which allows it to adopt legislation without the prior scrutiny of parliament. 
 
(iii) Strategic litigation 
 
Romanian prosecutors remain reluctant to take action in the case of alleged abuses.  
APADOR-CH found that of the 3,034 abuse complaints filed against police between 
2012 and 2014, only 14 went to court and 4 resulted in a conviction for abuse. In 
2015, of 828 complaints about police brutality, only one complaint reached a court.
38
   
                                                 
34 Alice Donald and Philip Leach, Parliaments and the European Court of Human Rights (Oxford 
University Press 2016), 208. 
35 Ibid 208-209. 
36 Ibid 200. 
37 Ibid 94, quoting Freedom House, Nations in Transit: Romania 525, and USAID, Civil Society 
Organization Sustainability Index 2013 – Romania. 
38 APADOR-CH, Cu ochii pe abuzurile poliţei (July 2015) available at http://www.apador.org/en/sunt-
abuzurile-politei-descurajate-de-autoritati/# (accessed 8 July 2018).  Figures provided in English by 
APADOR-CH in an open letter to Nils Muižnieks, Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of 
Europe and Dacian Cioloş, Prime Minister of Romania, dated 10 October 2016.  See APADOR-CH, 
‘The Romanian Prosecutor’s Office (POHCCJ) combats police violence through secret strategy”, 
available at http://www.apador.ch/en/parchetul-combate-abuzurile-politei-printr-o-strategie-secreta/ 
(accessed 3 September 2018). 
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Unsurprisingly, many cases involving a claim of failure to carry out an effective 
investigation end up at the ECtHR.  There have been many repetitive cases, where the 
Romanian authorities have failed to properly execute the judgment. 
 
One interviewee noted that the knowledge base of prosecutors and police did not 
seem to be improving: they lacked knowledge and capacity regarding how to apply 
legislation and abide by international treaties.  According to this interviewee, over the 
last decade, “things are worse if anything”.  In the past, when there was an alleged 
abuse, and where the prosecutor decided against bringing a case or the court found no 
violation, at least there was a detailed prosecution resolution or a proper reasoned 
judgement.  “Now it’s just two sentences.  Even the appearance of legality is 
diminishing.”39  The suggestion is that training is needed both in relation to technical 
knowhow, but also in relation to influencing underlying attitudes.  Another indication 
of incomplete socialisation was offered by a different interviewee. This interviewee 
recounted a conversation with a Norwegian NGO counterpart, who said that when a 
negative ECtHR decision is made, judges and lawyers are embarrassed and want to 
avoid it again.  The interviewee felt that there was no equivalent of this shaming 
effect in Romania. 
 
NGOs have filed applications related to deaths in psychiatric hospitals (including 
winning the right to represent a deceased victim),
40
 attacks on Roma communities 
                                                 
39 Interview with author, Bucharest, March 2017. 
40 The Centre for Legal Resources on Behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu v Romania ECtHR App. No. 
47848/08– a landmark case in setting a precedent allowing NGOs to lodge a case on behalf of victims 
who would not otherwise be able to bring a case.  The victim died in a psychiatric hospital at the age of 
18.  With no other representative, the Court allowed the NGO Centre for Legal Resources to act on his 
behalf to argue a violation of Article 2 ECHR. 
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(the Moldovan case being a particularly important pilot judgment),
41
 and attacks on 
gay pride marches as well as cases of torture and ill-treatment by police.  In Notar v 
Romania, declared admissible in 2003, APADOR-CH assisted the applicant, who was 
ill-treated while still a minor by police officers. Even though the case was settled, it 
led to an important change for complainants: the authorities agreed to change tax 
arrangements for individuals who attempted to sue for damages in domestic courts in 
respect of police abuse.  Before then, the complainant was required to pay advance 
taxes for approximately 10% of the compensation being claimed.  This obviously 
represented a deterrent to cases, as many would-be complainants could not afford the 
payment, in particular as there was no guarantee of being successful in their claim.
42
 
In recent years there have been huge numbers of cases on prison conditions – while 
not usually brought by NGOs as part of a litigation strategy, NGO monitoring reports 
are regularly referred to in the official ECtHR decisions.
43
   
 
The Committee of Ministers was tasked with supervising the execution of a group of 
cases involving attacks on Roma, known as the Barbu Anghelescu (no. 46430/99) 
                                                 
41
 Moldovan v Romania (no.2) ECtHR No. 41138/98 and 64320/01.  Of the two judgments, one 
related to a friendly settlement.   Budapest-based organisation ERRC represented applicants in this 
case, which related to a mob attack on Roma in 1993. Alongside the destruction of homes, there were 
physical attacks on individuals, including one person being burnt alive.  In the friendly settlement the 
government  offered financial compensation and also to take measures to ensure the respect of rights 
guaranteed under the ECHR.  This included: Moldovan v Romania (no 1) para 29: enhancing school 
curriculum to fight discrimination; drawing up programmes for public information to challenge 
stereotypes about Roma; stimulating Roma participation in local society by promoting mutual 
assistance and community development projects; identifying and taking preventative measures in 
relation to conflicts likely to lead to ethnic violence; attempting to improve social conditions for Roma 
generally and this community (in Hădăreni) in particular. Implementation was supervised by the 
Council of Ministers.  The subsequent cases of  Kalanyos and others v Romania, ECtHR App. No. 
57884/00 and in Gergely v Romania ECtHR App. No. 57885/00, involving complaints that the police 
failed to protect applicants, of Roma origin, from attack by non-Roma villagers, were struck out on 
technical grounds, with reference to the fact that the government had been required to take a number of 
measures as a result of the earlier case. 
42 IHF, Annual Report on Human Rights Violations (2005): Romania, 27 June 2005. 
43
For references to NGO reports on detention monitoring, see for example Constantin Tudor v 
Romania, ECtHR App. No. 43543/09, para 52; Geanopol v Romania, ECtHR App. No. 1777/06, para 
37; Vartic v Romania, ECtHR App. No. 12152/05 para 34; Mazâlu v Romania, ECtHR App. No. 
24009/03 para 40; Lăutaru v Romania, ECtHR App. No. 13099/04 para 78; 8 Goh v Romania, ECtHR 
App. No. 9643/03 para 3. 
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group.  In its 2013 report, the Committee of Ministers noted that the awareness 
raising measures and training required by the state as part of its implementation of the 
judgements had failed to eradicate torture and ill-treatment against the Roma.   It 
found that there was still “progress to be made” in order for criminal investigations to 
be deemed effective, and observed that “no conviction for acts prohibited by Articles 
2 and 3 was reported during the reference period (2003 – 2012).”  In 2016, the 
Committee of Ministers closed its supervision of the state’s execution of these 
judgements.  APADOR-CH, European Roman Rights Centre and Romani Criss 
jointly protested that this was premature, due to the ongoing lack of effective 
procedural safeguards against ill-treatment and of an independent investigating 
body.
44
    
 
(iv) Practical Safeguards 
 
The joint statement by APADOR-CH, European Roman Rights Centre and Romani 
Criss about the implementation of the Barbu Anghelescu group of cases summarises 
ongoing civil society concerns in relation to the practical safeguards. They flag up 
two areas of especial concern: the failure to carry out a prompt initial medical 
examination of individuals at the point when they are taken into custody, and the 
obstacles to accessing a forensic medical examination where a detainee alleges ill-
treatment.  They also note ongoing difficulties with conservation of and access to 
CCTV footage from places of detention.
45
   
                                                 
44 APADOR-CH, European Roman Rights Centre and Romani Criss, Memorandum on the 
implementation of the judgments in the group of cases Barbu Anghelescu (no. 46430/99) concerning 
police brutality in Romania, June 2016 available at http://www.errc.org/cms/upload/file/joint-
submission-to-the-council-of-europe-on-implementation-of-police-brutality-judgments-in-romania-
june-2%20016.pdf (accessed 18 March 2018). 
45 Ibid. Here the Memorandum cites Alston, in his Report of the Special Rapporteur on extreme 
poverty and human rights on his mission to Romania (April 2016) https://documentsdds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G16/072/54/PDF/G1607254.pdf?OpenElement  
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Police training on human rights is limited, and there does not appear to be a strong 
tradition of civil society delivery of training to the police.  Although there have been 
some training initiatives, including by NGOs, they are simply not reaching a critical 
mass.  As noted in chapter 2, small countries perform unexpectedly well on human 
rights, and it is possible that one reason is that it is easier to influence a critical mass 
of police officers in a state with a smaller population such as Albania, than in a state 
with a larger population such as Romania.   
 
With regard to monitoring, as noted earlier in the chapter, APADOR-CH is able to 
carry out both announced and unannounced inspections of prisons and police stations, 
while organisations attempting to visit state-run residential homes and deportation 
centres find it much more difficult to gain access.  One interviewee reported that once 
an individual has been formally charged, he or she is processed in the police lock-up 
by specialised staff.  Knowing that there have been convictions for ill-treatment, those 
staff members are keen not to have people in their custody with signs of violence, in 
case they are blamed, and so will readily call doctors and prosecutors where needed.
46
   
APADOR-CH has been involved in a European project led by the Irish Council for 
Civil Liberties with the aim of embedding observers in police stations for periods of 
up to three months to monitor if rights are respected in practice, for example, whether 
detainees are informed of the right to a doctor, whether a lawyer actually turns up 
when summoned and so on.  At the time of the research visit in 2017, attempts were 
underway to get permission from the relevant ministry/prosecutor’s offices to put 
pressure on the police to allow access, as the police themselves were reportedly not 
proving to be very open to access requests.
47
 
                                                 
46 Interview with author, Bucharest, March 2017. 
47 Ibid. 
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Romania was notably tardy in its implementation of the requirement to appoint a 
National Preventive Mechanism (NPM).  It ratified the relevant protocol in 2009 and 
asked for three years rather than the usual two to implement it.  Three years later, it 
still had not done so and had to seek a further extension.  After considering creating a 
new institution for this role, it ended up by rushing through arrangements to add the 
role of NPM to the existing Ombudsman’s office in 2014.  As seen in the other case 
studies, including the NPM within the mandate of the Ombudsman can work well: an 
advantage is that the Romanian Ombudsman’s office has sixteen regional offices, 
making it accessible to victims outside the capital. At the time of appointment, 
however, the Ombudsman’s Office had no experts, no training, and no dedicated 
resources.  The staff assigned to this role had to learn from the more experienced 
NGO monitors how to carry out monitoring.  While a lack of resources also affects 
the NPM in Bulgaria, a significant difference in Romania is the Ombudsman’s (and 
therefore the NPM’s) lack of independence.  In Romania, the Ombudsman is 
politically appointed, and Ombudsmen have been dismissed in the past for political 
reasons.  There is a real concern over its willingness and capacity to be independent 
and criticise the state.  The Romanian Ombudsman has been criticised for its failure 
to comply with the Paris Principles: in response, in January 2018, the state introduced 
a legislative amendment announcing its commitment to ensure full compliance with 
the Paris Principles.
48
  It remains to be seen if this will be implemented in practice. 
Initially the NPM indicated that it would confine itself to pre-announced visits to 
places of detention.  This would have reduced the ability of monitors to identify 
abuses, although it would at least have served as “norm patrol”, in the sense of 
                                                 
48 Romanian Ombudsman, “National Human Rights Institution”, undated statement on website, 
available at 
http://avpoporului.ro/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=441&Itemid=283&lang=en  
(accessed 18 March 2018).   
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offering a regular reminder of the expectation of norm-compliant behaviour.   The 
NPM subsequently amended its approach so it now does a combination of announced 
and unannounced visits.  Having initially announced that its monitoring teams would 
be made up only of government officials, it yielded to NGO protests that this would 
undermine its independence.  It now invites NGOs to take part in monitoring visits, 
although the basis on which invitations are issued is not always clear: some of the 
NGOs invited lack relevant experience of detention monitoring.  In addition, while 
other members of the monitoring teams have their expenses for these visits covered, 
this financial support is not extended to the NGO representatives, which makes their 
participation more financially difficult for the organisations to sustain. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
While civil society faces challenges in Bulgaria, its advocacy has attained a degree of 
traction that is not in evidence in Romania.  State hostility to civil society, and the 
restrictions it imposes, has hindered civil society’s ability to act as a conduit through 
which the state internalises human rights norms, including the prohibition on torture 
and ill-treatment.  When criticised for a human rights violation, the state’s habitual 
reaction is to turn on its critics rather than the perpetrator. Romania appears to be 
taking lessons from countries such as Hungary and Poland in taking measures to 
repress civil society, both in terms of disproportionate reporting requirements and in 
manipulating the dispersal of EU structural funds; such measures are symptomatic of 
a lack of willingness to work in genuine partnership with NGOs. 
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Parau found the prospect of EU accession did allow civil society to wield greater 
influence than previously as a result of new linkages to transnational advocacy 
networks, together with executive self-restraint in anticipation of EU accession.
49
   
She detects that some elements of “persuasion, social influence, socially constructed 
identities, and learning” did take place – the sociological aspect of state change 
highlighted by constructivist theories – and did help to shape state behaviour to a degree.  
However, examining civil society in Romania post-accession, it seems fair to conclude 
that these changes have not become well-embedded.  The prospect of EU accession 
led to hopes that Romania would adopt a more norm-compliant approach, learned 
from its neighbours.  However, there is a competing type of “contagion” in the 
region, whereby states such as Hungary and Poland pass on to their neighbours their 
strategies to suppress civil society.  Romania currently appears more susceptible to 
the latter than the former. 
 
The difference in outcome in Bulgaria and Albania on the one hand, and Romania on 
the other hand, does not seem attributable to less-valid strategic choices on the part of 
Romanian civil society. The strategies used by APADOR-CH are relatively similar to 
those used by its Bulgarian counterpart, but the outcomes are not the same.  One 
difference is BHC’s annual survey of ill-treatment in detention, arguably a uniquely 
effective tool that could be usefully adopted in a context such as Romania. Given the 
access issues, however, along with Romania’s attempts to conceal incidents of ill-
treatment, it is not clear that its use would be permitted by the state authorities. It is 
telling that where access to places of detention is possible (eg. APADOR-CH access 
to prisons), there has reportedly been some improvement. Where access has been 
                                                 
49 Cristina Parau (2009) ‘Impaling Dracula: how EU accession empowered civil society in Romania’. 
West European Politics, 32(1) 119-141. 
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denied (other closed institutions), there does not seem to have been improvement. 
This is important evidence to support the contention that a sufficient degree of access 
is a scope condition for successful activism. 
 
Referring back to the indicators of internalisation, Romania’s progress can be 
summarised as follows:   
Indicator Situation in Romania Progress? 
Actors invoking the norm Norm invoked by organisations 
such as APADOR-CH, and by 
international and regional bodies 
such as UNCAT and CPT; used by 
Romanian lawyers in the context 
of ECtHR.    
 
See however Donald and Leach’s 
finding that Members of 
Parliament sometimes 
misrepresent ECtHR findings for 
their political advantage. 
 
Some progress but 
a mixed picture 
Domestic accountability State’s response to allegations 
defaults to denial rather than 
investigation 
Problematic 
Positive role played by 
NPM 
Lack resources, expertise and 
independence  
Problematic 
 
Compared to Bulgaria and Albania, Romania demonstrates more resistance to the 
involvement of civil society, and consequently seems to have made little or no 
progress along the path leading to internalisation of the norm. 
  
 251 
 
Chapter 8 Macedonia 
 
Of the four states examined in this research, Macedonia experienced the most notable 
decline in its civil society advocacy score, which dropped steadily from 2007 
onwards.  As will be explored in this chapter, this period was marked by a political 
climate which was very hostile to civil society.  Macedonia was initially considered 
an early contender for EU accession, but its political crisis saw its progress halted.  It 
began the period with the best record on torture, as the only one of the four states 
receiving the middle CIRI score in 2000.  As of 2011, it still appeared to be a middle 
performer on torture. This chapter will consider whether as advocacy declined post-
2011, its performance on torture also declined.   
 
The country’s political history has been somewhat tumultuous: for much of its short 
history as an independent state, it has been marked by ethnic tensions, including 
resentment from ethnic Albanians who have often felt excluded from political 
participation.  The police were politicized to the extent that Macedonia has been 
described as essentially a police state during the years 1998-2002.
50
  This small state 
experienced a large-scale influx of refugees arising from the 1999 conflict in Kosovo, 
and 2001 saw the eruption of conflict in Macedonia itself, including serious abuses by 
a special police rapid response unit, known as the Lions.  A peace deal, the Ohrid 
agreement, was struck by the end of 2001.  International players such as the EU, 
NATO and OSCE were keen to avoid another lengthy Balkan conflict and were 
                                                 
50
 Biljana Vankovsk, ‘Security Sector Reform in Macedonia’, in Fluri and Trapans (eds), Defence and 
Security, vol. 2, 26-28, cited in Eirin Mobekk, ‘Police Reform in South East Europe: An Analysis of 
the Stability Pact Self-Assessment Studies’.  Defence and Security Sector Governance and Reform in 
South East Europe Self-Assessment Studies: Regional Perspectives Police Reform in South East 
Europe by Nomos, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) (2005): 155-
168. 
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prepared to support the state to re-establish itself on a peaceful footing.  For the first 
few years, the government seemed to be performing reasonably well on human rights, 
with the provisions of the Ohrid agreement largely being implemented.  Macedonia 
submitted its candidacy for EU membership in 2004 and was formally recognised as a 
candidate in 2005.    
 
The political climate changed in 2008 when Greece resisted Macedonia’s entry into 
NATO on the basis that its name implies territorial aspirations in relation to the Greek 
region which also carries the name of Macedonia.  Greece has adopted the same 
attitude in respect of Macedonian aspirations to join the EU, despite Macedonia’s 
success in securing an ICJ ruling that Greece’s actions were incorrect. The (then) 
ruling party, the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Democratic Party 
for Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE), responded by increasing its 
insistence on the ancient Macedonian lineage of the majority of the population and 
with increasing levels of intolerance for criticism, conflating criticism of the party 
with a failure in patriotism towards the state.  Its hostility to civil society criticism is 
explored in more detail below.  From 2010 the government embarked on an 
expensive campaign (known as “Skopje 2014”) to affirm the country’s identity 
through the erection of huge statues and museums in the capital (considered by many 
Macedonians to be at least partly a money-laundering exercise).  In December 2012 
there were physical scuffles between government and opposition MPs within the 
parliament.  A phone-tapping scandal became public in 2015.  The EU Commission 
described Macedonia in 2016 as a captured state.
51
 
                                                 
51 “Concerns about state capture affecting the functioning of democratic institutions and key areas of 
society persist”: European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the 
Regions, 2016 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy,  Brussels, 9.11.2016 COM(2016) 715 final, 
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There were mass protests in 2015 and 2016, with the latter sometimes referred to as 
the “Colorful Revolution”; traces of paintballs on public buildings (and at the 
entrance to the Macedonian Helsinki Committee office) were visible at the time of the 
research visit in May 2017.  Anti-government rallies were countered by pro-
government rallies.  In March 2017, the EU warned the Macedonian government that 
its ethnically divisive rhetoric amounted to “playing with fire”.52 April 2017 saw 
Macedonian nationalists breaking into the assembly and attacking members of 
Parliament in protest against the election of an ethnic Albanian Speaker.  A 
breakthrough came in May 2017, when the ruling party agreed to the peaceful transfer 
of power to a new coalition government, which included ethnic Albanian 
representation.   
 
Interviewees in May 2017 were optimistic that the installation of a new government 
would lead to a positive human rights “bounce”, at least in the short-term.  They felt 
criticism of human rights practices would be acceptable for the next few years 
because it would reflect on the previous government, as an inherited problem, rather 
on than the current one.  The new government would want to demonstrate its 
legitimacy by implementing visible reforms. Membership of organisations such as 
NATO and EU would be a renewed possibility if such reforms could be 
demonstrated.  There was renewed hope that civil society would be able to engage in 
proper dialogue with government, that its legitimacy will be accepted, that access to 
places of detention would again become possible, that there would be new 
                                                                                                                                           
12.  By contrast, on the same page of the report the European Commission commends Albania’s 
“steady progress” and the fact that “Fundamental rights continue to be broadly respected in the 
country.”   
52 Andrew Rettman, ‘EU to Macedonia: “Stop playing with fire”’, EU Observer, Brussels 22 March 
2017, available at https://euobserver.com/foreign/137332 (accessed 31 March 2018). 
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opportunities for funding, and that proper independent accountability mechanisms 
would be put in place.
53
   
 
1. Trends in torture and advocacy  
 
 
Figure 2 Torture (CIRI scores) and Advocacy in Macedonia (USAID scores) 
 
During the period, the political backdrop sketched above affected the opportunities 
both for civil society advocacy, and the state’s performance on torture.  The graph 
shows that advocacy steadily increased in the run-up to the state’s recognition as an 
EU candidate in 2005, peaking in 2006 and 2007.  As with the other states, there is 
recognition by civil society that the prospect of EU accession represents an important 
opportunity to influence the state.  With the change in the political climate from 2008 
onwards, advocacy began a notable downward trajectory. 
 
In relation to torture, the state’s record deteriorates in 2001, at the time of the conflict.  
This is consistent with the findings in chapter 2 that conflict is strongly associated 
with worse state performance on torture.  The score improves again in 2003, which 
                                                 
53 Interviews with author, Skopje, May 2017. 
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may be largely attributable to the end of the conflict rather than to any specific 
torture-related intervention.  After a further decline in performance in 2005-2007, the 
score improves again from 2008-2011.  If we considered state performance only at 
the time of the CIRI cut-off point in 2011, Macedonia could be considered a relative 
success story, performing on par with Bulgaria and Albania, with all three achieving 
the medium score of 1 as compared to Romania’s score of 0.  However, if we attempt 
to evaluate state performance on torture after that date, the picture becomes quite 
different.  Unfortunately, there is no Macedonian equivalent of the annual Bulgarian 
Helsinki Committee annual survey of abuse reported by detainees.  As with Albania 
and Romania, it is necessary to resort to the wording of the annual US State 
Department Report on Country Practices on Human Rights in order to examine 
trends. 
Year US State Dept Country Report description of torture in Macedonia 
2000 “police occasionally used excessive force during the apprehension of criminal suspects, and 
they occasionally abused prisoners, especially members of ethnic minorities” 
2001 “police frequently used excessive force during the apprehension of criminal suspects and often 
tortured and abused prisoners, especially members of the ethnic-Albanian minority. Police 
beatings of ethnic-Albanian males were common and frequently were conducted with 
implements such as wooden bats, batons, iron bars, and steel cables; such beatings occasionally 
resulted in the death of the victims” 
2002 “police at times used excessive force during the apprehension of criminal suspects and 
sometimes tortured and abused prisoners” 
2003 Ditto 
2004 Ditto 
2005 “police at times used excessive force during the apprehension of criminal suspects and 
sometimes abused prisoners” 
2006 Ditto 
2007 “there were credible reports that police at times used excessive force during the apprehension 
of criminal suspects and that they abused prisoners” 
2008 Ditto 
2009 Ditto 
2010 Ditto 
2011 Ditto 
2012 Ditto 
2013 Ditto 
2014 Ditto 
2015 Ditto 
2016 Ditto 
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From 2011 onwards, the situation with regards to torture and ill-treatment seems to be 
one of stasis and failure to improve.   The Committee for the Prevention of Torture 
issued a report in 2016 that supports this contention.  It is highly critical, categorising 
its relationship with the state as “profoundly dissatisfactory” on the basis that the state 
had repeatedly failed to implement the recommendations that the CPT had been 
making over the years of its visits.  It noted that in Idrizovo Prison in particular, 
“prisoners are not safe”.  The CPT accused the authorities of indifference to this 
situation.
54
 
 
2. Civil Society in Macedonia 
 
According to the 2011 CIVICUS civil society index report, civil society in 
Macedonia was most active in the area of human rights as compared to other areas 
such as poverty eradication.
55
  The sector was strongly networked, and benefitted 
from diverse sources of funding, both from international donors such as the EU, from 
the state, and from membership fees.
56
  However, as with the case studies in previous 
chapters, there was “insufficient involvement” by the public in civil society activities, 
in a society marked by low trust and low inclusion.
57
  Low availability of paid roles in 
CSOs alongside low volunteering rates limited the human capital available within the 
sector, threatening the sustainability of activities.  As with the other states examined 
                                                 
54
 CPT, Report to the Government of ‘the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’ on the visit to “the 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” carried out by the European Committee for the Prevention 
of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) from 6 to 9 December 2016, 
CPT/Inf (2017) 30 Strasbourg, 12 October 2017, 23. 
55 CIVICUS, Civic Engagement – Long Road to Go: CIVICUS Civil Society Index Report for the 
Republic of Macedonia (Macedonian Center for International Cooperation, Skopje March 2011) 51. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid 52. 
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in this research, accountability was primarily construed in terms of foreign donors 
rather than a local constituency.
58
 
 
As in the other states examined here, a limited number of NGOs work on the issue of 
torture and ill-treatment.  During its ad hoc and period visits, the Committee for the 
Prevention of Torture met the following organisations: 
 
Year  Organisations met 
2016 Ad hoc 
None listed 
2014 Periodic 
Macedonian Helsinki Committee 
Poraka (Centre for the Support of Persons with Mental 
Disabilities) 
2011 Ad hoc 
None listed 
2010 Periodic 
Centre for support of persons with intellectual disability - PORAKA 
Civil Society Research Centre 
Macedonian Helsinki Committee 
2008 Follow up to the 2006 and 2007 visits 
Macedonian Helsinki Committee 
2007 Ad hoc 
None listed 
2006 Periodic 
Macedonian Helsinki Committee  
Centre for support of persons with intellectual disability - PORAKA  
Organisation for Support of People with Mental Illnesses 
"Welcome"  
Civil Society Research Center 
2004 Ad hoc 
Macedonian Helsinki Committee for Human Rights  
Civic Society Resource Centre (CSRC) 
2002 Periodic 
Macedonian Helsinki Committee for Human Rights 
Civic Society Resource Centre (CSRC) 
Macedonian Psychiatric Association 
2001 Ad hoc 
Local 
- Association for Human Rights Protection of Roma 
- Civil Society Resource Centre 
                                                 
58 Ibid. 
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- Macedonian Helsinki Committee for Human Rights 
- Natyra 
 
International 
- Human Rights Watch 
Table 2: CSOs with whom the CPT held meetings during its monitoring visits  
(Source: CPT reports).  The names are reproduced as they appear in the CPT reports, so in some 
cases are reproduced differently across different visits. 
 
Using Brysk’s typology, we again see a leading role for institutional reformers such 
as the Helsinki Committee.  There are advocates, a “conscious constituency” 
prepared to lobby governments on behalf of victims who cannot speak for themselves 
(Human Rights Watch in 2001).  Affected populations include a Roma-centred 
organisation (Association for Human Rights Protection of Roma) and Pareko, an 
organisation of the parents and families of individuals with intellectual disabilities.  
There is a professional norm promoter in the form of the Macedonian Psychiatric 
Association. 
 
Challenges for Civil Society 
Across the sector as a whole, activism is often associated with political and ethnic 
allegiances.  The Macedonian Centre for European Training argues that the ruling 
political party has deliberately stymied the development of authentic local civic 
activism that transcends such ethnic or party concerns.  It has done so by 
manipulating the public discourse to discredit genuine social movements; where 
protests have taken place, the ruling party has also responded by sponsoring counter-
protests aimed at serving the party’s own purposes.59  An example of this response 
                                                 
59 Macedonian Centre for European Training, Traitors, Hirelings and Sandwich-Protestors: Civil 
Activism in the Macedonian Public Discourse (Foundation Open Society - Macedonia 2013), 5 et seq.  
One interviewee pointed out that the organisation responsible for researching and writing this 
publication perceives itself as the victim of the government actions it describes: this report should not 
necessarily be read as an objective, academic account of the situation.  However, NGOs’ own 
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was seen in the protests that followed the killing of a young man named Martin 
Neskovski by a police officer on the night of 5-6 June 2011, during celebrations for 
VMRO-DPMNE’s electoral victory in the city centre.  The Ministry of the Interior 
first denied the incident, admitting it only two days after the event.  The perception of 
an official cover-up led to street protests over the rest of the summer.  According to 
the Macedonian Center for European Training, the governing party claimed that the 
protestors belonged to the opposition and were cynically making political capital out 
of the death: a governing party-backed counter-protest duly took place outside the 
opposition headquarters, denouncing the politicisation of the young man’s death.60  
The culprit received a 14-year prison sentence, and the case was noted in the 
European Commission’s Progress Report for the Republic of Macedonia 2011, but 
the other demands of the protesters against police brutality, such as increased civil 
oversight in relation to the Ministry of the Interior, were not met. 
 
According to the analysis of the Macedonian Center for European Training, much of 
the coverage in government-backed media focused on anti-NGO narratives, even 
though NGOs were not part of the initial protests.
61
  One newspaper article referred to 
the perils presented by “a strong non-governmental sector, which in our country could 
be disastrous.  A strong non-governmental sector in a weak country can create 
chaos”.62  Colonising the high moral ground, commentators accused NGOs of 
distastefully “attempt[ing] to score political points on the brutal murder of an 
innocent young man”.63   
                                                                                                                                           
perceptions of their working environment are relevant to this account: all references to this publication 
should be understood in this context. 
60 Ibid 22. 
61 Ibid 24-25. 
62 Ibid 25.  English translation by the author of the report.  
63 Ibid and ditto. 
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As in Bulgaria and Romania, the figure of Soros represented a bogeyman in the 
government-backed media: protestors were “Soros vultures” and Soros was portrayed 
as bankrolling protest lacking genuine indigenous roots.
64
  Individuals motivated to 
protest police brutality were portrayed as “sorosoid-instigated, ill-intended, politically 
motivated”.65  In the view of the Macedonian Center for European Training, this 
discouraged potential protestors, and “controlled the hegemonic discourse”.66  The 
fact that the MHC supported the protest along with the main opposition party led to 
suggestions of a conspiracy to overthrow the ruling party.
67
  Activists were 
stigmatised as the Other, as dangerous agitators: criticism of the ruling coalition was 
conflated with criticism of the state, so protestors became portrayed as anti-patriotic - 
traitors to their homeland. Then Prime Minister Gruevski argued that instead of 
looking to foreign donors, local civil society should rely only on government funding, 
a measure which would have significantly eroded the independence of the sector.
68
 
 
According to CIVICUS, other government-backed attempts to colonise the civil 
society space include Stop Operation Soros (SOS), launched in January 2017 to 
promote claims that Soros was bankrolling the opposition by channelling funding 
through NGOs;  the pseudo-protest movements Movement Tvrdokorni and Ilinden 4: 
Civic Initiative for Common Macedonia (holding protests which promoted the 
government agenda); and the registration of two new pro-government organisations, 
the Association National Front – Prilep Municipality and Foundation Macedonian 
                                                 
64 Ibid 26. 
65 Ibid 28. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid 25-26. 
68 Ellery Roberts Biddle and Filip Stojanovski, ‘Despite regime change, Macedonia still reeling from 
persecution’, IFEX, 4 January 2018, available at https://www.ifex.org/macedonia/2018/01/04/civi-
society-persecuted/  (accessed 31 March 2018) 
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Heritage Todor Aleksandrov.
69
  This phenomenon of GONGOS – government-
organised “NGOs” – was previously noted in chapter 4.70 
 
Government suspicion and hostility has also found expression through aggressive 
financial inspections.  According to the US State Department report 2016, shortly 
before the December elections, the Public Revenue Office announced it would audit 
NGOs associated with the civil society-led campaigns "We Decide," "We Deserve 
Better," and "The Citizens of Macedonia”.  The opposition party SDSM subsequently 
stated that forty-two members of the opposition who had expressed criticism of the 
previous government were themselves subject to audits and investigations. The US 
State Department noted that “Critics of the audits, including the ombudsman, called 
them a ‘witch hunt’ and urged public institutions not to serve the interests of the 
political parties or their members.”71  The Public Prosecutor attempted to establish 
funding link with USAID/Soros to make a case that MHC was financially backed to 
support the opposition.
72
  The Tax Revenue office came to Macedonian Helsinki 
Committee office to inspect its accounts and, at the time of the research visit in May 
2017, was still present in their offices after seven months.  
 
Assessing the situation of Roma health activists, Abdikeeva and Covaci note that 
these individuals too “face harassment and pressures in the form of audits and 
                                                 
69
 CIVICUS, ‘Foundation Open Society Macedonia: “Civil Society Under Unprecedented Attack”’, 
CIVICUS Monitor website, 5 April 2017, available at 
https://monitor.civicus.org/newsfeed/2017/04/05/foundation-open-society-macedonia-civil-society-
under-unprecedented-attack/  (accessed 31 March 2018). 
70 See Julia Kreienkamp, Responding to the Global Crackdown on Civil Society, Policy Brief 
September 2017, Global Governance Institute 8. 
71 US State Department Reports on States Human Rights Practices 2016. 
72 Interview with author, Skopje, May 2017.  See also Civicus Monitor ‘Foundation Open Society 
Macedonia: “Civil Society Under Unprecedented Attack”’, 5 April 2017, https://monitor.civicus.org 
(accessed 28 May 2017) and OMCT Urgent Intervention - Macedonia: Smear campaign and 
administrative harassment against the Macedonian Helsinki Committee (MHC), 28 February 2017. 
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negative media coverage aimed at stifling their activism”, with some activists facing 
further threats, “such as the prospect of family members losing their jobs, and even 
threats of violence if they continue participating in rallies and demonstrations.”73  In 
April 2017, the Executive Director of Foundation Open Society Macedonia described 
Macedonia civil society as facing “unprecedented attack”, resulting in a closing of the 
available civil space.
74
 
 
The ruling party’s agreement to a peaceful transfer of power in May 2017 ended the 
political deadlock affecting the country, with a coalition government taking power.  
In June 2017, twenty-one NGOs affected by the “unwarranted, multiple financial 
inspections” described above held a press conference to demand “an impartial inquiry 
into the unjustified political pressure placed on civil society under the previous 
government” and for clarification and reform of the grounds on which the authorities 
could inspect NGOs.  The sector expressed optimism that the new coalition 
government would offer a more welcoming and enabling environment for civil 
society activism.
75
  In July 2017, the new government published its “Plan 3-6-9”, 
which explicitly referred both to the recommendation of EU institutions and 
consultations with civil society, pledging inter alia that: 
 The Government will treat the civil society as an equal partner and corrector of its 
decisions, with the full right of the civil society to participate in the policy-making 
                                                 
73
 Alphia Abdikeeva and Alina Covaci, ‘The Impact of Legal Advocacy Strategies to Advance Roma 
Health: The Case of Macedonia’ (2017) Health and Human Rights Journal 19(2), 99–110. 
74 CIVICUS Monitor, ‘Foundation Open Society Macedonia: “Civil Society Under Unprecedented 
Attack" ‘, CIVICUS Monitor website, 5 April 2017, available at 
https://monitor.civicus.org/newsfeed/2017/04/05/foundation-open-society-macedonia-civil-society-
under-unprecedented-attack/  (accessed 31 March 2018). 
75 Balkan Civil Society Development Network, ‘Cautious signs of improvements in respect for 
freedom of association’, CIVICUS Monitor website, 31 July 2017, available at 
https://monitor.civicus.org/newsfeed/2017/07/31/cautious-signs-improvements-respect-freedom-
association/  (accessed 31 March 2018). 
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process, to suggest and to criticize. The Government intends to make the dialogue 
with the civil society continued, transparent and fully inclusive.76 
 
At the time of writing, it is too early to say how long it will take civil society to fully 
recover from the difficulties faced over the last few years.  If the new government 
fulfils its commitment, Macedonia may be able to offer a hopeful example to show 
that the narrowing of civil space need not be a permanent one. 
 
Civil Society Strategies 
 
As with the case studies, much of the advocacy on torture and ill-treatment is carried 
out by a small number of experts in CSOs: the depth strategy discussed previously.  
However, the protests against police brutality that followed the death of Martin 
Neskovski show that wider public mobilisation has also played a role (breadth 
strategy).  While it did little to change the actions of the then government, it created 
expectations for what the successor government would need to do in order to be 
legitimate.
77
   
 
The government’s hostility to the civil society sector up to 2017 has made it virtually 
impossible for organisations to adopt an insider approach (save for government-
sponsored organisations with no real independence or willingness to criticise the 
authorities).  CSOs were forced into an outsider approach.  The findings here support 
                                                 
76
 Government of the Republic of Macedonia, ‘Plan 3-6-9’, 4 July 2017, downloaded in English via 
Ellery Roberts Biddle and Filip Stojanovski, ‘Despite regime change, Macedonia still reeling from 
persecution’, IFEX, 4 January 2018, available at https://www.ifex.org/macedonia/2018/01/04/civi-
society-persecuted/  (accessed 31 March 2018). 
77
 “These protests have tended to shape public opinion in becoming critical of the government’s 
policies rather than in persuading the government to reverse its decisions” - Aneta Cekik and Lidija 
Hristova, ‘The current state of civil society in Macedonia and its distinctive patterns of development’ 
in Danica Fink-Hafner (ed) The Development of Civil Society in the Countries on the Territory of the 
Former Yugoslavia since the 1980s (Faculty of social sciences, Ljubljana 2015), 199. 
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Kitschelt’s argument, set out in chapter 3, that the strategies used by social 
movements are largely determined by the political openings in the state in question.
78
  
He notes that activists tend to preferentially use insider strategies where possible, and 
are most effective where they have the most access to formal political decision-
making.  The outsider stance is adopted faute de mieux rather than as a matter of 
choice.  The sector’s outsider strategies was a manifestation of its tense relationship 
with the state: while there was little opportunity to change governmental policy or 
actions in the short-term, when viewed over the longer term, the sector’s demands 
helped to frame expectations for the new government once it took power.  With the 
new government’s expressed openness to civil society from 2017 onwards, it is to be 
expected that CSOs will move to more insider strategies, although it is too early to 
identify whether this is in fact taking place. 
 
The sector’s criticism of the VMRO-DPMNE government can be understood in terms 
of the boomerang model: inwards-facing activism directed at the state gained little or 
no traction, but outwards-facing critiques directed at the EU and other actors were 
redirected back towards the state (see for example the EU’s warning that the state was 
“playing with fire” in 2017) and eventually made its position untenable. 
 
The three previous case studies featured a pattern whereby in the early 1990s, 
international organisations drew attention to the issue of torture and ill-treatment, 
with local organisations subsequently leading the way in reporting on the issue.  
Amnesty International noted in its country reports in 1994 and 1995 and again in 
1998 that the torture and ill-treatment of ethnic Albanian detainees was a particular 
                                                 
78
 Herbert Kitschelt, ‘Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest: Anti-nuclear Movements 
in Four Democracies’ (1986) British Journal of Political Science 16(1), 57-85. 
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concern, and it issued a full-length report on this issue in 2000.
79
  In 2001 and 2002, it 
published reports focusing on the ill-treatment of Roma.
80
  In 2002, the organisation 
issued a report on abuses by paramilitaries,
81
 and in 2002 and 2003 it published 
reports on the ill-treatment of ethnic minorities (ethnic Albanians, ethnic Turkish and 
Roma).
82
  Amnesty’s focus then shifted to issues such as the state’s complicity in the 
US rendition programme,
83
 attacks on gay people,
84
 and the abuse of migrants and 
asylum-seekers.
85
 Its 2017/18 report reproduces information provided by the 
Hungarian-based European Roma Rights Centre and the European Committee for the 
Prevention of Torture.
86
  Human Rights Watch has followed a similar trend: a report 
on police violence in 1998,
87
 concerns about attacks on LGBTI activists,
88
 and more 
recently concern regarding police violence against refugees and migrants.
89
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The situation differs from the states examined in previous chapters in that there is less 
evidence for the reporting baton being handed over to local organisations in recent 
years.  While AI’s 2017/18 report referred to two other sources (European Roma 
Rights Centre and CPT), neither are local to Macedonia.  It is instructive to compare 
how the US State Department cites the Macedonian Helsinki Committee compared to 
its citations of Bulgarian Helsinki Committee in its 2016 reports.  For Bulgaria, the 
US State Department makes multiple references to the BHC’s reports on the situation 
of detainees (along with a reference to the attack on BHC President Krasimir Kanev).  
For Macedonia, the US State Department does not quote from the Macedonian 
Helsinki Committee’s reports, but mentions its limited access to detainees, the arrest 
of one of its former members, and the questioning of some of its current members in 
connection with the protests.  In Bulgaria, the local organisation has more obviously 
taken over as the primary monitor and reporter of abuses, while in Macedonia this is 
not the case, and the organisation features in this international reportage more as a 
victim of abuse than a source of information about the abuse of others. In another 
instance of the role that international organisations continue to play given the 
constraints on local organisations, the CPT met HRW during its monitoring visit to 
Macedonia in 2001.  The CPT more commonly meets only locally-based 
organisations during its visits. 
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3. Categories of Activism 
 
(i) Information activities 
NGOs’ ability to investigate and disseminate information about abuses was 
constrained by their lack of access to places of detention, described in more detail in 
the section on monitoring, below.  While the Macedonian Helsinki Committee’s 
September 2015 report refers to police abuses in a prison, the organisation is 
repeating the outcome of recent decisions by the ECtHR rather than providing new 
information based on its own findings.
90
  MHC published a 2013 report based on its 
visits to psychiatric institutions,
91
 and as of 2018 was publishing monthly reports on 
the situation of refugees, migrants and asylum-seekers,
92
 but the denial of access to 
police stations and prisons severely restricted its ability to acquire and publish direct 
information about abuses in the criminal justice system. 
 
As in Romania, organisations were able to make use of freedom of information 
requests to uncover some useful data.  In 2015, the Macedonian Helsinki Committee 
wrote to all 26 courts and 22 public prosecutors’ offices, receiving replies from about 
75%.  They were informed that from 2009-2015 there were approximately 70 
complaints lodged relating to torture, leading to 30 investigations and 8 convictions, 
none of which resulted in time being served (any sentences were suspended).
93
   
                                                 
90 MHC, Quarterly Report on Human Rights in the Republic of Macedonia, September 2015, 4. 
91 MHC Report on the visit of the Helsinki Committee to the special institutions and psychiatric 
hospitals in the Republic of Macedonia for 2011 and 2012, 12 February 2013. 
92 Available on website at www.mhc.org.mk/pages/ (accessed 8 July 2018). 
93 Interview with author, Skopje, May 2017. 
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Further inhibiting information strategies is the fact that, as in Romania, prisoners 
reportedly fear that reporting abuse will lead to reprisals.
94
  The CPT’s report of its 
2011 visit stated that “prisoners were clearly convinced that complaining would 
aggravate their situation and lead to reprisals.”  According to one of the interviewees 
for this research, even when torture is obvious, it gets covered up.
95
   Where 
organisations are prevented from carrying out their own monitoring, they are in a 
much weaker position to refute state denials about abuse.  They may uncover 
individual instances, but it is harder to make the case that it is part of a systematic 
problem, and harder to propose system-wide solutions. 
 
(ii) Dialogue strategies 
 
The state’s willingness to engage in dialogue with NGOs also shows a similar 
downward trajectory over the period under scrutiny.  In its response to the CPT’s 
2001 visit, the state said that three working meetings were held between 
representatives of the uniformed police and those of the civil society, with the 
purpose of improving cooperation between NGOs and police.
96
  By contrast, there is 
no equivalent in the state’s response to the CPT’s 2016 visit.  It is evident that once 
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 CPT, Report to the Government of “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” on the visit to 
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the political climate became more hostile in 2008, NGOs had reduced opportunities to 
engage in training and dialogue with state agents.   
 
(iii) Strategic litigation 
Prior to the Criminal Code of 2013, if a prosecutor refused to bring charges, an 
individual could still take the complaint to court.  This happened a few times, 
although with little success, and trials were unduly extended.  Since the introduction 
of this Code, an individual may not bring a case in lieu of the prosecutor, so 
everything depends on the prosecutor’s decision.  If the prosecutor is not willing to 
bring charges, this decision cannot be appealed.  The only recourse is ECtHR, and 
there have been a number of cases where the victim successfully established a breach 
of Article 3 due to the state’s failure to investigate.97  Most cases are brought by 
individual lawyers rather than NGOs as part of a litigation strategy: MHC’s difficulty 
in getting access to prisoners and prisoners’ fear of retribution mean that this is not a 
significant part of their strategy.  The Budapest-based European Roma Rights Centre 
has however successfully taken cases to the ECtHR and in at least one case, it worked 
alongside a local Macedonian organisation, the Štip Association for the Protection of 
Roma Rights.
98
 
                                                 
97 Asllani v The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, ECtHR App. no. 24058/13; Hajrulahu v The 
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supported the applicant in Sulejmanov v The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, ECtHR App. 
no. 69875/01 and Jasar v The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, ECtHR App. no.69908/01.  In 
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in less than a month involving the suspicious death of a young Romani man…..There were accusations 
from sources within the prison….that he was being mistreated by the prison guards and doctors.  He 
was reportedly not getting enough food as the guards were taking it away from him…..The doctor is 
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(iv) Practical safeguards 
The years immediately after the Ohrid agreement of 2001 saw opportunities for 
training, along with international support in areas such as police reform.  The US-run 
International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program had already started 
providing technical expertise to the police and training the trainers in 2000 and 
developed a professional standards unit.  The OSCE created a Police Development 
Unit assigning trainers and advisers to field stations.  By July 2003, around 1270 
police officers had undertaken training by the OSCE together with the Ministry of the 
Interior.
99
  The state reported to the CPT that local NGOs were involved in these 
training initiatives: in 2002 the Macedonian Helsinki provided a 2-day workshop on 
police powers to stop and search, and led work to create a human rights manual for 
Macedonian police.
100
 The same year, the NGO Center for Open Communication ran 
a seminar on policing multi-ethnic communities, with Open Society Institute 
funding.
101
   By contrast, in the state’s response to the CPT after its 2016 visit, it lists 
a number of training initiatives, but makes no reference to NGO involvement.
102
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for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) on its visit 
 271 
 
Much of the state training is led by internal staff, although their response mentions 
the involvement of “three international consultants”103 and a study visit to Ireland.104  
While potentially valuable, international training support is necessarily limited in 
duration, in contrast to the ongoing engagement of domestic civil society. Domestic 
civil society engagement helps to build relationships between local NGOs and with 
state actors: police, prison officers and Ministry officials, both senior and frontline 
staff, as well as with the NPM, as evident in the Albania case study.  Where the same 
organisations carry out detention monitoring and also training activities, the 
knowledge derived from their monitoring visits helps to ensure that the training 
addresses the kind of problems that arise in practice within the local context.  Chapter 
6 notes that in the course of delivering training, the Albanian Helsinki Committee 
identified problematic attitudes by some police officers towards the ill-treatment of 
prisoners, and drew this to the attention of the Minister of Interior and the Director 
General of the State Police.  Training carried out primarily or exclusively by 
international actors lacks this dimension.  If norms are presented as international 
expectations rather than local demands, state officials remain subject to rationalist 
logic: standards must be met to appease external observers.  It represents a missed 
opportunity to support the internalisation of norms, so that the new “logic of 
appropriateness” can take over in line with the constructivist approach. 
 
In the report of its 2014 visit, the CPT  noted that there had been improvement in the 
rights of access to a lawyer and a doctor, the right to have a third party notified of the 
detention, and the right to be informed of these rights, but “more remains to be 
                                                                                                                                           
to "the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" from 21 September to 1 October 2010, CPT/Inf 
(2012) 5, Strasbourg, 25 January 2012, 7-8. 
103 Ibid 5. 
104 Ibid. 
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done”.105  Many detainees alleged that they were denied access to a lawyer during the 
initial 24-hour detention period, while some said that there were not allowed to 
consult their lawyer at any point prior to the court hearing.
106
  Without a state-wide 
system of legal aid, access to a lawyer was “purely theoretical” for many.107  Some, 
although not all, interviewees reported being granted access to a doctor; police 
officers were reportedly present during all medical examinations of police detainees, 
which is likely to inhibit allegations of ill-treatment.
108
  The right to have a third party 
such as a family member informed of one’s detention was not always applied in 
practice.
109
  The CPT delegation noted that it was positive that police were now 
providing information sheets on the rights of detainees in multiple languages at the 
police stations visited, but it continued to receive complaints from some individuals 
that they had not been provided with this information.
110 
 
From 2004, the OSCE supported the Human Rights Project, which brought together 
five civil society organisations to support victims of police mistreatment.  The project 
enabled the provision of legal assistance to victims; organisations took complaints to 
relevant bodies, such as the internal police oversight mechanism/Ombudsman/Office 
of the Public Prosecutor.  In light of ECtHR cases criticising Macedonia for a 
procedural breach of art 3 ECHR (failure to investigate), OSCE pushed for the 
creation of independent oversight mechanisms, including the creation of a special unit 
within the public prosecutor’s office or and independent commission and an oversight 
                                                 
105
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mechanism at parliamentary level.  It also supported capacity-building at the 
Ombudsman’s office.   
 
With regard to monitoring, according to the US State Department report 2016, 
doctors, diplomatic representatives, the CPT and the ICRC have access to pre-trial 
detainees, with the approval of the investigative judgement.  NGOs such as the 
Helsinki Committee have much more limited access: there needs to be a direct 
request from the individual detainee.  This represents a significant curtailment of the 
organisation’s previous right to monitor: it used to visit prisons until 2011, when the 
Director for the Execution of Sanctions (a member of the ruling party) refused them 
further access.  In 2013, MHC was allowed to meet prisoners in visiting rooms, but 
this access was also withdrawn.  At the time of the research visit in 2017, MHC was 
unable to carry out detention monitoring in police stations and prisons, although it 
was able to visit psychiatric institutions.
111
 
 
In its account of its 2014 visit, the CPT noted with concern that the state commission 
which had been tasked with conducting monitoring visits to oversee the 
implementation of the 2006 Law on Execution of Sanctions had still not been 
established, more than eight years after the legislation was passed.
112
  Macedonia 
ratified OPCAT in December 2008 and designated the Ombudsman as NPM.  The 
NPM began operation in 2011, but had no dedicated budget line until 2013.   At the 
time of CPT’s 2014 visit there were three NPM positions, one of which was vacant.  
While it could invite professional experts to assist it with its monitoring visits, its 
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budget was insufficient to cover such costs.
113
  In its June 2016 report, the NPM 
noted that two members had left and one was on long-term sickness leave. The 
Ministry of Finance was not acceding to the Ombudsman’s request to have the vacant 
post filled.  While the NPM was managing to do some visits thanks to a seconded 
member of staff from elsewhere in the Ombudsman’s office, this lack of personnel 
clearly impacted the NPM’s ability to carry out its monitoring functions.  As a result 
of the influx of refugees and migrants, UNHCR was providing funding to the NPM as 
of mid-2017 on a short-term basis (funded till the end of the year), but its staff were 
reportedly young and inexperienced, and much of their detention monitoring focused 
(in line with the funding arrangement) on places where migrants and refugees were 
held.
114
 
 
3. Conclusion 
 
Chapter one noted that certain scope conditions need to be met in order for civil 
society activism to be successful in constraining torture and ill-treatment.  Amongst 
other conditions, there needs to be sufficient democracy to incentivize political elites 
to accede to demands to restrain abuses.  While this criterion was met at the start of 
the period under examination, this was no longer the case from 2008, with the capture 
of the state by ethnic Macedonian interests.  In such a context, activism struggled to 
make an impact.  The state offers an example of how actors hostile to human rights 
changes may counter-mobilise by means of a competing discourse based on stability 
and sovereignty.  Civil society actors were delegitimized through their portrayal as 
cat’s paws for sinister international actors: they were unpatriotic “Sorosoids”, and the 
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civil society sector required “deSorosification”.  As in Romania, it was not possible 
for civil society to achieve the purchase needed to influence the state. 
 
NGOs were prevented from accessing places of detention, and thus unable to 
undertake the process of norm patrol. The government attempted to show that it was 
complying with international requirements by designating the Ombudsman as NPM, 
but the NPM struggled to work effectively given the lack of funds and personnel.  
The CPT was allowed to access places of detention, but in 2016 was reporting that its 
recommendations were not being followed.  As in Romania, detainees were fearful of 
reprisals in response to complaints.   
 
A negative inference can be drawn here: the lack of monitoring has led to a lack of 
progress in tackling concerns related to torture and ill-treatment.   The lack of 
monitoring means that abuses are not detected and reported, and there is also no real 
deterrence.  It also limits the opportunities for civil society actors to build up 
relationships with the police and prison service.  It blocks off channels through which 
norms can become internalised by state agents.  Inability to monitor also limits other 
forms of activism – even if a CSO was invited to participate in training and dialogue 
with the state, it has less to contribute when it does not have the  intimate knowledge 
of the context derived from monitoring activities. Strategic litigation is difficult where 
there is reduced access to detainees and where detainees fear retribution.   
 
Applying the indicators of internalisation set out in the Introduction, Macedonia’s 
record is as follows:   
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Indicator Situation in Macedonia Progress? 
Actors invoking the norm Invoked by civil society and other 
actors; however the state has made 
efforts to discredit/delegitimise 
those invoking human rights norms 
as unpatriotic. 
Problematic 
Domestic accountability Few examples of effective 
accountability measures. 
Problematic 
Positive role played by 
NPM 
Extremely curtailed by lack of 
resources and relevant expertise.  
Problematic 
 
Macedonia is the negative case that supports the hypothesis: civil society has been 
blocked from taking the actions (especially detention monitoring) that are associated 
with improvements in the state’s performance on torture and ill-treatment.  In this 
environment, progress accordingly stalled, according to the evidence of the CPT 
reports. 
 
EU support and the prospect of EU accession were important in ending the 2001 
conflict and the state’s improved record in the years immediately afterwards.  
Greece’s opposition to Macedonian membership first of NATO, then of the EU, led 
to an angry backlash by the government.  Chapter 1 noted Goodman and Jinks’ 
suggestion that a state’s compliance with norms on the basis of its desire to join the 
EU could be an instance of external incentives crowding out internal motivation.
115
  If 
a state was carrying out reforms in order to position itself for EU membership, what 
would happen, they asked, when EU membership becomes less attainable or less 
desirable?  Would the impetus for reform also drop away?  The answer in the 
Macedonian context seems to yes, at least in the short term.   
 
                                                 
115 Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks, ‘How to Influence States: Socialization and International Human 
Rights Law’ (2004), Duke Law Journal, vol. 54 no 3, 621; Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks, 
Socializing States: Promoting Human Rights Through International Law (OUP 2013). 
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However, identity formation is complex and far from unidirectional.  When the new 
coalition government took power in 2017, its “Plan 3-6-9” reiterated its commitment 
to EU accession and to engagement with civil society.  At this point at least, both 
elements were posited as aspects of the state’s revised self-identity as a modern 
European state of good standing in the international community, a suggestion that 
there is an opportunity for the logic of constructivism to take hold, and that the state 
will be prepared to adhere to norms because norm-compliant behaviour fits with its 
preferred self-perception.  Such an outcome is of course far from inevitable: the 
counter-narrative that uses ethnic chauvinism to appeal to sovereignty remains a 
threat for the future.  At the time of writing, however, Macedonia offers hope that the 
narrowing of civic space across the region and beyond is reversible. 
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Chapter 9   Conclusions  
The overarching purpose of this research has been to explore when and how civil 
society activism can act as a driver for a better state performance on torture.  What are 
the pathways for this influence, and what conditions must exist for the activism to 
have an impact?   
 
1. Summary of Findings 
 
 
Chapter one noted the existence of a number of scope conditions for reform, including 
the absence of armed conflict, the existence of a demand that the state restrain abuse, 
and the presence of a sufficient level of democracy to incentivise political elites to pay 
heed to that demand, along with a civil society capable of articulating that demand 
effectively.  Political will to end abuse must be accompanied by institutional capacity 
to bring about the required change.    Chapter two demonstrated that states with higher 
levels of civil society advocacy usually have a better record on torture.  Controlling 
for conflict, population size and levels of democracy, the evidence also showed that 
states with more openness to civil society activism also tend to perform better on 
torture than states that are less receptive to civil society input.  Tracking progress over 
a five-year period, changes in the openness to activism score tend to be reflected in a 
corresponding change in the torture score. 
 
Building on these findings, chapter three examined the mechanisms through which 
civil society exerts influence over state practices, including a typology of 
organisational strategies.  This set the scene for the four country case studies: did their 
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differential levels of advocacy predict their outcomes on torture?  On paper, 
conditions for reform seemed ripe in the four states at the outset of the period. All 
aspired to EU membership during the period, and two achieved it.  All four states 
were therefore materially and socially vulnerable to international influence.  Aspiring 
EU member states are subject to rhetorical entrapment in relation both to human 
rights and to the principle of civic participation, creating space for civil society actors 
to assert that torture reform matters for the “Europeanisation” process.  Despite these 
important similarities, however, the states did not all demonstrate the same trajectory.  
State performance on torture improved in Bulgaria and Albania, but not in Romania 
and Macedonia.  The fact that the two states which acceded to the EU (Bulgaria and 
Romania) performed differently to each other, as did the two states which aspire to 
accession but who have not achieved it (Albania and Macedonia) is significant, 
because it shows that torture performance is not satisfactorily explained by a state’s 
efforts to meet EU accession criteria or ongoing conditionality measures once 
membership is achieved, or by the phenomenon of post-accession backsliding.  The 
outcomes are in line with the prediction derived from the hypothesis that more 
advocacy means better state performance on torture: the two states with the best 
advocacy scores in 2016 are also the two states demonstrating the most improvement 
relation to torture.  EU accession creates an opportunity for change, but a sufficient 
level of civil society engagement is required in order to capitalise on this opportunity.   
 
Of the two states which failed to demonstrate progress, Romania and Macedonia, the 
issue is not the non-existence or incompetence of local civil society organisations.  In 
both cases, there are NGOs with the interest and capacity to carry out the necessary 
advocacy activities.  The problem is that the scope condition of access is not fulfilled.  
 280 
 
This is a key finding of the research.  Access is more important than choice of 
organisational positioning or strategy: the states with better levels of access, Bulgaria 
and Albania, have seen greater improvement, despite locating themselves differently 
on the insider v outsider spectrum, and a differing use of strategies such as litigation.  
Access here encompasses access to decision-makers, to frontline state agents, and to 
persons deprived of their liberty.    This is a more expansive understanding of access 
than used elsewhere, as includes access to victims and potential victims while they are 
still deprived of their liberty.
564
  An NGO which has been denied access to places of 
detention can still advocate for victims, for example, by taking legal action on behalf 
of victims who seek their support.  Access to places of detention puts the NGO in a 
stronger position, however: it has a better overview of what is happening on the 
ground; its reports have more credibility; it can make more tailored recommendations; 
it has a better and more nuanced grasp of the prevalence of abuse.  Many victims will 
not approach an NGO, for varied reasons including distrust, because they do not know 
their rights have been violated (expecting violence to occur in such settings), because 
of the stigmatisation of NGOs, out of fear of reprisals and/or a sense that little will be 
gained, or because they live far from the NGO base and there are logistical and 
financial hurdles.  An NGO that can survey the entire population of a prison, as the 
Bulgarian Helsinki Committee has been doing, has a much firmer evidence base for 
its assertions, and can develop a clearer sense of what the practical challenges are and 
what concrete actions need to be taken in order to address abuses.   
Beyond these practical points lies the phenomenon of norm patrol: through its regular 
visits to places where individuals are deprived of their liberty, the civil society actors 
                                                 
564 Access is often framed as access to decision-makers: see for example Jutta Joachim, ‘Framing 
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Quarterly  47 (2) 247-274; Jutta Joachim, Agenda Setting, the UN, and NGOs: Gender Violence and 
Reproductive Rights (Georgetown University Press 2007). 
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function as punctual reminders of the expectation that detainees’ rights will be 
respected.  NGO monitors can begin to build relationships with frontline staff and 
identify where problematic attitudes persist, but also where practical measures can 
encourage staff to act in appropriate ways (as seen in the Albania case study).  What 
might initially seem a remote high-level commitment, the signing of an international 
treaty, becomes ever more familiar as a local expectation, particularly where it is 
backed up by the threat of a local sanction.  It is not proposed that we become so 
reliant on the constructivist aspect (“This is what we do because this is the done 
thing”) that we abandon the realist faith in sanctions (“This is what we do because 
there are negative consequences if we don’t”). This applies both at the level of 
individual officials, such as police and prison officers, and also at the level of states – 
even the most ardent constructivist does not argue that a day will come when we can 
excuse states from the jurisdiction of supranational human rights courts, because they 
have so far internalised their human rights obligations that a violation has become 
unthinkable.  Ultimately, the debate over whether constructivist theories or rationalist 
theories carry more explanatory power leads to the conclusion that both matter, 
although the relative weight varies according to the individual state context.  Whether 
abuse happens or not is predicated on a complex web of decision-making, by 
individuals, institutions and states, and the strands are made up both of incentive-
based reasoning (rationalist) and ideation (constructivist).  With the exposure to 
expectations of compliance over time, the proportion of the latter motivation may 
increase compared to the former. 
 
This concept of norm patrol adds to the conventional portrayal of NGOs as norm 
creators and norm disseminators: it highlights the symbolic importance of activities 
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such as detention monitoring as well as its practical utility.  If international 
organisations are sometimes criticised for their short span of attention,
565
 the local 
organisations examined here have demonstrated their constancy over two decades, 
day after day and year after year reaffirming their expectations of state behaviour.  It 
is contended that this long-term process of reiteration by domestic actors is key to the 
socialisation of state actors.  A senior police officer may attend a daylong training 
seminar by an international organisation explaining the international law on torture, 
and may be motivated to bring about change within the police station under his 
command.  However, it is contended that real lasting change is more likely to occur 
when a local organisation visits that same police station year after year, reiterating the 
expectation of compliance, and flagging up all the instances where this expectation is 
not met.  It takes time to reach a critical mass of state actors.  Where NGOs are denied 
this access, such as residential institutions and closed centres for migrants in 
Romania, and more generally in Macedonia, their impact is much reduced.  As they 
have less insight into what is happening, their reporting is compromised, and the 
training they provide (if they are permitted the opportunity to offer any) is less well 
adapted to the situation on the ground. 
 
In the states where civil society had good access (Bulgaria and Albania), NGOs were 
able to carry out norm patrol, and states demonstrated both an improvement in their 
torture scores and met indicators for internalisation of the norm.  Where access was 
more problematic (Romania and Macedonia), civil society norm patrol was greatly 
reduced, and the indicators for internalisation of the norm were not met. 
 
                                                 
565 Philip Alston and Colin Gillespie, ‘Global Human Rights Monitoring, New Technologies, and the 
Politics of Information’ (2012) European Journal of International Law 23(4), 1089-1123, 1105. 
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The importance of transnational networks has often been lauded: international 
partnerships help with credibility, funding, and what Risse et al term the “boomerang 
effect”: advocating outwards beyond the boundaries of the state so that the advocacy 
is reflected back inwards.  What this research underlines is the indispensability of the 
local organisations: their long-term presence, the knowledge and expertise build up 
over decades, their actions, day in and day out, to patrol the norms and to make them 
of local relevance and importance.  International activism on its own is not enough. 
Local organisations have deep local knowledge, understanding local power structures, 
legal systems, media priorities.  With regards to detention monitoring, they can visit 
more places more often.   They are accessible to victims.  They speak the local 
language both literally and figuratively. They have the motivation; they are not going 
to be distracted by a media-friendly crisis on the other side of the world.   
 
The case studies have explored the difficulties faced by local organisations.  The 
practical obstacles should not be under-estimated, including their financial viability.   
In this regard, EU accession brings some challenges, at least in the short-term, for 
organisations.  Their traditional donors pull out, leaving them to negotiate new 
funding arrangements: as seen in Romania, the state can manipulate access to EU 
funding in an attempt to hamstring its critics.  
 
NGOs must often also contend with political hostility.  The case studies outline how 
NGOs and NGO staff have been subjected to attack, physical, financial and 
reputational.  Backlash manifests itself in accusations that such organisations are anti-
patriotic, agents of the demonized Soros.  Macedonia in particular experienced a 
dramatic closing of civil space in the years from 2008, although at the time of writing, 
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there is hope that this may be reversed after the transition of power in May 2017.   
Having found that civil society is crucial to realizing the opportunities of reform 
offered by the EU accession process, the conclusion is that the EU must considerably 
increase its efforts to counter the closing of civil space in the region.  As well as 
advocating for rights, it must demand respect for rights advocates.   
 
International human rights treaties matter, of course, but they are spades, not magic 
wands: tools that must be used, not magic artefacts that bring about change through 
their mere existence.  Ultimately, it is this steady, unshowy, long-term persistence of 
local activists, drawing on international instruments, mechanisms and partners, and 
exploiting moments of state vulnerability, that makes all the difference. 
 
Returning to the hypotheses set out in the Introduction, the evidence therefore 
supports all three: 
1. Where scope conditions are met, states with higher levels of civil society 
activism perform better on torture than states with lower levels of civil society 
activism. 
2. Access to decision-makers, state agents on the frontline, and individuals 
deprived of their liberty is an important additional scope condition for 
successful civil society activism in the area of torture and ill-treatment. 
3. Access enables civil society actors carry out “norm patrol”, which is an 
important pathway towards the socialisation of state actors. 
4. Examining alternative explanations 
 
Does civil society matter (1): is the prospect of EU accession itself sufficient to bring 
about state reform? 
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The differing trajectories of Bulgaria and Romania demonstrate that EU accession by 
itself does not bring about lasting state reform on torture in and of itself: it represents 
an opportunity for reform, but this opportunity needs to be exploited by a set of actors 
for whom genuine reform is a goal, and who will not be satisfied with apparent reform 
offered up as a signal of state respectability.  These actors are found within civil 
society.  Without effective NGO activism, the opportunity for reform offered by EU 
accession is missed.   
 
Civil society contributes much-needed expertise on the local context.  It identifies 
how abstract ideals need to be translated into concrete local practice.  Its monitoring 
and reporting activities identify where reforms claimed by states are merely window-
dressing, so the state is pushed to do more than otherwise would.  Given the fact that 
the EU does not carry out significant human rights reporting in its own right, and UN 
and regional human rights bodies rely on the input of local organisations, where these 
organisations did not exist, the state would find it easier to fob off EU institutions 
with unsubstantiated claims of reform, undermining the value of pre- and post-
accession monitoring mechanisms.  
 
The same point applies to post-accession conditionality.  Both Bulgaria and Romania 
were subject to conditionality requiring continuing reform in the area of justice and 
home affairs, although improved performance on torture did not feature strongly as a 
criterion. Dimitrova and Buzogany previously found that after accession, both 
Romania and Bulgaria remained sensitive to naming and shaming before EU 
institutions, and that NGOs could leverage this sensitivity to achieve more democratic 
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policy-making and implementation.
566
 They concluded that these efforts were more 
successful in   Bulgaria, where activists were more highly mobilised compared to 
Romania.
567
  Their findings, which relate to environmental activism, are replicated 
here: EU accession and post-accession conditionality represent opportunities to make 
the state do the right thing, but they do not mean that that the state will spontaneously 
start doing the right thing.  This moment of state vulnerability must be exploited by 
norm entrepreneurs with a clear vision of the change that is needed and the clout to 
bring its influence to bear. 
 
Does civil society matter (2): is the existence of an NPM sufficient to bring about 
state reform? 
The fact that the NPM was nominated by the state and has authority derived from an 
international treaty makes it harder for the state to dismiss its criticisms.  We have 
seen in previous chapters that the relationship between NGOs and NPM appears to 
function well in Bulgaria and Albania, while in Romania and Macedonia, the state 
pre-empts meaningful criticism by the NPM by compromising its independence (for 
Romania in particular) and depriving it of resources.  Given the association between 
effective NPMs and improved state performance, could progress have occurred due to 
the NPM alone, without NGO input?    
 
In Bulgaria and Albania, the evidence shows the NPMs have benefited from working 
with NGOs, from their technical expertise and the knowledge acquired over years of 
detention monitoring and analysis of local legal arrangements.   Organisations such as 
                                                 
566 Antoaneta Dimitrova and Aron Buzogany, ‘Post-Accession Policy-Making in Bulgaria and 
Romania: Can Non-state Actors Use EU Rules to Promote Better Governance?’ (2014) Journal of 
Common Market Studies  52(1), 139–156. 
567 Ibid 152-3. 
 287 
 
BHC and AHC have a much longer history than the local NPMs, and have been 
carrying out monitoring visits to more sites over a longer period.    It may be possible 
in a different country context to identify an NPM that has driven reform 
independently of civil society, but certainly in states where the NPM is relatively new 
and inexperienced and with restricted resources (the case in all states examined here), 
the NGO contribution is extremely important in enabling them to carry out their 
mandate.  There is an amplification effect where criticism emanates from more than 
one source: where concerns are expressed both by NGOs and the NPM, they reinforce 
one another. 
 
Does civil society matter (3): could state institutions drive reform by themselves? 
An important indicator of state internalisation of a norm is its institutionalisation.  It is 
conceivable that in mature democracies with well-established institutions, such 
institutions can correct state abuses by themselves.  With regard to US abuses in the 
context of the so-called “war on terror”, it has been argued that it was state institutions 
– first the courts, then the change of regime through the usual democratic process – 
that halted torture, rather than the campaigning of human rights organisations.
568
  
According to Sikkink, there was some protest in transnational networks and through 
domestic mobilisation against US torture in Abu Ghraib/Guantanamo Bay, but 
ultimately change happened “primarily because the domestic institutions of a liberal 
domestic state forced the government back into compliance with human rights”.569  
But at least where state institutions have limited capacity and lack independence, 
rigour and public trust, civil society is required to fill the gap.  Over time, as state 
                                                 
568 Kathryn Sikkink, ‘The United States and torture: does the spiral model work?’ in Thomas Risse, 
Stephen C. Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink (eds), The Persistent Power of Human Rights (Cambridge 
University Press 2013) 
569 Ibid 290. 
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socialisation occurs, NGOs may become, not perhaps redundant, but less essential as 
the state institutions genuinely take responsibility.  If this does happen, it does not 
imply that abuse will never happen, but it means that the state’s own investigation and 
response mechanisms should kick in so the state becomes self-correcting.  Even in 
relatively sophisticated democracies, however, state institutions will sometimes fail, 
and civil society still takes a watchdog role.  To take a UK example, while a death in 
custody will lead to a state-initiated inquest, NGOs such as Inquest continue to play a 
role in highlighting patterns and demanding specific reforms.   
 
Having considered these alternative explanations, it can be concluded that the 
hypotheses explored in this research retain persuasive explanatory power. 
 
 
5. Areas of possible future research 
 
Chapter two identified that, globally, there are a number of states with low openness 
to activism that still performed anomalously well in relation to torture.  It has been 
conjectured that this surprising outcome is due to low reporting, limited local human 
rights expertise, and/or to the fact that complete autocracies experience little threat to 
tenure so that political elites feel little need to resort to torture.  This last point is 
logical in terms of politically-motivated torture, but less so in relation to torture in the 
criminal justice sector.  Unthreatened autocrats may lack a strong incentive to 
intimidate political rivals, but why should they care about the rights of individuals 
caught up in the criminal justice system?  Many of the anomalous states have small 
populations, and it has also been theorized that smaller states may perform relatively 
better because they are more socially vulnerable, are less at risk of the principal/agent 
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control issue, may have fewer social cleavages, and that leaders may be more 
accessible to any activists that do operate.  There may be more scope for quiet 
diplomacy, which leaves less trace on the record compared to, say, multiple public 
reports about violations.  Further research could unpick which of these explanations 
carries most explanatory power within a specific context.  In such states, there is the 
opportunity to explore whether there is an alternative mechanism to civil society, or 
whether civil society manifests itself in subtle ways that are less easily identified. 
 
Returning to Europe, and in relation to the narrowing of civil space and its 
consequences, the Eastern Europe region offers fruitful opportunities for many further 
case studies.  An obvious follow-up to this current research is an inquiry into whether 
Macedonia successfully reverses its narrowing of civil space after the 2017 political 
transition, and whether this results in measurable improvements in the state’s 
performance on torture.  In the region more generally, has the narrowing of civil space 
in Hungary and Poland been matched with a decline in their performance on torture?  
Will the EU follow through with threats to invoke Article 7 of the Treaty on European 
Union (enforced suspension of EU membership) and what will the consequences be?  
Will Bulgaria succumb to contagion by its neighbours and reduce the scope for civil 
society activism, and if so, will its record on torture consequently become worse?  
Chapter five noted that in 2017 Bulgarian Helsinki Committee reported that 
government departments had refused to renew an agreement regarding the monitoring 
of psychiatric hospitals, children’s institutions and social care homes for adults with 
mental disabilities, a worrying sign that access is under threat.  The progress of each 
of the four states over the next few years will continue to throw light on the 
effectiveness of civil society under very particular political conditions. 
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6. Policy Implications 
 
 
Simmons has suggested that a “well-advised policy plan” is to focus on regional 
efforts to improve human rights, exploiting the multiplier effect by which states are 
likely to emulate their neighbours’ performance on rights.570  This advice is echoed 
here, with the added warning that backsliding in one state is also likely to be 
replicated by neighbours.   The stratagems of backlash in one state may be borrowed 
by another: see for example the reoccurrence of tactics such as hostile tax inspections, 
and the anti-Soros rhetoric featuring in Macedonia, Bulgaria and Romania as well as 
other countries in the region. 
 
Given this contagion effect, the narrowing of political space in one state is of course a 
concern both in relation to the state itself, but also in terms of the potential 
implications for other states in the region.  The EU can and must do much more to 
combat this challenge within its member states and candidate states.  It needs to take a 
firmer position on associational and organisational rights: the right to have rights.  In 
the interests of its own future survival, the EU needs to counter the charge of 
democratic deficit, and should therefore have a strong self-interest in insisting that 
states be open to dialogue with their own civil society.  It seems both an achievable 
and highly desirable position for the EU to take.   
 
                                                 
570
 Beth Simmons, Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics (Cambridge 
University Press 2009), 376. 
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With regard to EU candidate states, a state’s respect for its own civil society (a 
genuinely independent civil society, not GONGOs directed by the state) should be a 
condition of its accession, and remain part of any conditionality arrangements post-
accession.  The EU should also be mindful of the funding challenges for local NGOs 
at the time of accession.  It is not enough to make funding available to the state to 
pass on to civil society: the manner in which the funding is channelled must be 
carefully scrutinised to ensure the state does not exploit the opportunity to silence 
critical voices.  International donors can also play a role in this regard: rather than 
simply withdraw funding on the assumption that NGOs will be able to access EU 
funding, they should work with the recipients of their funding to ensure that they are 
well prepared for the transition, and their future sustainability is real rather than just 
apparent. 
 
Local organisations in states acceding to the EU should in turn scrutinise very 
carefully the national arrangements through which EU funding will be made 
available. They need to identify potential impediments such as requirements for 
unattainable levels of upfront investment by organisations out of their own funds as a 
precondition for seeking EU funding for a given project.  With regard to advocacy 
strategies, this research has found that there is not necessarily a single right way to do 
advocacy: local organisations are best placed to understand what strategies are 
feasible and likely to be effective in the local context.  However, in the spirit of 
positive regional contagion, organisations should share good practice across borders 
to see if there are particular strategies that can usefully be replicated.  For example, 
the Bulgarian Helsinki Committee’s illuminating annual survey of prisoners might 
usefully be implemented elsewhere. 
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Looking beyond the region, this research establishes that even where external 
incentives for reform are particularly compelling, domestic civil society remains 
central to embedding better human rights practices.  By extension, international 
donors cannot rely on external incentives such as aid conditionality to bring about 
reform in third countries: external incentives may create an opportunity for change, 
but a sufficient level of domestic civil society engagement will be required in order to 
capitalise on this opportunity.  International donors must emphasise the value of 
domestic civil society within the states they wish to reform. 
 
7. Human rights: a failure to matter where needed most?  
 
Despite the potentially propitious context of these four case studies, progress has been 
partial: while two of the states improved their record on torture, none of the four has 
achieved the best possible score on torture according to CIRI.  If change is slow and 
difficult even under favourable conditions, what hope then for the citizens of states 
where there is less leverage for reform?  Must we resign ourselves to the “failure of 
international human rights law to matter where needed most,” that is, in states 
committing the worst violations?
571
  What can be done in situations where scope 
conditions are not met? 
 
Chapter one noted the somewhat pessimistic views of Bueno de Mesquita et al 
regarding states where the scope conditions for reform are not (yet) met.  They 
observe that would-be international human rights reformers may have to wait for 
years until the conditions are ripe for a particular state to change; in the meantime, the 
                                                 
571 Emilie M. Hafner-Burton and K Tsutsui ,‘Justice Lost!  The Failure of Human Rights Law to Matter 
Where Needed Most’ (2007) Journal of Peace Research 407-425. 
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would-be reformers can support local activists and lobby internationally, but the 
authors suggest these efforts will yield little reward until the state reaches a sufficient 
level of democracy.
572
  The implication is that such situations are simply too hard, 
such that it is hardly worth bothering: the international reformer can realistically only 
come back later, when the state is ready. 
 
To many activists, this would be an oddly passive viewpoint.  Activism has a more 
dynamic relationship with democracy than is implied in this description.  Activists do 
not wait for the right scope conditions before they make any effort to bring about 
change: they “make the road by walking”.573  Democratic space is not granted by a 
state to a passive civil society as a gesture of largesse; it is actively claimed by an 
activist civil society, often in the face of state opposition.  The act of claiming rights, 
including the right not to be tortured, is in itself a claiming of the space to make those 
demands.  Achieving rights requires democracy, but the process of demanding rights 
contributes to the creation of democracy.  As Joachim observes, at the beginning of 
the agenda-setting process, NGOs have limited influence, and their resources may be 
inadequate in the face of structural obstacles.  Over time, however, their efforts alter 
the context, opening up new political opportunities.  Their framing of issues is 
fiercely resisted at the start, but over time gains acceptance and legitimacy.
574
  The 
rules of the game may work against them at the start, but NGOs help to change the 
rules of the game over the course of play.  As seen in Macedonia, even if NGO 
                                                 
572
 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, George W. Downs, Alastair Smith, ‘Thinking Inside the Box: A Closer 
Look at Democracy and Human Rights’ (2005) International Studies Quarterly 49, 439-457, at 456. 
573 The phrase is derived from a poem by Spanish poet Antonio Machado, and was used as a metaphor 
for the process of bringing about social change in Myles Horton and Paulo Freire, We Make the Road 
by Walking: Conversations on Education and Social Change (Temple University Press 1990). 
574 Jutta Joachim, ‘Framing Issues and Seizing Opportunities: the UN, NGOs, and Women’s Rights’ 
(2003) International Studies Quarterly 47(2) 247-274; Jutta Joachim, Agenda Setting, the UN, and 
NGOs: Gender Violence and Reproductive Rights (Georgetown University Press 2007). 
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criticism of state abuse does not change state behaviour in the short term, it helps 
frame expectations for the next set of political leaders. 
 
A riposte to Bueno de Mesquita et al on practical grounds is that local organisations, 
which feature strongly in this research for the sheer durability of their commitment, 
do not have the luxury of finding an easier state to work with.  Their aim is not to tick 
off easy wins, but to bring about genuine change where they are.  As Gorvin argues: 
 
To put forward solely easy-to-implement recommendations – low-hanging fruit – for 
the sake of being able to say that advocacy works is to trivialize the enterprise, and 
risks making the work of taking on the truly difficult human rights issues harder.575 
Bringing about human rights improvements is a long, slow struggle.  Acknowledging 
the obstacles is not a counsel of despair, but one of fortitude: nobody ever said human 
rights progress would be easy. 
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 Ian Gorvin, ‘Producing the Evidence that Human Rights Advocacy Works: First Steps towards 
Systemized Evaluation at Human Rights Watch’ (2009) Journal of Human Rights Practice 1(3) 477-
487 at 482. 
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Appendix One – Country Scores  
I. CSO SCORES ON ADVOCACY (USAID) COMPARED WITH STATE SCORES ON TORTURE (CIRI) 
 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 USAID 
total 
  USAID CIRI USAID CIRI USAID CIRI USAID CIRI USAID CIRI USAID CIRI USAID CIRI USAID CIRI USAID CIRI USAID CIRI USAID CIRI  
High 
CSO 
score 
Estonia 2.0 2 1.8 1 2.1 1 2.0 1 2.0 1 2.0 1 1.9 1 1.8 1 1.8 1 1.8 1 1.7 1 20.9 
Poland 2.0 0 2.0 1 2.2 2 1.9 1 1.9 1 1.8 1 1.8 1 2.0 1 1.9 1 1.8 1 1.8 1 21.1 
Lithuania 2.0 1 2.0 0 1.8 1 1.6 1 2.0 1 1.9 1 2.0 1 2.0 1 2.0 1 2.1 1 2.0 1 21.4 
Slovakia 1.5 0 1.5 1 1.6 1 1.6 0 2.2 1 2.3 2 2.4 1 2.5 1 2.6 1 2.6 1 2.5 1 23.3 
Czech Rep 2.0 1 1.8 2 1.8 2 2.0 1 2.2 1 2.2 1 2.4 1 2.4 1 2.4 1 2.3 1 2.2 2 23.7 
Latvia 3.0 1 2.2 0 2.0 1 2.0 1 2.0 0 2.0 1 2.0 1 2.0 1 2.3 1 2.2 1 2.2 1 23.9 
Bulgaria 3.0 0 3.0 0 2.5 0 2.5 0 2.5 0 2.5 1 2.4 0 2.4 0 2.6 1 2.6 1 2.6 1 28.6 
Med 
CSI 
score 
Croatia 2.5 1 3.0 1 3.0 2 3.0 1 3.4 1 3.5 1 3.4 2 3.2 2 3.2 2 3.2 2 3.1 1 34.5 
Ukraine 4.0 0 4.0 0 3.5 0 3.4 0 3.1 0 3.1 0 3.0 0 2.9 0 2.9 0 2.8 0 2.7 0 35.4 
Hungary 3.0 2 3.5 1 3.5 1 3.3 1 3.3 1 3.2 1 3.2 1 3.3 0 3.2 1 3.1 1 3.1 0 35.7 
Macedonia 4.5 1 4.0 0 3.6 0 3.3 1 3.1 1 3.1 0 3.0 0 3.0 0 3.1 1 3.2 1 3.3 1 37.2 
Albania 4.0 0 3.0 0 3.9 0 3.6 0 3.4 1 3.3 1 3.3 0 3.3 1 3.4 1 3.4 1 3.5 1 38.1 
Bosnia 4.5 NA 4.2 0 3.9 0 3.6 0 3.3 1 3.3 1 3.1 1 3.1 0 3.1 1 3.1 0 3.1 0 38.3 
Kyrgyzstan 3.5 1 3.0 1 3.3 1 3.8 1 4.0 1 3.8 1 3.6 0 3.6 0 3.6 1 3.5 1 3.3 0 39.0 
Romania 3.5 0 4.5 0 4.0 0 3.8 0 3.6 0 3.4 1 3.4 0 3.3 0 3.4 0 3.4 0 3.4 0 39.7 
Armenia 5.0 0 4.0 0 4.2 0 3.8 1 3.7 0 3.8 0 3.8 0 3.7 0 3.6 0 3.4 0 3.4 0 42.4 
Kazakhstan 4.5 0 4.3 0 4.0 0 3.6 0 3.6 0 3.8 0 3.8 0 3.7 0 3.8 0 3.8 0 3.9 0 42.8 
Low 
CSO 
score 
Georgia 2.0 1 4.0 0 4.3 0 4.0 0 3.7 0 4.0 0 4.1 0 4.2 0 4.4 1 4.4 1 4.3 0 43.4 
Moldova 5.0 0 4.2 1 4.2 1 4.1 0 4.0 0 3.9 0 3.9 0 3.8 0 3.7 0 3.7 0 3.6 0 44.1 
Russia 4.5 0 4.9 0 4.2 0 4.5 0 4.2 0 4.2 0 4.1 0 4.0 0 4.1 0 4.1 0 4.0 0 46.8 
Tajikistan 5.5 0 5.0 0 4.5 0 4.5 0 4.6 0 4.6 0 4.9 0 5.1 0 5.2 0 5.1 0 4.9 0 53.9 
Azerbaijan 5.5 0 5.0 1 5.0 0 4.8 0 4.8 0 5.1 0 5.1 0 4.9 0 4.8 0 4.6 0 4.6 0 54.2 
Uzbekistan 5.2 0 5.1 0 4.9 0 5.1 0 5.6 0 5.8 0 5.9 0 5.9 0 5.9 0 5.9 0 5.9 0 61.2 
Belarus 6.0 1 5.5 0 5.4 0 5.7 0 6.0 0 6.0 1 6.0 0 6.0 0 6.0 0 6.0 0 5.9 0 64.5 
Turkmenistan 6.3 0 6.3 1 6.1 0 6.1 0 6.1 0 6.1 0 6.1 0 6.1 0 6.1 0 6.1 0 6.0 0 67.4 
 
This table corresponds to Figure 2 on page 76.
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II. STATE OPENNESS TO ACTIVISM COMPARED WITH SCORE ON 
TORTURE CONTROLLING FOR CONFLICT  
 
Data on conflict is taken from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program.  The threshold for 
conflict is deemed to be at least 25 battle-related deaths per calendar year, across the 
categories of intrastate, interstate, one-sided and non-state conflict.  
 
States without conflict 
 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
 FH CIRI FH CIRI FH CIRI FH CIRI FH CIRI 
Finland 12 2 12 2 12 2 12 2 12 2 
Germany 12 2 12 2 12 2 12 2 12 2 
Iceland 12 2 12 2 12 2 12 2 12 2 
Kiribati 12 2 12 2 12 2 12 2 12 2 
Liechtenstein 12 2 12 2 12 2 12 2 12 2 
Luxembourg 12 2 12 2 12 2 12 2 12 2 
Monaco 12 2 12 2 12 2 12 2 12 2 
Netherlands 12 2 12 2 12 2 12 2 12 2 
St Kitts & 
Nevis 
12 2 12 2 12 2 12 2 12 2 
Tuvalu 12 2 12 2 12 2 12 2 12 2 
Croatia 12 2 12 2 12 2 12 2 12 1 
Malta 12 2 12 2 12 1 12 2 12 2 
Belgium 12 2 12 2 12 2 12 1 12 1 
Norway 12 2 12 2 12 1 12 2 12 1 
Uruguay 12 2 12 2 12 2 12 1 12 1 
San Marino 12 2 12 1 12 2 12 1 12 1 
Slovenia 12 1 12 1 12 2 12 2 12 1 
Austria 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 2 12 1 
Canada 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 2 12 1 
Chile 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 2 
Czech Rep 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 2 
Dominica 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 2 
Barbados 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 
Cyprus 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 
Estonia 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 
France 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 
Australia 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 
Bahamas 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 
Latvia 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 
Portugal 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 
Slovakia 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 
Sweden 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 
Switzerland 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 
UK 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 
Ireland 12 1 12 1 12 0 12 1 12 1 
Italy 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 0 12 1 
Hungary 12 1 12 0 12 1 12 1 12 0 
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Mauritius 12 0 12 0 12 0 12 1 12 1 
Spain 12 0 12 0 12 0 12 0 12 1 
South Africa 12 0 12 0 12 0 12 0 12 0 
St Lucia 12 0 12 0 12 0 12 0 12 0 
Denmark 12 2 12 2 12 2 12 1 11 2 
New Zealand 11 1 11 1 11 2 11 2 12 2 
South Korea 12 1 12 2 11 1 11 2 11 1 
Poland 12 1 11 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 
Namibia 12 0 12 1 12 1 11 1 12 1 
Benin 11 1 12 0 12 0 12 0 12 0 
 Andorra 11 2 11 2 11 2 11 2 11 2 
Nauru 11 2 11 2 11 2 11 2 11 2 
Palau 11 2 11 2 11 2 11 2 11 2 
Marshall 
Islands 
11 2 11 2 11 2 11 2 11 1 
Micronesia 11 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 11 2 
Vanuatu 11 2 11 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 
Cape Verde 11 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 
Costa Rica 11 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 
Lithuania 11 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 
Panama 11 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 
Suriname 11 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 
Trinidad & 
Tobago 
11 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 
Belize 11 0 11 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 
Serbia 11 0 11 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 
Argentina 11 1 11 1 11 1 11 0 11 0 
Bulgaria 11 0 11 0 11 1 11 1 11 1 
St Vincent & 
Grenadines 
11 1 11 1 11 1 11 0 11 0 
Dominican 
Republic 
11 0 11 0 11 0 11 0 11 0 
Ghana 11 0 11 0 11 0 11 0 11 0 
Greece 10 0 10 1 11 0 12 0 12 0 
Taiwan 11 2 11 2 11 2 10 2 10 2 
Bolivia 11 1 11 1 10 1 10 1 10 1 
USA 11 0 10 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 
Romania 10 0 11 0 11 0 11 0 11 0 
Ukraine 10 0 10 0 10 0 11 0 11 0 
Sao Tome & 
Principe 
10 1 10 2 10 2 10 2 10 2 
Samoa 10 2 10 1 10 2 10 1 10 1 
Japan 10 2 10 1 10 1 10 1 10 0 
Botswana 10 1 10 1 10 1 10 1 10 1 
Montenegro NA 0NA 10 0 10 1 10 1 10 1 
Brazil 10 0 10 0 10 0 10 0 10 0 
Ecuador 11 0 11 0 11 0 10 0 9 0 
Mongolia 10 0 10 0 10 0 9 0 11 0 
Grenada 9 1 9 1 9 1 10 1 10 1 
Solomon 
Islands 
9 2 9 2 9 2 9 2 9 2 
Seychelles 9 2 9 1 9 1 9 1 9 2 
Antigua & 9 1 9 1 9 1 9 1 9 1 
 298 
 
Barbuda 
Jamaica 9 1 9 1 9 1 9 1 9 1 
Papa New 
Guinea 
9 0 9 0 9 0 9 0 9 0 
El Salvador 10 0 9 0 8 0 8 0 8 0 
Burkina Faso 9 0 9 0 9 0 8 0 8 0 
Indonesia 8 0 9 0 9 0 9 0 9 0 
Guatemala 8 1 8 1 8 1 8 1 8 1 
Guinea-
Bissau 
8 1 8 1 8 1 8 1 8 1 
Sierra Leone 8 1 8 1 8 1 8 1 8 0 
Albania 8 0 8 1 8 1 8 1 8 1 
Malawi 8 0 8 0 8 0 8 1 8 1 
Paraguay 8 0 8 0 8 0 8 1 8 1 
Lesotho 8 1 8 1 7 1 7 1 7 1 
Liberia 7 1 7 1 8 1 8 1 8 1 
East Timor 8 1 7 0 7 1 7 1 7 1 
Congo-
Brazzaville 
8 0 7 0 7 0 7 2 8 1 
Bosnia-
Herzegovina 
8 1 8 0 8 1 7 0 7 0 
Zambia 8 0 8 0 8 0 8 0 7 0 
Macedonia 7 0 7 0 7 1 7 1 7 1 
Mozambique 7 1 7 0 7 1 7 1 7 0 
Tanzania 7 1 7 0 7 0 7 1 7 1 
Nicaragua 8 0 8 1 7 1 6 1 6 0 
Comoros 6 2 6 1 6 1 6 2 6 2 
Morocco 6 1 6 1 6 0 6 1 6 1 
Moldova 6 0 6 0 6 0 6 0 6 0 
Venezuela 7 0 7 0 6 0 6 0 5 0 
Gambia 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 5 1 
Kuwait 5 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 
Malaysia 6 1 6 1 5 1 6 1 6 1 
Cambodia 6 0 6 0 6 0 5 0 5 0 
Gabon 6 1 6 1 6 1 5 1 4 1 
Armenia 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 
Haiti 3 1 5 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 
Togo 3 0 5 0 6 0 6 0 6 0 
Bahrain 5 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 0 
Jordan 5 0 5 0 5 0 4 0 3 0 
Oman 4 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 
Singapore 4 1 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 
Cote d’Ivoire 3 0 4 0 4 0 4 0 4 0 
Kazakhstan 4 0 4 0 4 0 4 0 3 0 
Brunei 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 
Swaziland 3 1 3 1 3 0 3 0 3 0 
Azerbaijan 3 0 3 0 3 0 3 0 3 0 
Bhutan 2 2 2 2 3 1 3 1 3 1 
Cameroon 3 0 3 0 3 0 2 0 3 0 
Egypt 3 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 
Qatar 2 1 2 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Tunisia 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 
UAE 1 2 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 
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Vietnam 2 1 2 1 2 0 2 0 1 0 
Cuba 2 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Belarus 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
Saudi Arabia 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Equatorial 
Guinea 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Libya 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
North Korea 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Syria 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Turkmenistan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Uzbekistan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
This table corresponds to Figure 3 on page 79-80. 
 
 
States with conflict in one or more years  
 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
 FH CIRI FH CIRI FH CIRI FH CIRI FH CIRI 
Israel 11 0 12 0 12 0 12 0 11 0 
Guyana 10 1 10 1 10 1 10 1 10 1 
India 10 0 10 0 10 0 10 0 10 0 
Mali 9 1 9 1 9 1 9 1 10 1 
Mexico 10 0 10 0 9 0 8 0 8 0 
Senegal 9 1 10 1 10 1 10 1 10 0 
Peru 10 1 9 1 8 1 8 1 8 1 
Kenya 9 0 9 0 9 0 9 0 8 0 
Philippines 9 0 9 0 8 0 8 0 8 0 
Sri Lanka 9 0 9 0 8 0 8 0 7 0 
Niger 7 1 9 1 8 1 8 1 8 1 
Georgia 8 0 8 0 7 1 7 1 7 0 
Lebanon 7 0 8 0 8 0 8 0 8 0 
Madagascar 8 1 8 1 8 1 8 0 7 0 
Nigeria 7 0 7 0 8 0 8 0 8 0 
Honduras  9 1 8 1 8 1 7 0 6 0 
Bangladesh 8 0 8 0 6 0 8 0 8 0 
Turkey 7 0 7 0 7 0 7 0 7 0 
Algeria 6 0 6 0 6 1 6 1 6 1 
Angola 6 0 6 0 6 0 6 0 6 0 
Uganda 6 0 6 0 6 0 6 0 6 0 
Central 
African 
Rep 
9 0 9 0 6 0 6 0 5 0 
Kyrgyzstan 8 0 8 0 7 1 5 1 5 0 
Mauritania 6 1 8 0 8 0 5 0 5 0 
Thailand 8 1 5 0 5 0 6 0 6 0 
Colombia 7 0 7 0 6 0 5 1 5 1 
Burundi 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 
Djibouti 5 1 5 1 5 1 5 1 5 1 
Fiji 9 0 4 1 4 1 4 1 4 1 
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Pakistan 6 0 6 0 4 0 7 0 7 0 
Chad 6 1 5 1 4 0 4 0 4 0 
Russia 6 0 4 0 4 0 4 0 4 0 
Afghanistan 5 0 5 0 5 0 4 0 4 0 
Nepal 3 0 6 0 6 0 6 0 6 0 
Tajikistan 4 0 4 0 4 0 4 0 4 0 
DRC 5 0 5 0 5 0 4 0 3 0 
Iraq 5 0 3 0 3 0 3 0 4 0 
Rwanda 3 0 3 1 3 1 3 1 4 1 
Yemen 3 0 3 0 4 0 4 0 3 0 
Guinea 5 1 5 0 5 0 5 0 2 0 
China 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 3 0 
Ethiopia 3 0 3 0 3 0 3 0 2 0 
Iran 3 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 3 0 
Zimbabwe 3 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 3 0 
Sudan 1 0 3 0 3 0 3 0 2 0 
Laos 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Somalia 1 NA 0 NA 0 NA 0 NA 0 NA 
Burma 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Eritrea 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
This table corresponds to Figure 4 on page 82. 
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III. STATE OPENNESS TO ACTIVISM COMPARED WITH SCORE ON 
TORTURE CONTROLLING FOR DEMOCRACY 
 
To determine level of democracy, the Freedom House score for political rights is 
used.  States are assessed on the electoral process, political pluralism and 
participation, and functioning of government. The score is independent of the score 
for associational and organisational rights.  It is a 7-point scale, with the lowest scores 
representing the strongest democracies.  States have been divided into three 
categories: high democracy states (based on a Freedom House Political Rights score 
of 1); medium democracy states (score of 2-5) and low democracy states (score of 6-
7).
576
 
 
High Democracy states 
 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
 FH CIRI FH CIRI FH CIRI FH CIRI FH CIRI 
Finland 12 2 12 2 12 2 12 2 12 2 
Germany 12 2 12 2 12 2 12 2 12 2 
Iceland 12 2 12 2 12 2 12 2 12 2 
Kiribati 12 2 12 2 12 2 12 2 12 2 
Liechtenstein 12 2 12 2 12 2 12 2 12 2 
Luxembourg 12 2 12 2 12 2 12 2 12 2 
Netherlands 12 2 12 2 12 2 12 2 12 2 
St Kitts & 
Nevis 
12 2 12 2 12 2 12 2 12 2 
Tuvalu 12 2 12 2 12 2 12 2 12 2 
Malta 12 2 12 2 12 1 12 2 12 2 
Belgium 12 2 12 2 12 2 12 1 12 1 
Uruguay 12 2 12 2 12 2 12 1 12 1 
Norway 12 2 12 2 12 1 12 2 12 1 
San Marino 12 2 12 1 12 2 12 1 12 1 
Slovenia 12 1 12 1 12 2 12 2 12 1 
Canada 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 2 12 1 
Austria 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 2 12 1 
Chile 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 2 
Czech Rep 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 2 
Dominica 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 2 
Australia 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 
Bahamas 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 
Barbados 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 
Cyprus 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 
Estonia 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 
France 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 
                                                 
576
 Downloaded from https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-aggregate-and-subcategory-
scores (accessed 30 November 2016). 
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Portugal 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 
Slovakia 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 
Sweden 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 
Switzerland 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 
UK 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 
Ireland 12 1 12 1 12 0 12 1 12 1 
Italy 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 0 12 1 
Hungary 12 1 12 0 12 1 12 1 12 0 
Mauritius 12 0 12 0 12 0 12 1 12 1 
Spain 12 0 12 0 12 0 12 0 12 1 
St Lucia 12 0 12 0 12 0 12 0 12 0 
Denmark 12 2 12 2 12 2 12 1 11 2 
Poland 12 1 11 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 
Israel 11 0 12 0 12 0 12 0 11 0 
South Korea 12 1 12 2 11 1 11 2 11 1 
New Zealand 11 1 11 1 11 2 11 2 12 2 
Andorra 11 2 11 2 11 2 11 2 11 2 
Nauru 11 2 11 2 11 2 11 2 11 2 
Palau 11 2 11 2 11 2 11 2 11 2 
Marshall 
Islands 
11 2 11 2 11 2 11 2 11 1 
Micronesia 11 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 11 2 
Cape Verde 11 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 
Costa Rica 11 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 
Lithuania 11 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 
Panama 11 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 
Belize 11 0 11 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 
Ghana 11 0 11 0 11 0 11 0 11 0 
Greece 10 0 10 1 11 0 12 0 12 0 
USA 11 0 10 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 
Japan 10 2 10 1 10 1 10 1 10 0 
Grenada 9 1 9 1 9 1 10 1 10 1 
Bosnia-
Herzegovina 
8 1 8 0 8 1 7 0 7 0 
 
This table corresponds to Figure 5 on page 84. 
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Medium Democracy states 
 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
 FH CIRI FH CIRI FH CIRI FH CIRI FH CIRI 
Monaco 12 2 12 2 12 2 12 2 12 2 
Croatia 12 2 12 2 12 2 12 2 12 1 
Latvia 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 
South Africa 12 0 12 0 12 0 12 0 12 0 
Namibia 12 0 12 1 12 1 11 1 12 1 
Benin 11 1 12 0 12 0 12 0 12 0 
Vanuatu 11 2 11 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 
Suriname 11 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 
Trinidad & 
Tobago 
11 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 
Serbia 11 0 11 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 
Argentina 11 1 11 1 11 1 11 0 11 0 
Bulgaria 11 0 11 0 11 1 11 1 11 1 
St Vincent 
& 
Grenadines 
11 1 11 1 11 1 11 0 11 0 
Dominican 
Republic 
11 0 11 0 11 0 11 0 11 0 
Romania 10 0 11 0 11 0 11 0 11 0 
Taiwan 11 2 11 2 11 2 10 2 10 2 
Bolivia 11 1 11 1 10 1 10 1 10 1 
Ecuador 11 0 11 0 11 0 10 0 9 0 
Ukraine 10 0 10 0 10 0 11 0 11 0 
Sao Tome & 
Principe 
10 1 10 2 10 2 10 2 10 2 
Samoa 10 2 10 1 10 2 10 1 10 1 
Botswana 10 1 10 1 10 1 10 1 10 1 
Guyana 10 1 10 1 10 1 10 1 10 1 
Montenegro NA 0NA 10 0 10 1 10 1 10 1 
Brazil 10 0 10 0 10 0 10 0 10 0 
India 10 0 10 0 10 0 10 0 10 0 
Mongolia 10 0 10 0 10 0 9 0 11 0 
Senegal 9 1 10 1 10 1 10 1 10 0 
Mexico 10 0 10 0 9 0 8 0 8 0 
Seychelles 9 2 9 1 9 1 9 1 9 2 
Mali 9 1 9 1 9 1 9 1 10 1 
Peru 10 1 9 1 8 1 8 1 8 1 
El Salvador 10 0 9 0 8 0 8 0 8 0 
Solomon 
Islands 
9 2 9 2 9 2 9 2 9 2 
Antigua & 
Barbuda 
9 1 9 1 9 1 9 1 9 1 
Jamaica 9 1 9 1 9 1 9 1 9 1 
Papa New 
Guinea 
9 0 9 0 9 0 9 0 9 0 
Kenya 9 0 9 0 9 0 9 0 8 0 
Indonesia 8 0 9 0 9 0 9 0 9 0 
Philippines 9 0 9 0 8 0 8 0 8 0 
Sri Lanka 9 0 9 0 8 0 8 0 7 0 
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Honduras  9 1 8 1 8 1 7 0 6 0 
Paraguay 8 0 8 0 8 0 8 1 8 1 
Guatemala 8 1 8 1 8 1 8 1 8 1 
Guinea-
Bissau 
8 1 8 1 8 1 8 1 8 1 
Sierra Leone 8 1 8 1 8 1 8 1 8 0 
Albania 8 0 8 1 8 1 8 1 8 1 
Malawi 8 0 8 0 8 0 8 1 8 1 
Lesotho 8 1 8 1 7 1 7 1 7 1 
Liberia 7 1 7 1 8 1 8 1 8 1 
Georgia 8 0 8 0 7 1 7 1 7 0 
Nicaragua 8 0 8 1 7 1 6 1 6 0 
East Timor 8 1 7 0 7 1 7 1 7 1 
Zambia 8 0 8 0 8 0 8 0 7 0 
Tanzania 7 1 7 0 7 0 7 1 7 1 
Macedonia 7 0 7 0 7 1 7 1 7 1 
Mozambique 7 1 7 0 7 1 7 1 7 0 
Turkey 7 0 7 0 7 0 7 0 7 0 
Colombia 7 0 7 0 6 0 5 1 5 1 
Comoros 6 2 6 1 6 1 6 2 6 2 
Moldova 6 0 6 0 6 0 6 0 6 0 
Kuwait 5 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 
Malaysia 6 1 6 1 5 1 6 1 6 1 
Burundi 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 
 
This table corresponds to Figure 6 on page 84. 
 
 
Low Democracy states 
 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
 FH CIRI FH CIRI FH CIRI FH CIRI FH CIRI 
Burkina Faso 9 0 9 0 9 0 8 0 8 0 
Madagascar 8 1 8 1 8 1 8 0 7 0 
Nigeria 7 0 7 0 8 0 8 0 8 0 
Lebanon 7 0 8 0 8 0 8 0 8 0 
Central 
African Rep 
9 0 9 0 6 0 6 0 5 0 
Niger 7 1 9 1 8 1 8 1 8 1 
Bangladesh 8 0 8 0 6 0 8 0 8 0 
Congo-
Brazzaville 
8 0 7 0 7 0 7 2 8 1 
Kyrgyzstan 8 0 8 0 7 1 5 1 5 0 
Mauritania 6 1 8 0 8 0 5 0 5 0 
Gambia 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 5 1 
Morocco 6 1 6 1 6 0 6 1 6 1 
Algeria 6 0 6 0 6 1 6 1 6 1 
Venezuela 7 0 7 0 6 0 6 0 5 0 
Angola 6 0 6 0 6 0 6 0 6 0 
Uganda 6 0 6 0 6 0 6 0 6 0 
Pakistan 6 0 6 0 4 0 7 0 7 0 
Thailand 8 1 5 0 5 0 6 0 6 0 
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Gabon 6 1 6 1 6 1 5 1 4 1 
Haiti 3 1 5 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 
Cambodia 6 0 6 0 6 0 5 0 5 0 
Nepal 3 0 6 0 6 0 6 0 6 0 
Togo 3 0 5 0 6 0 6 0 6 0 
Djibouti 5 1 5 1 5 1 5 1 5 1 
Armenia 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 
Guinea 5 1 5 0 5 0 5 0 2 0 
Fiji 9 0 4 1 4 1 4 1 4 1 
Afghanistan 5 0 5 0 5 0 4 0 4 0 
Jordan 5 0 5 0 5 0 4 0 3 0 
Chad 6 1 5 1 4 0 4 0 4 0 
Russia 6 0 4 0 4 0 4 0 4 0 
Tajikistan 4 0 4 0 4 0 4 0 4 0 
Cote d’Ivoire 3 0 4 0 4 0 4 0 4 0 
Kazakhstan 4 0 4 0 4 0 4 0 3 0 
Bahrain 5 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 0 
Oman 4 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 
Singapore 4 1 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 
Brunei 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 
Swaziland 3 1 3 1 3 0 3 0 3 0 
Azerbaijan 3 0 3 0 3 0 3 0 3 0 
Cameroon 3 0 3 0 3 0 2 0 3 0 
Zimbabwe 3 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 3 0 
Ethiopia 3 0 3 0 3 0 3 0 2 0 
Bhutan 2 2 2 2 3 1 3 1 3 1 
Iraq 5 0 3 0 3 0 3 0 4 0 
Rwanda 3 0 3 1 3 1 3 1 4 1 
Yemen 3 0 3 0 4 0 4 0 3 0 
UAE 1 2 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 
Iran 3 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 3 0 
China 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 3 0 
Egypt 3 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 
Qatar 2 1 2 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Tunisia 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 
Cuba 2 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Sudan 1 0 3 0 3 0 3 0 2 0 
Vietnam 2 1 2 1 2 0 2 0 1 0 
Laos 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Saudi Arabia 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Belarus 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
Burma 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Equatorial 
Guinea 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Eritrea 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Libya 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
North Korea 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Syria 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Turkmenistan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Uzbekistan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
This table corresponds to Figure 7 on page 84. 
 
 306 
 
IV. STATE OPENNESS TO ACTIVISM COMPARED WITH SCORE ON 
TORTURE CONTROLLING FOR POPULATION SIZE 
 
 
Small populations 
 
FH = Freedom House score on associational rights (0-12, with the higher score 
representing the higher level of openness to activism)  
CIRI = Conrad and Moore torture dataset (0-2, with the higher score representing the 
better performance on torture). 
 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
 FH CIRI FH CIRI FH CIRI FH CIRI FH CIRI 
Kiribati 12 2 12 2 12 2 12 2 12 2 
Iceland 12 2 12 2 12 2 12 2 12 2 
Luxembourg 12 2 12 2 12 2 12 2 12 2 
St Kitts & 
Nevis 
12 2 12 2 12 2 12 2 12 2 
Tuvalu 12 2 12 2 12 2 12 2 12 2 
Monaco 12 2 12 2 12 2 12 2 12 2 
Malta 12 2 12 2 12 1 12 2 12 2 
San Marino 12 2 12 1 12 2 12 1 12 1 
Dominica 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 2 
Barbados 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 
Bahamas 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 
Cyprus 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 
Estonia 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 
St Lucia 12 0 12 0 12 0 12 0 12 0 
Mauritius 12 0 12 0 12 0 12 1 12 1 
Andorra 11 2 11 2 11 2 11 2 11 2 
Nauru 11 2 11 2 11 2 11 2 11 2 
Palau 11 2 11 2 11 2 11 2 11 2 
Marshall 
Islands 
11 2 11 2 11 2 11 2 11 1 
Micronesia 11 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 11 2 
Trinidad & 
Tobago 
11 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 
Vanuatu 11 2 11 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 
Cape Verde 11 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 
Suriname 11 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 
St Vincent 
& 
Grenadines 
11 1 11 1 11 1 11 0 11 0 
Belize 11 0 11 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 
Sao Tome & 
Principe 
10 1 10 2 10 2 10 2 10 2 
Samoa 10 2 10 1 10 2 10 1 10 1 
Guyana 10 1 10 1 10 1 10 1 10 1 
Grenada 9 1 9 1 9 1 10 1 10 1 
Solomon 
Islands 
9 2 9 2 9 2 9 2 9 2 
Antigua & 9 1 9 1 9 1 9 1 9 1 
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Barbuda 
Seychelles 9 2 9 1 9 1 9 1 9 2 
Guinea-
Bissau 
8 1 8 1 8 1 8 1 8 1 
Lesotho 8 1 8 1 7 1 7 1 7 1 
East Timor 8 1 7 0 7 1 7 1 7 1 
Comoros 6 2 6 1 6 1 6 2 6 2 
Gambia 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 5 1 
Gabon 6 1 6 1 6 1 5 1 4 1 
Djibouti 5 1 5 1 5 1 5 1 5 1 
Fiji 9 0 4 1 4 1 4 1 4 1 
Bahrain 5 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 0 
Brunei 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 
Swaziland 3 1 3 1 3 0 3 0 3 0 
Bhutan 2 2 2 2 3 1 3 1 3 1 
Qatar 2 1 2 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Equatorial 
Guinea 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
This table corresponds to Figure 8 on page 88. 
 
 
 
Medium populations 
 
 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
 FH CIRI FH CIRI FH CIRI FH CIRI FH CIRI 
Finland 12 2 12 2 12 2 12 2 12 2 
Netherlands 12 2 12 2 12 2 12 2 12 2 
Croatia 12 2 12 2 12 2 12 2 12 1 
Uruguay 12 2 12 2 12 2 12 1 12 1 
Belgium 12 2 12 2 12 2 12 1 12 1 
Norway 12 2 12 2 12 1 12 2 12 1 
Slovenia 12 1 12 1 12 2 12 2 12 1 
Chile 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 2 
Czech Rep 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 2 
Austria 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 2 12 1 
Costa Rica 11 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 
Latvia 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 
Lithuania 11 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 
Panama 11 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 
Portugal 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 
Slovakia 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 
Sweden 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 
Switzerland 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 
Ireland 12 1 12 1 12 0 12 1 12 1 
Hungary 12 1 12 0 12 1 12 1 12 0 
Denmark 12 2 12 2 12 2 12 1 11 2 
Namibia 12 0 12 1 12 1 11 1 12 1 
Benin 11 1 12 0 12 0 12 0 12 0 
Israel 11 0 12 0 12 0 12 0 11 0 
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New Zealand 11 1 11 1 11 2 11 2 12 2 
Serbia 11 0 11 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 
Bulgaria 11 0 11 0 11 1 11 1 11 1 
Greece 10 0 10 1 11 0 12 0 12 0 
Dominican 
Republic 
11 0 11 0 11 0 11 0 11 0 
Romania 10 0 11 0 11 0 11 0 11 0 
Ecuador 11 0 11 0 11 0 10 0 9 0 
Bolivia 11 1 11 1 10 1 10 1 10 1 
Botswana 10 1 10 1 10 1 10 1 10 1 
Mongolia 10 0 10 0 10 0 9 0 11 0 
Senegal 9 1 10 1 10 1 10 1 10 0 
Mali 9 1 9 1 9 1 9 1 10 1 
Jamaica 9 1 9 1 9 1 9 1 9 1 
Papa New 
Guinea 
9 0 9 0 9 0 9 0 9 0 
Burkina Faso 9 0 9 0 9 0 8 0 8 0 
El Salvador 10 0 9 0 8 0 8 0 8 0 
Sri Lanka 9 0 9 0 8 0 8 0 7 0 
Guatemala 8 1 8 1 8 1 8 1 8 1 
Sierra Leone 8 1 8 1 8 1 8 1 8 0 
Niger 7 1 9 1 8 1 8 1 8 1 
Albania 8 0 8 1 8 1 8 1 8 1 
Paraguay 8 0 8 0 8 0 8 1 8 1 
Malawi 8 0 8 0 8 0 8 1 8 1 
Zambia 8 0 8 0 8 0 8 0 7 0 
Lebanon 7 0 8 0 8 0 8 0 8 0 
Madagascar 8 1 8 1 8 1 8 0 7 0 
Honduras  9 1 8 1 8 1 7 0 6 0 
Liberia 7 1 7 1 8 1 8 1 8 1 
Congo-
Brazzaville 
8 0 7 0 7 0 7 2 8 1 
Georgia 8 0 8 0 7 1 7 1 7 0 
Bosnia-
Herzegovina 
8 1 8 0 8 1 7 0 7 0 
Nicaragua 8 0 8 1 7 1 6 1 6 0 
Central 
African Rep 
9 0 9 0 6 0 6 0 5 0 
Macedonia 7 0 7 0 7 1 7 1 7 1 
Kyrgyzstan 8 0 8 0 7 1 5 1 5 0 
Mauritania 6 1 8 0 8 0 5 0 5 0 
Angola 6 0 6 0 6 0 6 0 6 0 
Moldova 6 0 6 0 6 0 6 0 6 0 
Kuwait 5 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 
Cambodia 6 0 6 0 6 0 5 0 5 0 
Chad 6 1 5 1 4 0 4 0 4 0 
Haiti 3 1 5 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 
Togo 3 0 5 0 6 0 6 0 6 0 
Burundi 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 
Armenia 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 
Guinea 5 1 5 0 5 0 5 0 2 0 
Jordan 5 0 5 0 5 0 4 0 3 0 
Tajikistan 4 0 4 0 4 0 4 0 4 0 
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Cote d’Ivoire 3 0 4 0 4 0 4 0 4 0 
Kazakhstan 4 0 4 0 4 0 4 0 3 0 
Oman 4 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 
Singapore 4 1 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 
Rwanda 3 0 3 1 3 1 3 1 4 1 
Azerbaijan 3 0 3 0 3 0 3 0 3 0 
Cameroon 3 0 3 0 3 0 2 0 3 0 
UAE 1 2 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 
Zimbabwe 3 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 3 0 
Tunisia 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 
Cuba 2 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Laos 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Belarus 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
Eritrea 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Libya 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Syria 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Turkmenistan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
This table corresponds to Figure 9 on page 88. 
 
 
 
Large populations 
 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
 FH CIRI FH CIRI FH CIRI FH CIRI FH CIRI 
Germany 12 2 12 2 12 2 12 2 12 2 
Canada 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 2 12 1 
France 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 
UK 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 
Australia 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 
Italy 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 0 12 1 
Spain 12 0 12 0 12 0 12 0 12 1 
South Africa 12 0 12 0 12 0 12 0 12 0 
Poland 12 1 11 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 
South Korea 12 1 12 2 11 1 11 2 11 1 
Argentina 11 1 11 1 11 1 11 0 11 0 
Ghana 11 0 11 0 11 0 11 0 11 0 
USA 11 0 10 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 
Taiwan 11 2 11 2 11 2 10 2 10 2 
Japan 10 2 10 1 10 1 10 1 10 0 
India 10 0 10 0 10 0 10 0 10 0 
Brazil 10 0 10 0 10 0 10 0 10 0 
Mexico 10 0 10 0 9 0 8 0 8 0 
Indonesia 8 0 9 0 9 0 9 0 9 0 
Kenya 9 0 9 0 9 0 9 0 8 0 
Peru 10 1 9 1 8 1 8 1 8 1 
Philippines 9 0 9 0 8 0 8 0 8 0 
Nigeria 7 0 7 0 8 0 8 0 8 0 
Bangladesh 8 0 8 0 6 0 8 0 8 0 
Mozambique 7 1 7 0 7 1 7 1 7 0 
Tanzania 7 1 7 0 7 0 7 1 7 1 
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Turkey 7 0 7 0 7 0 7 0 7 0 
Thailand 8 1 5 0 5 0 6 0 6 0 
Colombia 7 0 7 0 6 0 5 1 5 1 
Morocco 6 1 6 1 6 0 6 1 6 1 
Algeria 6 0 6 0 6 1 6 1 6 1 
Venezuela 7 0 7 0 6 0 6 0 5 0 
Pakistan 6 0 6 0 4 0 7 0 7 0 
Uganda 6 0 6 0 6 0 6 0 6 0 
Malaysia 6 1 6 1 5 1 6 1 6 1 
Nepal 3 0 6 0 6 0 6 0 6 0 
Afghanistan 5 0 5 0 5 0 4 0 4 0 
Russia 6 0 4 0 4 0 4 0 4 0 
DRC 5 0 5 0 5 0 4 0 3 0 
Iraq 5 0 3 0 3 0 3 0 4 0 
Yemen 3 0 3 0 4 0 4 0 3 0 
Ethiopia 3 0 3 0 3 0 3 0 2 0 
Iran 3 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 3 0 
Sudan 1 0 3 0 3 0 3 0 2 0 
Egypt 3 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 
China 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 3 0 
Vietnam 2 1 2 1 2 0 2 0 1 0 
Saudi Arabia 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Uzbekistan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
North Korea 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
 
This table corresponds to Figure 10 on page 88. 
 
III. Trends 2006-2010 
 
 
Average scores – States without conflict 
 CIRI FH 
2006 0.886 8.695 
2007 0.845 8.563 
2008 0.873 8.704 
2009 0.908 8.662 
2010 0.866 8.641 
 
Average scores – States with conflict 
 CIRI FH 
2006 0.271 6.188 
2007 0.25 5.75 
2008 0.292 5.771 
2009 0.271 5.688 
2010 0.208 5.542 
 
These two tables correspond to Figure 11 on page 95. 
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Average scores – high democracy states 
 CIRI FH 
2006 1.211 11.614 
2007 1.246 11.649 
2008 1.246 11.632 
2009 1.246 11.684 
2010 1.228 11.667 
 
Average scores – medium democracy states 
 CIRI FH 
2006 0.6719 9.141 
2007 0.6 9.169 
2008 0.7231 9.015 
2009 0.7231 8.908 
2010 0.6308 8.892 
 
Average scores – low democracy states 
 CIRI FH 
2006 0.388 4.09 
2007 0.343 4.075 
2008 0.328 3.851 
2009 0.343 3.791 
2010 0.313 3.687 
 
These three tables correspond to Figure 12 on page 96. 
 
 
Average scores – countries with small populations 
 
 CIRI FH 
2006 1.298 9.319 
2007 1.213 9.149 
2008 1.255 9.149 
2009 1.255 9.149 
2010 1.277 9.106 
 
Average scores – countries with medium populations 
 
 CIRI FH 
2006 0.573 7.787 
2007 0.607 7.888 
2008 0.652 7.809 
2009 0.663 7.663 
2010 0.573 7.618 
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Average scores – countries with large populations 
 
 CIRI FH 
2006 0.42 7.38 
2007 0.38 7.26 
2008 0.36 7.12 
2009 0.34 7.16 
2010 0.38 7.08 
 
 
These three tables correspond to Figure 13 on page 97. 
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